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ABSTRACT
Public-private partnership (P3) procurement has grown into an
internationally acclaimed means of achieving value for money while procuring
public infrastructure projects. Unlike conventional infrastructure procurement
models, P3s transfer a considerable amount of project risk away from the public
sector to the private sector. During a long, methodical procurement phase, public
and private partners reach a final risk allocation agreement over forecasted risks
regarding a project’s potential design, build, finance, operation, and maintenance.
This thesis begins with exploring the P3 procurement phase, highlighting
relevant project actors and stages leading up to the signing of a final contract. The
concepts of risk and project risk management are studied under the assumption that
P3 project partners operate under a principal-agent relationship, where public
authorities are tasked with aligning private partner motivations with their own
motivations through contractual incentives.
A core literature database provides 54 identified P3 project risks along with
their suggested sectorial allocations. Exactly half – 27 – of these risks are deemed
contentious because they are not unanimously allocated to a given sector within
the database. These 27 contentious P3 project risks were subjected to an expert
questionnaire asking Canadian practitioners to allocate them to a preferred sector
based on a five-point semantic differential scale. The respondent pool was equally
comprised of public and private sector practitioners from an array of specialized
occupations relevant to P3 project risk management.
Expert input was subjected to various quantitative methods that measured:
(i) levels of agreement within sectors over risk allocation preferences, (ii) levels of
agreement between sectors over risk allocation preferences, and (iii) overall risk
allocation preferences based on the five-point semantic differential scale. It is
found that: (i) both sectors enjoy strong levels of agreement over risk allocation
preferences, (ii) 6 of 27 risks show statistically significant levels of disagreement
between sectors over their allocation preferences, and (iii) there are risks that
should generally be borne by either the public or private sector pending individual
P3 project circumstances.
The research findings should enable scholars and practitioners alike to
establish more concrete conceptions of where P3 project risks should generally be
allocated pending circumstantial conditions unique to different P3 projects. Where
risks cannot be broadly allocated due to circumstantial conditions, a review of the
study’s final risk allocation model provides contextual considerations that
influence their allocation. Concluding sections acknowledge this study’s
methodological and theoretical limitations. Recommendations for future studies to
consider, both methodological and theoretical, are provided.
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CHAPTER 1
A NATIONAL CONTEXT FOR P3s
1.1 Introduction
Public-Private Partnerships (P3s) are rapidly emerging as a predominant form of
public infrastructure procurement in Canada in lieu of conventional methods due to their
capacity for accessing alternative financing sources and transferring multiple project risks
away from the public sector. The emergence of P3s in Canada originates from the public
sector’s “new public management” (NPM) approach to governance in response to
globalization pressures and increasing levels of both infrastructural necessities and public
debt.1 Under NPM, P3s are used to procure public infrastructure more efficiently by
drawing private actor investment and involvement into the public sphere.
On an international level, governments are globally embracing P3s as a means to
procure new infrastructure – and services – to address an “infrastructure deficit.”2 The
European Union (EU), World Bank, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) have all developed regulations, guidelines, and promotional
campaigns for the global use of P3s,3 while the European Commission (EC) publicly

1

Darrin Grimsey and Mervyn Lewis, Public Private Partnerships: The Worldwide Revolution in
Infrastructure Provision and Project Finance (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007).; Biljana Rakić
and Tamara Rađenović, “Public-Private Partnerships as an Instrument of New Public
Management,” Facta Universitatis-Series: Economics and Organization 8, no. 2 (2011): 207–20,
http://scindeks.ceon.rs/article.aspx?artid=0354-46991102207R.
2
Anthony E Boardman, Matti Siemiatycki, and Aidan R Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in
Canada and Elsewhere” 9, no. 12 (2016), 1.; Eoin Reeves, “Public—Private Partnerships in
Ireland: Policy and Practice,” Public Money & Management 23, no. 3 (July 1, 2003): 163,
doi:10.1111/1467-9302.00364.; Geethanjali Nataraj, Infrastructure Challenges in South Asia: The
Role of Public-Private Partnerships, ADB Institute Discussion Papers, vol. 80, 2007, 5.
http://www.adbi.org/discussion-paper/2007/09/27/2364.infrastructure.challenges.south.asia/.
3
European Commission, “Guidelines for Successful Public Private Partnerships,” DG Regional
Policy Http://ec. Europa. Eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/guides/ppp_en. Pdf (Brussels:
1

termed the “Investment Plan for Europe” – a monolithic investment program premised on
procuring public infrastructure through large-scale financing from the private sector4 – its
number one initiative in the EC’s new “roadmap for getting Europe back to work, based
on clear priorities… to boost [its] economy.”5 In North America alone, cumulative P3
investments reached over 200 billion dollars in either planned or realized monies by
2010.6 In the United States, the Obama administration heavily considered policies to
attract private financing and investment of large infrastructure projects.7
North of the American border, Canadian governments have embraced P3s even
more than their neighbouring state; scholars note that “there has been much more P3
activity in Canada than in the USA.”8 The 2011 Canadian federal budget introduced
measures to ensure the national use of P3 projects increased, making it mandatory for
government departments and agencies to assess and evaluate the feasibility of procuring
large pieces of public infrastructure – or megaprojects – through P3 contracts:

European Union, 2003); Banco Asiático de Desarrollo, Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento, and
others, “Public Private Partnerships Reference Guide Version 2.0” (Washington, D.C.: World
Bank, 2014); OECD, “Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Public Governance of
Public-Private Partnerships,” Oecd (Paris: OECD, 2012),
https://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/PPP-Recommendation.pdf.
4
European Commission, “European Commission Investment Plan,” 2015, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0012&from=EN.
5
European Commission, “A New Start: European Commission Work Plan to Deliver Jobs,
Growth and Investment” (Strasbourg, 2015), par. 4. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-156308_en.htm.
6
In American dollars. See Public Works Financing, “Public Works Financing Major Project
Database” (Peterborough, NH, 2016), http://pwfinance.net/projects-database/.
7
White House Press Secretary Office, “Increasing Investment in U.S. Roads, Ports and Drinking
Water Systems through Innovative Financing,” 2015, http://www.nawc.org/uploads/documentsand-publications/documents/2015 BUILD AMERICAN INVESTMENT THROUGH
INNOVATIVE FINANCING FACT SHEET.pdf.
8
Anthony E. Boardman and Aidan R. Vining, “P3s in North America: Renting the Money (in
Canada), Selling the Roads (in the USA),” in International Handbook on Public-Private
Partnerships, ed. Graeme A. Hodge, Carsten Greve, and Anthony E. Boardman (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 355.
2

Going forward, federal departments and agencies will be required to
evaluate the potential for using a P3 for large federal capital projects. All
infrastructure projects creating an asset with a lifespan of at least 20 years
and having a capital cost of $100 million or more will be subjected to a P3
Screen to determine whether a P3 may be a suitable procurement option.
Should the assessment conclude that there is P3 potential, the procuring
department will be required to develop a P3 proposal among possible
procurement options.9
Canada now boasts what is widely considered to be one of the most successful
state models of P3s in the world.10 At the end of 2016, a total of 247 P3 projects have
been either approved for commission, under construction, or completed in Canada11
across multiple public sectors12 resulting in an estimated capital value of over 116 billion
dollars. 13 As a global leader in P3 infrastructure procurement, Canadian federal,

9

Department of Finance Canada, “Budget 2011, The Next Phase of Canada’s Economic Plan: A
Low-Tax Plan for Jobs and Growth,” 2011, http://www.budget.gc.ca/march-mars2011/plan/chap4a-eng.html., 102.
10
Mark Hellowell, “Public-Private Partnerships: What the World Can Learn from Canada” (The
Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships, 2014.), http://www.constructcanada.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/canada_p3_white_paper_swg.pdf.
11
I.e. from initial stages done post-project approval and pre-project construction – such as request
for qualifications, request for proposals, or commercial close – to stages done post-project
construction, such as the operations and maintenance phases of a P3 facility or complete
expiration of the P3 contract entirely. See The Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships,
“Canadian PPP Project Database” (Toronto: CCPPP, 2016),
http://projects.pppcouncil.ca/ccppp/src/public/search-project.
12
I.e. Transportation, health, energy, justice, education, accommodations, recreation, water
treatment, and information technology. Supra note 9.
13
In Canadian dollars. See Stephen Thorne, “The World Learns About P3s from Canada”
(Toronto: The Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships, 2016),
http://www.pppcouncil.ca/web/News_Media/2016/The_World_Learns_About_P3s_from_Canada
.aspx.
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provincial, and municipal governments are highly committed to incorporating private
investment in their infrastructure projects, especially in the transportation sector.14
1.2 Defining Optimal Risk Allocation
P3 megaprojects are having a profound influence on Canada’s infrastructural
landscape, albeit the large majority of P3 projects in Canada are contracted primarily
through provincial governments and in primarily urban areas.15 As P3s continue to grow
in national popularity, the need for a clear and cohesive dialogue between Canadian
practitioners, from both public and private sectors, increases. One of the main factors
considered in structuring P3s is risk allocation and transfer.
More specifically, the success of P3s is dependent on agreement between project
actors over which parties will bear potential benefits or losses incurred from risks that
may arise over a project’s timeline. Factors like costs associated with mitigating a risk,
the likelihood of a risk’s occurrence, and a risk’s potential severity to a project all play
pivotal roles in deciding which parties should bear which risks, and how much they
should be compensated for bearing them.
All notable project risks have the potential to directly affect a project and/or its
actors adversely in two general ways: (i) a project’s provision of responsibilities16 or (ii) a
project’s financial capacity.17 Since P3 advocates characterize the procurement process as
an innovative way to meet service-based and finance-based objectives, mitigating risks
14

Charles Lammam, Hugh MacIntyre, and Joseph Berechman, “Using Public-Private
Partnerships to Improve Transportation Infrastructure in Canada,” no. May (2013): 1–78,
papers3://publication/uuid/35113246-01FE-4BB2-8E7E-41064EFAA36D.
15
Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere,” 1.
16
For example, when a facility’s construction is behind schedule.
17
For example, when a facility’s construction incurs unanticipated cost overruns.
4

that affect project responsibilities and financing is crucial. Where P3s deliver public
services efficiently and economically, they create value for money (VFM), which is
broadly defined as “the optimum combination of lifecycle costs and quality to meet user
requirements.”18
VFM will be elaborated on in the next chapter. For now, it is important to know
that P3s are premised on obtaining VFM, and – of the factors that influence a P3’s VFM
– the allocation of project risk is one of the most critical. Risk transfer is “at the heart” of
P3 procurement.19 Indeed, the “core of a P[3] arrangement… is the transfer of appropriate
risks from the public to the private partner.”20 The comprehensiveness with which risk is
treated in P3 projects separates this highly innovative infrastructure procurement model
from conventional procurement models. P3 contracts tend to be much more complex than
conventional public-private contracts, as risk transfer and risk management are integral
contractual components to the design, build, finance, operation, and management
(DBFOM) of P3-procured public infrastructure.
While Chapter 2 explicates the major players and steps involved in P3
procurement processes, a general conception of risk allocation can be portrayed here.
Risk transfer occurs on many levels in P3s. First, there is a primary transfer of risk from
the public sector to the private sector – i.e. the P3 contract – followed by a secondary
18

A Roumboutsos et al., “Risks and Risk Allocation in Transport PPP Projects: A Literature
Review,” in COST Action TU1001 Public Private Partnerships: Trends & Theory, ed. Athena
Roumboutsos and Nunzia Carbonara (COST European Cooperation in Science and Technology,
2011), 17-18, http://www.ppptransport.eu/docs/2011_12_Discussion_Papers.pdf.
19
E R Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance, 2nd ed.,
Elsevier Finance (London: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2011),
https://books.google.ca/books?id=fyHWtz7OepsC.
20
Roumboutsos et al., “Risks and Risk Allocation in Transport PPP Projects: A Literature
Review,” 18.
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transfer of risk delineated between private sector parties – i.e. subcontracts – leaving
many potential opportunities for suboptimal risk transfer to take place. Of course, P3
actors do not possess clairvoyant capabilities; there will be parties that experience a more
desirable project outcome than others pending which risks arise and which players they
adversely affect.
However, through the educated input of public and private practitioners – whose
opinions are supported by both theoretical knowledge of, and practical experience with,
P3 risk management – the primary transfer of risk in P3 contracts can reach equitable
levels to achieve what is referred to as optimal risk allocation. Optimal risk allocation is
achieved when a P3 contract, which is signed at the end of the P3 procurement phase,
transfers risks to the parties best able to manage them and at the most efficient cost.21
Figure 1.1 provides a broad summary of the theoretical advantages of using P3
procurement models in lieu of conventional procurement models. The following chapters
expound on these concepts. For now, it is important to know that P3 benefits can only be
realized through sound contracts premised on optimal risk allocation between both public

21

Jennifer Firmenich and Marcus Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the
Provision of Social Infrastructure,” in New Forms of Procurement: PPP and Relational
Contracting in the 21st Century, ed. Marcus Jefferies and Steve Rowlinson (New York:
Routledge, 2016), 71–94; Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, “Using Public-Private
Partnerships to Improve Transportation Infrastructure in Canada”; Bon Gang Hwang, Xianbo
Zhao, and Mindy Jiang Shu Gay, “Public Private Partnership Projects in Singapore: Factors,
Critical Risks and Preferred Risk Allocation from the Perspective of Contractors,” International
Journal of Project Management 31, no. 3 (2013): 424–33, doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2012.08.003;
US Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, “Risk Assessment for
Public-Private Partnerships: A Primer,” no. December (2012): 44,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/pdfs/p3/p3_risk_assessment_primer_122612.pdf; Mario Iacobacci,
“Dispelling the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of Public-Private Partnerships for
Infrastructure Investments,” no. January (2010): 83; Yongjian Ke et al., “Preferred Risk
Allocation in China’s Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects,” International Journal of Project
Management 28, no. 5 (2010): 482–92, doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2009.08.007.
6

and private actors. The remainder of this thesis delineates the P3 process, illuminates
factors that affect risk allocation, and offers solutions based on original research premised
on extensive literature reviews.
Figure 1. 1: Key features Distinguishing P3s from Conventional Procurement22
P3

Conventional

Comparative Advantage

Procurement Model

Procurement Model

of P3 Model

Output-based contracts

Input-based contracts

Mostly or fully
private financing

Mostly or fully
public financing

Conditional payments
based on delivery

Regular payments
in intervals

Integration of two
or more project phases
(i.e. design, build,
operation, and/or
maintenance)
Project management
by private sector

Project phases
contracted separately
(i.e. design, build,
operation,
and maintenance)
Project management
by public sector

Promotes private sector
innovation in building public
infrastructure
Transfers investment risks
from taxpayers to private
sector
Gives Incentives to the private
sector to work both on time
and on budget
Transfers project risks from
taxpayers to private sector; this
ensures accountability
Utilizes private sector’s
expertise in specialized fields

The goal of this thesis is to develop a clearer understanding of risk allocation in
P3s, followed by developing further insight into what is required to arrive at sound risk
allocation models between public and private actors at the P3 procurement stage. The
assessment, allocation, and management of P3 project risks involve a plethora of players
from public and private sectors alike. Thus, insights into the competing perspectives of

22

This is a summative adaptation of Mario Iacobacci’s original table; see Iacobacci, “Dispelling
the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure
Investments,” 3. The third section of the table concerning the comparative advantage of P3
models over conventional models is an original addition.
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P3 actors – both public and private – based in Canada have been sought out and analyzed
for empirical review.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The remaining structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the core
lexicon of the P3 procurement process and its administration. A detailed overview of the
general P3 procurement process, from its inception as a considered possibility to its
completion at financial close, will provide readers with a comprehensive understanding
of the many actors and stages involved in the signing of an official P3 contract. Once
fundamental P3 concepts are explained, modern research trends and academic studies of
focus are underlined in literature reviews of forthcoming chapters.
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical overview of how P3s can be examined and
assessed. Theory frameworks and methodologies used to analyze P3 risk allocation and
risk management are considered. Agency theory is then adopted to conceive of the
relationship between public and private parties as a principal-agent relationship premised
on self-motivation and a progressive separation between power and control. The
theoretical concept of risk is examined and demarcated from uncertainty before assessing
P3 project risk management (PRM) in the following chapter.
Chapter 4 outlines the PRM process in detail based on an extensive literature
review. Concepts like pre-contractual PRM and post-contractual PRM, first-step risk
transfer and second-step risk transfer, and risk identification, assessment, classification,
and mitigation are explained to provide an overview of the PRM process for both public
and private actors.

8

Chapter 5 presents a literature review of articles from which this thesis’ original
research is premised. This core literature database is comprised of a dozen articles that
directly reference risk allocation preferences between public and private sectors. A crosscomparative analysis of the core literature database is conducted to arrive at sound risk
preferences and contentious risk preferences. Sound risk preferences are defined as those
given the same allocation preferences amongst the dozen pieces of literature that
comprise the study’s core database. Contentious risk preferences are defined as those that
have been allocated to different preferential sectors at least once amongst the articles in
the core literature database.
Chapter 6 presents an original psychometric study premised on the allocation
preferences of contentious risks outlined in the previous chapter. Sound risks are not
included in the study because it is assumed that their conclusive allocation preferences
within the core literature database signifies a lessened need to conduct original research
over their allocation preferences. An expert questionnaire is used to obtain risk allocation
preferences of contentious P3 project risks from both public and private sector
practitioners. Respondent views are measured using a semantic differential scale. The
data is aggregated and analyzed through various quantitative methods to find patterns of
risk allocation preferences for P3s both within and between the public and private sector.
After a data analysis of the questionnaire’s preliminary findings, explanations are
proposed to describe identifiable patterns of reasoning within and between respondent
groups. This chapter proposes an equitable risk allocation decision model premised on
the study’s respondent preferences.

9

Chapter 7 concludes with an acknowledgement of the study’s limitations – both
methodological and theoretical – and suggestions for future research, highlighting further
recommendations for risk management and risk transfer in P3 literature.
Keyword searches include commonly used phrases and abbreviations associated
with P3s, such as: public-private partnership (P3 or PPP), private financing initiative
(PFI), alternative financing and procurement (AFP), design-build-finance-operatemaintain (DBFOM), build-operate-transfer (BOT), build-operate-own (BOO), buildoperate-own-transfer (BOOT), project risk management (PRM), risk mitigation, risk
transfer, and risk allocation, among others.23 References retrieved from keyword searches
were subject to content analysis to confirm their thematic relation to optimal risk
allocation in P3s.

23

PFI and AFP procurement methods “are essentially an outgrowth of the public-private
partnership.” These terms have been used interchangeably in literature to denote P3-esque
projects. The use of different acronyms is often a matter of politicized rhetoric – contingent on
geopolitical trends of different regions or politically-charged motives of public organizations.
Plainly, “any arrangement which involves a government player and a [risk-bearing] private sector
player may be described as a kind of public-private partnership.” See Kevin McGuinness and
Steve Bauld, “P3, PFI, and AFP: De-Cluttering the Terms Used Regarding Capital Asset
Procurement,” Summit: Canada’s Magazine on Public Sector Purchasing 13, no. 4 (2010): 2,
http://www.summitconnects.com/Articles_Columns/PDF_Documents/20100601/jun10_vol13_i4
_07.pdf.
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CHAPTER 2
THE P3 PROCUREMENT PROCESS
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 aims to both clarify P3 nomenclature and elucidate the P3 procurement
process. Before conducting a literature review of contemporary P3 research on project
risk management and risk allocation, it is necessary to develop an understanding and
appreciation of the wide array of influential actors and project phases involved in P3
procurement. Because P3 contracts contain sensitive, privileged information, data on
project bidding, project negotiation, and project implementation is scarce. A large amount
of contractual data on the intricacies of P3 projects is inaccessible because private biding
firms “are often reluctant to share information about their strategies.” 24 Thus, an
empirical assessment of primary data pertaining to specific policies between public and
private parties is unfeasible.
However, theoretical models that explain the P3 procurement process, P3 project
decision-making, and P3 risk management – especially from the public sector’s
perspective – are plentiful.25 Such resources are used to conduct a literature review
explaining the chronological P3 procurement process and the major actors involved.
Concepts such as project risk, P3 player relationships, obtaining value for money, and the
feasibility of conducting P3s in lieu of conventional models are explained largely from
the perspective of the public sector.
24

Dennis De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the
Tender Process,” Ku Leuven Faculty of Economics and Business, no. 490 (2015): 13,
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/500596/1/PhD+dissertation+Dennis+De+Clerck.p
df.
25
Ibid, 12.
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Due to their situational nature, a consensus on the exact definition of P3s does not
exist. P3 literature invites a multidisciplinary study of multiple industries, scopes, and
sectors of focus. 26 Across the globe, different countries have their own varying
experiences with P3 projects – so much so that scholars have argued in favour of
assessing P3 projects on a country-specific basis in lieu of extrapolating results to
develop global models. 27 There are, however, general characteristics of P3s that
consistently arise in the literature examined: (i) P3s are a partnership agreement between
public and private sectors for delivering infrastructure and/or services; (ii) the tasks and
responsibilities involved in delivering infrastructure – which may include service
components as well – are shared between partners; and (iii) the risks and rewards
involved with infrastructure delivery are also shared.28
Also, it is generally accepted that the private sector is responsible for two or more
of the following infrastructure tasks in any P3: (i) design, (ii) build, (iii) finance, (iv)

26

Disciplines used to assess P3s include political science, legal science, and economics.
Industries of study include transportation, health care, and education. Scopes of study include
international, national, jurisdiction-based, and case-based. Sectors of focus include project risk
management, operations management, and project cost-benefit analyses. These lists are not
exhaustive; P3 literature is not limited to the aforementioned examples.
27
Albert P. C. Chan et al., “Drivers for Adopting Public Private Partnerships—Empirical
Comparison between China and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” Journal of
Construction Engineering and Management 135, no. 11 (2009): 1115–24,
doi:10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000088; Ronald W. McQuaid and Walter Scherrer,
“Changing Reasons for Public–private Partnerships (PPPs),” Public Money & Management 30,
no. 1 (2010): 27–34, doi:10.1080/09540960903492331; Ofer Zwikael and Mark Ahn, “The
Effectiveness of Risk Management: An Analysis of Project Risk Planning Across Industries and
Countries,” Risk Analysis 31, no. 1 (2011): 25–37, doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01470.x; K S
Rebeiz, “Public-Private Partnership Risk Factors in Emerging Countries: BOOT Illustrative Case
Study,” Journal of Management in Engineering 28 (2012): 421–28,
doi:10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000079.
28
Iacobacci, “Dispelling the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of Public-Private Partnerships
for Infrastructure Investments”; Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, “Using Public-Private
Partnerships to Improve Transportation Infrastructure in Canada.”
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operation, and/or (v) maintenance (DBFOM).29 It is assumed that all carefully structured
P3 contracts are created in the attempt to promote the benefits of: an optimal share of risk
and reward between partners, an optimal method of financing between partners, and
performance-based conditional payments by which the public sector sets goals and the
private sector micromanages the means to achieve them.
Performance-based conditional payments are contingent on a P3 contract’s
stipulations (e.g. timelines of completion and materials that should be used) whereby
private actors incur either rewards or penalties based on their performance exceeding,
meeting, or falling short of the public sector’s stipulations.30 This relationship generally
transpires between the public sector’s specialized crown corporations and a consortium of
specialized private firms that form a “special purpose vehicle” (SPV).
While the private actor in a P3 theoretically consists of a single company, it is
generally a consortium of multiple joint venture companies (JVs) that form an SPV. A
consortium is an association of several companies forming a coalition to adequately
address the diverse levels of specialized industry experience required to produce public
infrastructure. Because P3s delineate a diverse array of tasks to the private sector aside
from simply building infrastructure – contra conventional procurement methods – private
sector consortiums (i.e. SPVs) must address an array of fields: finance (e.g. insurance
companies and banks), law (e.g. public-private mediation, land use permits, and

29

Samuel Carpintero, “Public-Private Partnership Projects in Canada : A Case Study Approach”
9, no. 5 (2015): 1; Iacobacci, “Dispelling the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of PublicPrivate Partnerships for Infrastructure Investments,” iv; Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman,
“Using Public-Private Partnerships to Improve Transportation Infrastructure in Canada,” iii.
30
Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, “Using Public-Private Partnerships to Improve
Transportation Infrastructure in Canada,” iv-v.
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environmental policy), engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance, among
others.31
Another key aspect of SPV consortiums is that – despite being their own distinct
legal entities – SPVs limit risks and liabilities transferred to them from public authorities.
Financial burdens and project responsibilities are spread throughout different JVs under
SPVs.32 Potential risks transferred from the government to SPVs may include: project
delays and cost overruns, erratic functionality of the finished facility, or the potential risk
that the user demand and revenue stream projections denoted with a future piece of
infrastructure are not realized.
In exchange for taking on various risks, SPVs can be reimbursed through: (i)
availability payments, where the government directly compensates the SPV through preagreed periodic dates “based on the facility being available for use when needed and
meeting certain requirements with penalties levied otherwise” (e.g. where government
funds are allocated under the stipulation of safety regulations being met);33 (ii) milestone
payments, where the government pays the SPV through the completion of pre-agreed
project standards;34 (iii) full tolls, where the SPV retains all profit from the P3 facility for

31

Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, “Using Public-Private Partnerships to Improve
Transportation Infrastructure in Canada,” 4.
32
While at first blush it may appear to be a benefit that firms can absorb a shared risk under a
SPV consortium, this shared risk can also harm the project, as it leaves firms susceptible to a
complex allocation of tasks and responsibilities, which can be especially harmful if issues arise in
projects and there is no clear actor or outlet to blame. This will be elaborated on in Chapter 4,
Section 4.4.1 during a case study on the Right Honourable Herb Gray Parkway.
33
Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, “Using Public-Private Partnerships to Improve
Transportation Infrastructure in Canada,” 17.
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For milestone payments, like availability payments before it, payments “may be subject to a
holdback provision or liquidated damages (penalties) should the private partner not fully meet the
obligations as outlined in the project agreement’s predetermined performance specifications.” See
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Policy and Guidelines Supply Manual”
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an agreed period of time; or (iv) shadow tolls, where payments are issued “from the
public sector authority based on the use of the facility. Wishing to receive payment, the
private operator has an incentive to provide suitable customer service, thus enticing
drivers to use a road.”35 Any combination of these methods may be used to compensate
SPVs.
Together, SPVs and specialized crown corporations interact under a mutually
agreed upon contract to procure public infrastructure in Canada. The SPV consortium is
usually incentivized with some future revenue stream over the life of a long-term P3
contract, which typically lasts 20 to 35 years.36 Generally, the communal goal of P3s is to
incentivize the private sector – known for possessing a presumably higher level of
expertise and innovation than the government – to invest in large-scale infrastructure
projects while absorbing a large share of accountability and risk associated with these
projects.37
In principle, the aforementioned revenue streams are supposed to cover the
private consortium’s portion of investment in the project’s DBFOM while including a
margin for profit to be realized over the course of the project’s lifecycle. Upon the end of
the project’s lifecycle, contracts are either renegotiated or ownership of the facility

(Government of Canada, 2016), 9.60.45, e., https://buyandsell.gc.ca/policy-andguidelines/supply-manual/section/9/60#section-9.60.
35
Lammam, MacIntyre, and Berechman, “Using Public-Private Partnerships to Improve
Transportation Infrastructure in Canada,” 17.
36
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort, “The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private
Partnerships,” Journal of Public Economic Theory 17, no. 1 (2015): 4.; Boardman, Siemiatycki,
and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere,” 2.
37
De Clerck, “Public-Private Partnership Procurement : Game-Theoretic Studies of the Tender
Process,” viii; Iacobacci, “Dispelling the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of Public-Private
Partnerships for Infrastructure Investments,” 32.
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reverts back to the government.38 In the event that asset ownership reverts back to the
government, the P3 process has been referred to as a “rent to own” transaction; “that is,
the public sector pays the private sector an annual rental fee for a specified period and
then owns the asset at the end of that period.”39
2.2 P3 Project Types
The aforementioned situational nature and complexity of P3s also means that their
structure, or delivery model, will vary between projects. The delivery model is contingent
on the public sector’s infrastructural needs, the project’s available funding options, the
urgency associated with the project’s timeline, the expert agents available for the project,
potential risks associated with the project, and other strategic considerations.40
The private sector’s involvement in DBFOM phases of a P3 project signifies its
delivery model. While a literature review revealed that scholars consider a P3 to involve
the private sector in at least two phases of DBFOM,41 progressive interpretations of P3s
are widely adopting a consensus that major private sector involvement in the financing of
projects are a prerequisite to be considered an authentic P3. By this standard, a P3 project
provides “project financing and also engages in at least two of the other [DBOM]
activities… ensur[ing] that the private sector has some [financial] ‘skin in the game.’”42
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The interpretation above runs parallel with the Federal Government of Canada’s
interpretation, which recognizes four distinct P3 infrastructure delivery models – all of
which include a financing phase for SPVs: (i) DBF, (ii) DBFO, (iii) DBFM, and (iv)
DBFOM.43 Regardless of the delivery model used, P3 projects in Canada will always
differ from conventional procurement options in that they are financed at least partially
by the private sector under a single, performance-based contract rather than financed by
the public sector under distinct, separate contracts to various firms for DBOM.44
It is important to note that the delivery models listed above all entail the design
and construction of new public infrastructure, but – because P3s can be utilized to offer
the public both critical infrastructure and/or services45 – not all P3 projects entail the
procurement of a major piece of infrastructure. Just as P3s can vary in project delivery
models, they can also vary in project scopes. P3s can be used as an outlet for providing
structural modifications, structural additions, operational services, and maintenance
services to previously existing infrastructure. The phases required of a P3 project, as well
as the extent to which the public sector transfers risk to the private sector, are contingent
on project scope. The three general scopes of P3 projects are: brownfield, greenfield, and
hybrid projects.
Previously existing infrastructure can be leased under P3 brownfield projects,
where the public actor “generates a capital inflow or debt payoff by transferring the
rights, responsibilities, and revenues attached to an existing asset to a private [actor]…

43

Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Policy and Guidelines Supply Manual,”
9.60.5, b.
44
Ibid., 9.60.5, e.
45
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for a defined period.”46 Generally, brownfield projects present considerably less risk to
private actors, because design and build phases (i.e. construction) are either minimal or
non-existent, and service-related factors like toll revenue or traffic volume can be
projected more accurately due to the already-existing facility’s present or past patterns of
use by the public.
In greenfield projects, public actors transfer either a portion or all of the project’s
DBFOM responsibilities – and the risks associated with them – to private actors. Because
greenfield projects require infrastructure procurement and the operation and maintenance
of new pieces of infrastructure, they “generally present higher risks to both [public and
private] parties than do brownfield projects because of the greater uncertainty
surrounding traffic forecasts, permitting, and construction.” 47 The complexity of
greenfield projects becomes increasingly apparent when issues of financing and future
revenue allocation are addressed, as project management teams consider the options of
using availability payment concessions or toll concessions to reimburse the private actor,
for example.
Hybrid projects require the expansion or extension of existing pieces of
infrastructure through capital improvement, whereby private actors provide financing
options to improve,48 operate, and/or maintain the facility. While risks associated with
future revenue for hybrid projects are relatively lower than greenfield projects, both
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US Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, “Risk Assessment for
Public-Private Partnerships: A Primer,” no. December (2012): 9,
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47
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public and private actors may still have to contend with issues of uncertainty concerning
estimations of the public’s willingness to accept new or increased toll fees that are often
used to finance the project.49 Further unforeseen issues denoted with any construction
project may also arise, such as latent defects within the facility’s new extensions. PPP
Canada Inc. notes that hybrid projects “offer less potential for risk transfer because it may
not be possible to distinguish the defects in new construction from pre-existing or latent
defects in the [pre-existing] infrastructure.”50
The extent to which private firms engage in various DBFOM activities varies
between P3 projects, including those with the same delivery model. For example, for
hospitals, prisons, and schools procured through DBFOM P3s, private firms may provide
‘soft’ operation services, (e.g. cleaning, laundry, catering, etc.) while the public sector
retains control of the primary operation services pertaining to the main functions of
respective facilities (e.g. nursing, detainment, teaching, etc.). In rare instances, DBFOM
P3s can transfer core operation services to the private sector as well. For example, there
are P3s in the Spanish city of Valencia that require SPVs to provide medical services as
part of their operation duties for hospitals procured under a DBFOM delivery model.51
The delivery model used for P3 projects shares a generally positive relationship with the
degree of risk transferred to the private sector, as shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2. 1: Scope of P3 Risk Transfer by Delivery Model52

2.3 Major P3 Players: Interests, Incentives, and Financial Relationships
To summarize, public authorities use P3s to procure, operate, and maintain
infrastructure efficiently – achieving VFM – through long-term, lifecycle-driven
contracts. The public sector utilizes the private sector’s capacity to bear project risks and
provide alternative financing options. SPVs are financially reimbursed through the public
sector via one or more of the aforementioned methods (e.g. directly through payments
and/or indirectly through tolls) and, in some P3 projects, public authorities will provide
public subsidies via government bonds (with budgetary authority).53 Generally, the more
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risks a private partner bears, the more compensation it receives from governments.54
SPVs are also privately financed through lenders and equity investors. In turn, private
SPV financiers encourage SPVs to bear minimal project risks so that they are more likely
to receive subsequent repayment for their capital contributions.55
Lenders provide bonds and loans to SPVs to cover the large majority of a P3
project’s required initial investment. In return for providing original private capital,
lenders require SPV repayment through amortization agreements and associated interest
fees. Their interest rates for capital bonds and loans are contingent on SPVs’ risk-bearing
capacities, which are assessed before contractual agreements (i.e. through due diligence).
Generally speaking, SPVs with higher risk-bearing capacities pay lenders back with
lower risk premiums and interest.56 Lenders prioritize: (i) the dependability of SPVs to
deliver on future dues owed, (ii) the capacity of SPVs to bear risks, and (iii) the
soundness of project contracts to ensure relevant parties are contractually liable for
financial risks associated with a project’s DBFOM.57
Equity Investors also contribute to the initial investment of P3 projects. They
provide private equity to the project, which is an essential component to ensure riskbearing agents are held accountable for future project risks. Their share of equity is
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contingent on macroeconomic factors, and – like the interest rates of lenders – their
required dividends and subsequent interest fees become more expensive as SPVs bear
more risks.58 Both project lenders and equity investors require due diligence to ensure
that SPVs are dependable in issuing repayments and accurately gauging their respective
risk-bearing capacities.59
The relationship between public authorities, SPVs, lenders, and equity investors
for DBFOM P3s is depicted in Figure 2.2. SPVs – and their accompanying JVs – are at
the focal point of all DBFOM monetary relations, as they bear most of the project’s risk
and, often, capital financing. The relationship between individual JVs – within SPV
consortiums – and other P3 players is described more in depth in Chapter 4. For now, it
suffices to conceptualize P3 projects as a set of interdependent relations between public
and private agents premised on sound project financing and optimal risk allocation.
In particular, the remainder of this paper focuses on the features of DBFOM P3
projects, as these project models encapsulate all relevant broad phases related to risk
allocation between public and private actors during P3 procurement. Figure 2.2 is a
summative adaptation of various sources in P3 literature, particularly taken from primers
and general P3 guides.
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Figure 2. 2: Structural Relationships of Major P3 Players in DBFOM Projects60
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2.4 Advisory Units
In order for a P3 to be successful, the public sector requires specialized legal and
technical skills in writing and negotiating P3 contracts with private firms. Thus,
governments create specialized public agencies – or crown corporations – to handle P3s
(e.g. PPP Canada Inc., Partnerships BC, and Infrastructure Ontario). In some instances,
projects can be so specialized that they require their own crown corporation altogether to
handle the construction and continued operation of infrastructure projects (e.g. the
Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority for the Gordie Howe Bridge). Often, specialized
public agents consult with private sector experts in an array of fields while overseeing a
given project.
Private advisory units to the public sector may include: financial, legal, technical,
procurement, fairness, and integrity advisors.61 Together, public and private agents form a
dedicated project team – called a P3 project team – to coordinate different activities,
including: planning, procurement, design, and construction phases. They also develop
performance specifications for the project and provide oversight to public-private
communications throughout project phases.62 Third party advisors can come from both
the public and private sector.
For an example of a third party advisor from the public sector, the P3 National
Center of Expertise (P3 NCOE) assists the federal government in obtaining support for
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Real Property Branch projects,63 facilitating informed decision making through drafting
and submitting reports to federal bodies like the Treasury Board Secretariat and Public
Works and Government Services Canada. The P3 NCOE can have a role in both the
assessment and development of P3 projects.64
Another large vanguard for P3s in Canada, albeit not an official public entity, is
the Canadian Council of Public-Private Partnerships (CCPPP). Established in 1993, the
CCPPP is a member-based organization comprised of – and sponsored by – both public
and private representatives. Together, these public and private sponsors form the
CCPPP’s Board of Directors along with its various committees.65 While the Council is
considered a nonpartisan third party organization, its research studies, published findings,
forums, and annual conference on P3s suggest biased reporting for P3s in lieu of
alternative infrastructural procurement methods. As a pro-P3 lobby group, it “is difficult
to see them as impartial or unbiased, although they… have a role in helping the public
sector negotiate with potential private partners once the decision to go the P[3] route has
been made.”66 The CCPPP also provides a project database that summarizes the status of
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all P3 projects – planned, active, or completed – in Canada. This database is accessible to
the public.67
For an example of a third party advisor from the private sector, Deloitte LLP – a
finance, law, auditing, consulting, and risk management firm – has developed a global
network of P3 teams that provide assistance to both public and private sector clients in
the selection, negotiation, procurement, and financing of P3 projects. Both federal and
provincial governments have hired Deloitte LLP for advisory roles. The former generally
use the private advisor to help develop P3 frameworks and policies while the latter
generally use the private advisor to help assess, structure, and procure individual P3
projects. Deloitte LLP also aids private actors, both financiers and SPVs alike, with P3
projects. For financiers, Deloitte LLP provides both financial advisor services (e.g. debt
structuring) and financial transaction services. For SPVs, Deloitte LLP assists in
developing project bids, structuring deals, and negotiating contracts.68
When private sector experts comprise part of a P3 project team, they must sign
confidentiality agreements to ensure that due diligence is applied to the commercially
confidential meetings P3 project teams hold. For example, during pre-contractual
planning stages of a project, private third party advisors to the public sector may possess
information that has yet to be released to SPV bidders. If any private advisors to the
public sector have possible ties with a bidding private firm, they must not collude with
this firm because P3 fairness and integrity rules dictate that SPV bidders must receive
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project information simultaneously in the Request for Proposal (RFP) stage before the
public sector awards a contract to its ‘preferred proponent’ – the winning SPV.69
The RFP stage, coupled with the Request for Qualifications (RFQ) stage, deals
with SPV bids for a project that the government evaluates. This integral step to the P3
process is explained towards the conclusion of this chapter. Before SPVs can bid for a P3
project, however, the government must first evaluate if a P3 model is the optimal
procurement method (i.e. in lieu of conventional procurement). Ergo, planned public
infrastructure projects that are large enough to warrant the consideration of a P3 go
through a screening process consisting of P3 Screening, risk analysis, and Value for
Money (VFM) analysis.70
2.5 P3 Screening
While P3s are issued on a federal, provincial, and municipal level in Canada, the
federal government plays a large role in advancing potential P3 projects during early
screening stages. Major branches and departments in the federal government, like the
Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) and Public Works and Government Services Canada
(PWGSC), play advisory roles in documenting and evaluating early stage P3 screenings
and assessments to ensure that a potential P3 procurement method is advisable in lieu of
conventional procurement methods.
The TBS is in charge of awarding various P3 approvals, “including project
approval, expenditure authority, contract approval, and the authority to enter into a real
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property transaction.”71 PWGSC holds ultimate accountability for recommending the
most suitable delivery model for P3 projects under the DBFOM spectrum.72 There are
various departments within PWGSC that contribute to both risk and financial analysis of
prospective P3 projects. An exhaustive list of these departments is, however, outside of
the scope of this research.73
In 2008, the federal government established PPP Canada Inc. as an overarching
federal crown corporation to act as an advisory unit for various departments and agencies
involved in P3s and prospective P3 projects. PPP Canada Inc. – along with the TBS and
PWGSC – consider various contributing factors to potential P3 procurement. These
factors include, but are not limited to: (i) private sector interest and capacity; (ii) asset
characteristics and size; (iii) time horizon; (iv) public acceptance or interest; (v)
opportunity to transfer risk; (vi) performance specifications; (vii) potential for innovation;
(viii) organizational capacity; and (ix) financial or funding considerations.74
When considering the viability of a potential P3 project, relevant departments and
agencies must use and abide by PPP Canada Inc.’s P3 Screening Matrix and supporting
guide. The P3 Screening Matrix is a tool used in conjunction with a department’s
assessment of capital projects for P3 potential. Users are faced with fourteen distinct
questions that individually assess specific criteria pertaining to a potential P3 project.
Each of the fourteen questions are answered with a score between one to five. These
71
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corresponding response indicators are meant to be objective in nature, with specific
information demarcating the number values between one and five.75
For example, one of the fourteen criteria questions concerns the anticipated
service life of the asset in question. Because “longer-lived assets tend to be better suited
to a P3,” five points are given if an asset’s “life is greater than 25 years,” and one point is
given if an asset’s “life is less than 10 years.” In another example, for a criteria question
concerning the potential for contract integration, five points are given if – under the
DBFOM model – “all elements… could be integrated into one contract” while,
conversely, one point is given if “only two elements could be integrated into one
contract.” This rationale is given because “P3s generate value… [through] the integration
of various elements of the potential P3. The greater the potential for integration, the more
likely a P3 will be viable.”76 Together, the values given for each of the fourteen
questions accumulate to give a total score out of seventy to predict the feasibility of a P3
project. The higher the score, the more likely it is suitable for some form of P3
procurement model.
The Federal Government of Canada provides the screening matrix described
above. While it serves as a simple and clear template for risk assessment, there are more
intricate and exhaustive matrices used when assessing the viability of P3s and the
monetary risks associated with allocating risks throughout a P3 project. Often, these in-
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depth matrices are held as private property to be used between SPV consortiums and
public authorities during P3 contract negotiations.
The World Bank provides an example of a more complex screening matrix that
can be used to deeply assess the following areas of risk in using P3s to procure
transportation infrastructure, all of which will be elaborated on in upcoming chapters:
design risks, site risks, construction risks, force majeure risks, revenue risks, operation
and maintenance risks, performance risks, external risks, other market risks, political
risks, default risks, and strategic risks.77
2.6 Value for Money
If a P3 has been selected as a conceivable outlet for a project’s procurement after
it goes through P3 screening, a value for money (VFM) analysis becomes the determining
factor for deciding to use a P3 and, more specifically, deciding which P3 delivery model
is the optimal method for procuring and managing the given project.78 VFM compares the
costs and benefits of investment options pertaining to P3 projects through a risk-adjusted,
iterative process that occurs throughout the project planning process. The VFM “is based
on significant input from the project team and client who are most familiar with
Government of Canada and project-specific requirements.” 79 To mitigate evaluative
subjectivity, data retrieved from internal (i.e. public) and external (i.e. private) experts is
continually reassessed and aggregated throughout project phases.
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VFM aids government officials with their recommendations to either proceed
with a project or not by providing critical information concerning “project-specific
qualitative, quantitative, and risk factors.”80 Literature on VFM analysis for proposed P3
projects outlines: (i) the creation of a “Public Sector Comparator” (PSC), a tool charged
with estimating the whole-life cost of a proposed project through conventional means of
infrastructure procurement; 81 (ii) using hypothetical “shadow bids” from a public
authority (e.g. Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority) to estimate the whole-life cost of a
proposed project through a P3;82 and (iii) comparing the values of the two aforesaid
methods in an “apples-to-apples” manner.83
A typical PSC includes: base costs, financing costs, ancillary costs, retained and
transferable risk, and competitive neutrality. Base costs refer to all relevant costs
involved in both building and owning a piece of public infrastructure – including the
delivery of services associated with it – for a pre-determined amount of time (e.g. a
DBFOM project’s lifecycle).
Ancillary costs refer to other costs, such as project monitoring costs and project
procurement costs (e.g. easement costs for using privately owned land to build public
80
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infrastructure, like right-of-way fees).84 Financing costs refer to both project issuance fees
(e.g. attorney and accountant fees) and interests costs shared amongst taxpayers (i.e.
public debt). The premiums of both retainable risks (i.e. public risk) and transferrable
risks (i.e. private risk) refer to an assigned monetary value placed on bearing various
project risks, derived from complex quantitative measures. These will be covered in more
detail in Chapter 4. Lastly, competitive neutrality refers to mathematical adjustments
made when assessing procurement options that account for competitive advantages and
disadvantages accrued by virtue of a public authority’s public ownership of infrastructure
and services (e.g. a public agent’s advantage of tax exemptions over private agents).85
In response to a PSC, a shadow bid is developed to estimate potential future bids
from the private sector. These hypothetical estimations, contrasted with the PSCestimated conventional procurement costs, consider: the net amount of expected
payments to be given to the private agents involved (this includes base costs, financing
costs, and premiums for transferred risks), the estimated value of the public sector’s
retained risks, and the value of the public sector’s ancillary costs.86
With a PSC and shadow bid in place, the public authority of a P3 project conducts
a financial assessment of a proposed project that compares the different costs for
procuring the infrastructure and assesses the financial subsidies required when using
either a conventional or P3 procurement model. Figure 2.3 broadly depicts the
84
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preliminary risk analysis phase of a potential P3 project – i.e. VFM phase – before it is
granted public consent to follow through with the project. This figure adopts a public
sector stakeholder perspective.
Figure 2. 3: Preliminary Value for Money Methodology for P3s
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During the final phase of calculating preliminary VFM, referred to above as
‘financial assessment,’ the PSC’s predicted project costs of conventional procurement
and the shadow bid’s predicted project costs of P3 procurement are compared on a riskadjusted basis. If a shadow bid’s projected estimation costs less than a PSC, the project is
likely to be contracted out through a P3. When a P3 presents net savings over
conventional procurement options, it provides VFM.
VFM is expressed as the difference by which either the PSC (i.e. conventional
model) or shadow bid (i.e. P3 model) exceeds the other in cost. Because even incremental
changes in underlying assumptions used in a complex VFM analysis can drastically
change results, “it is important to undertake a sensitivity analysis to understand the
[project’s] critical assumptions” during preliminary VFM assessment measures.87
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Thorough government-issued user manuals and reports on PSCs, shadow bids,
and general VFM processes are publicly accessible for those who wish to understand the
subtle complexities involved in these stages of P3 screening. 88 For an independent
evaluation of VFM procedures, there are scholarly articles – albeit limited in number –
that highlight strengths and weaknesses of current VFM methodology along with further
suggestions for public agencies to adopt when conducting VFM assessments for
prospective P3 projects.89
Government VFM projections are also regularly scrutinized by the Office of the
Auditor General of Canada (OAG) through ex post project reports and audits. The OAG
is an independent government watchdog that audits federal government departments,
agencies, and crown corporations, reporting publicly to the House of Commons on
matters on the allocation and management of public resources. The OAG increases
transparency between public authorities and Canadian taxpayers by highlighting the
consistency of government statements and projections for P3 projects.90
The accuracy of government-issued PSCs, shadow bids, and VFM statements are
inspected through public reports, which often include recommendations for government
88
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on how to proceed with either current or future projects based on the OAG’s findings.91
One particular criticism of VFM assessments globally, including in Canada, is that
governments are often guilty of overestimating “their own capacity to manage such large,
complex, and long-term projects aside from what the final value [of their predictions]
might say.” 92 Figure 2.4 depicts a conceptual illustration of a preliminary VFM
calculation comparing a PSC with a shadow bid for a prospective P3 project.

Cost in Millions

Figure 2. 4: Conceptual Value for Money Illustration
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Although the shadow bid estimates an increased amount of $5 million for base
costs, $2 million for financing costs, and $4 for ancillary costs over the PSC, a projected
$23 million reduction in costs from privately transferred risks and $11 million in
adjustments for competitive neutrality result in a projected $23 million in savings overall.
The shadow bid’s projected net cost of $104 million divided by the PSC’s projected net
cost of $127 million equals 0.82,93 meaning the same project procured through a P3 is
estimated to be 18 percent cheaper than if it were procured through conventional
methods.
Thus, Figure 2.4 represents an estimated 18 percent VFM for a P3. This
hypothetical example of VFM illuminates the general trade-offs that encourage the use of
P3s both in Canada and around the world – the public sector trades large risks to the
private sector in exchange for relatively higher project base costs, financing costs, and
ancillary costs. In other words, while P3s may generally be more expensive than
conventional procurement options, they have the potential to mitigate and transfer
conventional project risks away from the public sector, securing more VFM, and thus
making large infrastructure projects cheaper and safer for governments in the long term.
2.7 Competitive Selection
Once a P3 is selected as the optimal procurement model for an infrastructure
project via VFM analysis, the public sector generally conducts a Request for
Qualifications (RFQ) followed by a Request for Proposal (RFP). Together, the RFQ and
RFP stages aid public authorities in choosing what they believe to be the best SPV
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consortium for a P3 project through a competitive bidding process where public agencies
invite private actors to submit proposals for their services.
SPV proposals are assessed by public authorities, the public sector’s third party
advisors, and fairness monitors. Fairness monitors, like P1 Consulting Inc., are appointed
by the government to ensure its selection of a preferred proponent is as objective and
unbiased as possible. Fairness monitors are provided full access to documentation
concerning the competitive selection process. 94 RFQ and RFP invitations extend to
private firms on an international, national, and local representation level.
In the RFQ stage, prospective SPVs submit a detailed portfolio of their
consortiums’ abilities to handle all relevant parameters of a P3 project. Prospective SPVs
express their interest in, and qualifications for, a project by outlining their ability to
handle specified phases – either all or some – of a project’s DBFOM. SPVs are supposed
to show how they can provide the government with VFM and reduce the project’s burden
on taxpayers. RFQs provide a broad synopsis of project backgrounds, overviews,
expectations, instructions, evaluation criteria, deadlines, and any other pertinent
information for SPVs considering a submission. The main purpose of RFQs is to
establish a shortlist of qualified consortiums – often the three most qualified from the
pool of submissions – to invite to the following RFP stage, which is more specific,
exhaustive, complex, and demanding.95
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The reason for RFQs being less comprehensive than RFPs is twofold: firstly,
RFQs do not require the inclusion of project specifities to fulfill their purpose as a broad
tool to “weed out” unqualified consortiums; second, RFQs are conducted considerably
earlier – sometimes years earlier – than RFPs, and thus the monolithic list of precontractual project requirements is likely to be incomplete during the RFQ stage. 96 For
example, the Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority’s (WDBA) RFQ for the Gordie Howe
International Bridge left several significant sections open to further deliberation pending
its RFP. In the 113-page document, the WDBA’s RFQ informs Project Co that its role is
still uncertain with respect to parts of the bridge’s design and build: 97
Project Co’s role with respect to the design of buildings and structures and
such matters as site drainage, site servicing, location and size of storm
water management ponds, and requirements for transformer sub-stations,
will be provided in the RFP Process.98
The WDBA warns Project Co that, due to incomplete land acquisitions, Project Co’s role
and accompanying expenses are subject to change:
The project requires the acquisition of properties in both Ontario and
Michigan… Acquisition of the required properties has yet to be fully
completed. The properties to be acquired will be described in the RFP
Process. To the extent that property acquisition has not been completed
prior to Financial Close, it is currently anticipated that the Project
96
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Agreement will provide relief to Project Co in the event that the status of
acquisition of specific parcels materially and unavoidably impacts the
Project schedule. The RFP will provide further details regarding the
acquisition process and responsibilities of Project Co in connection with
that process.99
The WDBA informs Project Co that its planned method of payment for the project is still
uncertain:
A toll systems study is currently being finalized and the current indications
are that the tolling system will be a mixed manual and electronic system
with details to be confirmed at the RFP stage. Further details on the setting
of toll rates, the collection and administration of tolls, and toll revenues
will be provided in the RFP... The RFP will contain details of any
payments during the construction phase and after construction following
the commencement of services.100
Finally, the WDBA reminds Project Co that its initiation of a Competitive Selection
Process by no means presents an obligation to proceed with the project prior to Financial
Close:
This RFQ does not commit WDBA in any way to proceed to an RFP
Process, award a contract or proceed with the Project and WDBA is
entitled at any time to exercise the rights… to terminate the Competitive
Selection Process and proceed with the Project, in whole or in part, in…
some other manner…101
Once three consortiums are selected from the RFQ stage, the project’s public
governing body issues an RFP to qualified bidders. RFPs include draft project
agreements, which constitute the planned contractual outlines and duties Project Co is
expected to follow. These drafts delineate project output specifications in full, setting out
99
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detailed technical requirements for an infrastructure’s design, construction, operation, and
maintenance. While output specifications and further project agreements set out in the
RFP are issued by the public sector, they are often the result of rigorous consultation with
third party advisors, both public and private (e.g. legal and financial advisors).102
During the procurement process, RFP specifications are open to modification via
collaborative meetings with the qualified bidders. Over the span of months, or years,
qualified bidders are given separate, confidential audiences with public authorities to
discuss their requests for amendments to the draft project agreements on an individual
basis. Input from the private sector helps refine disputable areas of the RFP before the
government selects a preferred proponent to sign the project agreement.103 The governing
authority issues a final draft to the qualified bidders after negotiations have taken place,
and this draft is used as the common basis for the proponents’ final RFP proposals.
Final RFP proposals generally entail both technical and financial submissions for
the project. Proponents’ technical submissions include a submission of their official
approach to relevant project phases (e.g. design plans, construction management, quality
assurance, asset operation and maintenance, among others.). Proponents’ financial
submissions include confirmation from their funding sources that the project’s financial
terms have been agreed to – otherwise referred to as “fully committed financing.”104
Typically, public authorities prioritize contractor quality when selecting bidders at the
RFQ stage (e.g. brand, history, and reputation) and bid quality when selecting a preferred
102
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proponent at the RFP stage (e.g. cheaper bids and greater risk-taking capabilities).105
Thus, RFPs must be exhaustive and specific in nature.
Following the selection of a winning bidder, the finalization of required
documentation between the government and its preferred proponent takes place before
the project can reach financial close. This includes “final limited discussions to customize
the Project Agreement and other Project Documents… and… to clarify any ambiguous
terms, so that it can be finalized for execution.” 106 Should the government and its
preferred proponent come to an impasse during final discussions, the next preferred
proponent may be chosen for the project. Or, in extreme circumstances, it is important to
remember that the government retains the right to terminate P3 projects during
competitive selection stages altogether.
Qualified firms that have made it to the RFP stage but are not awarded contracts
receive honorariums of a pre-agreed amount for their participatory efforts in the project
(e.g. for the Gordie Howe International Bridge, the amount is currently $5 million).107 In
theory, the government purchases the right to own the intellectual property of
unsuccessful proponents’ RFP proposals.108 The main purpose of this practice, however,
is to encourage the continued participation of potential proponents in future P3 projects
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by alleviating the significant costs of preparing RFP bids. RFQ bids, conversely, are not
eligible for government-issued honorariums. Private firms are fully liable for all expenses
incurred during the RFQ stage of the competitive selection process. This ensures that
only ‘serious’ bidders participate in the competitive selection process.
2.8 Conclusion
The end of the competitive selection process marks the end of the project
procurement phase, which is officially completed when the preferred proponent reaches
financial close with the public authority and subsequently signs the final project
agreement. In theory, once the final project agreement is signed, the negotiable terms of a
P3 contract should be settled. In practice, this is generally not the case. The duration of
most P3 projects post financial close – i.e. during respective DBFOM phases – are mired
in contractual disputes between public and private partners, as well as disputes between
private partners themselves.
Scholars note that P3s have “characteristics propitious to recurrent renegotiations;
they represent long term, complex commercial and financial arrangements, in heavily
regulated sectors, subject to significant political sensitivities, vulnerable to changes in
circumstances and often grounded in uncertainty.”109 In an updated, oft-cited study in P3
literature, recent data suggests that 78 percent of transportation P3 projects and 87
percent of wastewater management projects face major renegotiation at some point after
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financial close. Further, the average time spent renegotiating project disputes for
transportation and wastewater P3 projects is 0.9 years and 0.8 years, respectively.110
Post-contractual renegotiation and legal mediation are common elements of P3s
and disputes can arise due to a plethora of factors. From a post-contractual perspective,
disputes between P3 actors arise due to the limitations of incomplete contracts, which
often experience variance between ex ante risks and ex post risks. From a pre-contractual
perspective, disputes between P3 actors arise due to the drawbacks of subjective
assessment during risk allocation at the procurement stage.
When optimal risk allocation is achieved at pre-contractual stages, variance
between ex ante and ex post risk becomes minimal, and project risk management (PRM)
under the incomplete P3 contract becomes easier. Thus, pre-contractual PRM directly
affects post-contractual PRM and, accordingly, attention must be focused on achieving
optimal risk allocation before the P3 contract is signed.
Chapter 2 emphasizes the structures and processes involved in creating a P3
project agreement, where risks and duties are officially transferred in a finalized contract.
While open to renegotiation, risk transfer in P3 contracts has profound effects on the rest
of a project’s DBFOM and PRM practices. Thus, it is integral for P3s to achieve optimal
risk allocation during the procurement phase in order to be successful in subsequent postcontractual project phases. Figure 2.5 presents a template timeline that delineates the
general procurement process of P3s.
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Figure 2. 5: Stages of the P3 Procurement111

Ideally, optimal risk allocation is achieved from mutually agreed upon risk
transfer at financial close between public and private agents. More often than not,
however, actors disagree on what constitutes optimal risk allocation – making
cooperative project risk management between public authorities and SPVs crucial to a
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P3’s success. A final outlying factor – not considered in Chapter 2 – that spurs
suboptimal PRM, and subsequent contractual disputes, is moral risk.
Scholar Olufemi Vincent Tolani states that “the real success of P[3] projects
depends on the degree to which risk is genuinely transferred from the public to the private
sector and optimally shared.”112 His adverbs are not arbitrarily placed; while managing
risks “optimally” can be understood from a cost-efficient perspective as risk transfer to
the agents best equipped to handle them, managing risks ‘genuinely’ denotes the moral
concerns of strategic and opportunistic behaviour that can affect P3 projects. Moral risks
can erode a project’s potential VFM. Thus, its potential affects on P3s cannot be
overlooked. This behaviour can be explained via agency theory, where the principalagent relationship public authorities and SPVs share is premised on self-motivated efforts
from public authorities and their private partners.
Chapter 3 establishes a theoretical dimension to its literature review of the P3
process – specifically pertaining to P3 PRM under principal-agent relationships. Chapter
4, while explicative in nature, draws from these insights to illuminate the theoretical
factors driving the behaviour of respective P3 players during PRM.
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CHAPTER 3
RISK AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS
3.1 Introduction
P3 PRM can be analyzed under many different theoretical frameworks,
methodological approaches, disciplines of study, and agents of focus. Scholarly
assessment of risk in P3 projects has roots in neoclassical political economics. Unlike
traditional institutional economics, neoclassical political economy extends economic
activity to social and legal models, treating them as separate institutions that intersect
with, and affect, economic decision-making.
Modern political economy perspectives that work within a neoclassical
framework – like new institutional economics, behavioural economics, and public-choice
theory – account for social and legal complexities in political economics like bounded
rationality, asymmetric information acquisition and sharing, opportunism, strategic
behaviour, incomplete contracts, adverse selection, optimism bias, and asset
specification.113
P3 literature can be categorized in relation to its: sector of focus,114 adopted
stakeholder perspective,115 type of research,116 data sources used,117 subject of research,118
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and methodologies used. It is of note that a large portion of P3 literature lacks explicit
theoretical models and, in some instances, conclusive methodology.119 However, popular
theoretical frameworks used in the literature include: agency theory, transaction cost
theory, public choice theory, and property rights theory.120 Popular methodologies used in
the literature include: simulation models (e.g. Monte Carlo), multiple regression, real
options theory, game theory, data envelopment analysis, fuzzy methods, artificial
neuronal networks, multi-attribute utility theory, network theory, cluster analysis,
stochastic processes, analytical hierarchy process, and psychometrics.121
Recently, a large amount of literature on renegotiation issues in P3s has surged,
suggesting private partners are employing strategic and opportunistic behaviour when
bidding on projects. In other words, SPVs’ ex ante pre-contractual agreements with
public authorities are not in line with their ex post post-contractual actions.122 Scholars
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note that private contractors can employ opportunistic, strategic behaviour – like
asymmetric information sharing – to receive excessive compensation for bearing risks.123
Chapter 3 adopts agency theory as an explicative tool for explaining public-private issues
during P3 risk management. Once the parameters of public authorities and SPVs are
explained as a principal-agent relationship, the concept of risk is expounded on. Chapter
3 concludes with an introduction to PRM, which is the centered focus of Chapter 4.
3.2 Agency Theory
Like P3s, agency theory is an interdisciplinary venture. Stephen Ross describes
agency theory as “a relationship… between two… parties when one, designated as the
agent, acts… on behalf of… the other, designated [as] the principal, in a particular
domain of decision problems.”124 It is used to describe and prescribe outlets for principalagent relations that involve delegated authority, “resulting in problems of control, which
has been applied to a broad range of substantive contexts across different disciplines.”125
These ‘problems of control’ stem from the distinctive – and sometimes divergent –
interests of principals and agents.
Principals, or owners, cooperate with their agents, or managers, in the oversight of
projects. Typically, P3 literature denotes public authorities with a principal role and SPVs
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with an agent role, though multiple principal-agent perspectives can be found.126 While
principals hire agents and retain eventual ownership of the asset in question (i.e. public
infrastructure), they depend on agents to manage projects, thus leading to a progressive
separation of power.127 Because P3s generally revolve around output-based contracts,
agents retain some input-based autonomy. As agents become more autonomous in how
they conduct business for principals, they attain more control over a project’s input.
Agency theory frameworks adopt the realist perspective that both principals and
agents are self-interested actors seeking to maximize their utility. Thus, as maximal
utility agents, they may have diverse objectives that can compromise project cooperation.
From the perspective of a principal owner – i.e. the government – the main problem of
cooperation in agency theory is ensuring that the interests of managers fall into alignment
with the interests of owners.128
When applied to P3s, agency theory investigates the tasks and responsibilities of
self-interested actors in the presence of potential moral hazard issues. P3s create
environments conducive to moral hazards and, through research premised on agency
theory, scholars find that P3 agents are inclined towards strategic behaviour when
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confronted with: (i) opposite objectives from their partners 129 and/or (ii) negative
production externalities.130 Figure 3.1 presents a typical principal-agent relationship.
Figure 3. 1: Traditional Principles of Principal-Agent Relationships

3.2.1 The Principal-Agent Issue of Adverse Selection
Chapter 2 delineates many procurement steps of the P3 process. In particular, it
explains the tender process, where public authorities issue RFQs and RFPs to private
bidders in an attempt to select a preferred proponent through competitive selection.
Public authorities (i.e. principals) provide malleable – or at least negotiable – risk
allocation frameworks in conjunction with RFPs. Then they invite qualified bidders to
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conduct their own assessments of the project risks involved. Through their own PRM
processes – which are explained in detail in Chapter 4 – private bidders provide public
authorities with their respective takes on: (i) risk probabilities, (ii) potential risk impacts,
(iii) risk mitigation proposals, and (iv) associated risk premiums.131
Competition within the P3 tender process is critically contingent on opportunistic
possibilities of contract renegotiation. For example, if strategic private bidders expect to
renegotiate their contract after financial close, they could renegotiate for higher risk
premium rates or decreased project input – this leaves public authorities with less
efficient bidders than they initially perceive at financial close.132 Consider, during the
RFP stage, each SPV’s bid should be based on an authentic estimate of what will be the
net cost of the project including adequate risk premiums to account for potential
alterations in a project’s future environment.
The preferred proponent selected after the RFP stage should be relatively efficient
and economical compared to its competitors. However, due to the aforementioned issues
of agency theory, bidders may provide public authorities with unsolicited bids. Two types
of competitors present a deceptive advantage at the RFP stage: (i) subjective SPV bidders
that evaluate future costs and risks poorly and (ii) immoral SPV bidders that assign lower
probabilities of risk towards expensive scenarios, because these bidders are prepared to
enact strategic methods to protect themselves from paying from such scenarios. These

131

Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of
Social Infrastructure.”
132
Monteiro, “Risk Management,” 274-277; Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation
Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria,” 210.
51

types of private bidding agents are referred to as “the fools” and “the corrupt” in P3
literature.133
These two seemingly efficient yet deceptive SPV bidders present an apparent
advantage to public authorities during the tender process because they are able to
compensate for underproduction with lower risk assessments. Thus, they are able to
produce deceptively lower RFP bids than that of their competitors, who may have been
more efficient.134 In this case, governments “may succumb particularly where… [they do
not] have a clear framework for dealing with unsolicited bids or where… [they are] fully
‘sold out’ based on the optimism bias of the private sector.”135
While preliminary project assessments (e.g. P3 screening) and competitive
selection procedures (e.g. RFPs) are used as means of circumventing the likelihood of
adverse selection of project partners and risk bearers, scholars advise public authorities to
be more prudent and judicious towards contractual negotiations with private partners.136
3.2.2 The Principal-Agent Issue of Project Risk Management
Once a P3 contract is signed, the public authority’s control of the project transfers
to its SPV partner, creating issues like asymmetrical information sharing over the
project’s DBFOM. From the SPV’s perspective, post-contractual PRM is premised on
maximizing profits, even at the expense of a project’s DBOM (e.g. utilizing sub-standard
resources to save money). From the public authority’s perspective, post-contractual PRM
133
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is premised on identifying conflicting goals between a government and its agents and
implementing measures to limit the self-interested behaviour of private agents (e.g.
through project oversight, control mechanisms, and incentive schemes). By enforcing
contractual clauses and providing incentive schemes, public authorities inhibit
strategically malicious conduct from private partners.137
Unlike transaction cost theory models, agency theory places heavy emphasis on
private agents being risk averse opposed to risk neutral.138 Thus, economic scholars note
that contractual ex post principal-agent issues entail not only progressive separation of
control, but risk-sharing too.139 Post-contractually, public authorities must be prudent
about the aforementioned issues of (i) conflicting motives between public-private
partners and (ii) managing private partner behaviour. Pre-contractually, public authorities
must also be prudent about private agent attitudes towards risk identification and
assessment, as their evaluations affect contractual negotiation over risk transfer before
reaching financial close.
In essence, differing perceptions of risk result in different recommendations over
proposed risk mitigation tactics for a project’s DBFOM. Thus, information asymmetry
between public authorities and SPVs may arise strategically from ‘corrupt’ agents or
authentically from ‘fools.’140 This is why P3s benefit largely from pre-contractual PRM –
137
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which entails negotiation between public authorities and SPVs – to arrive at “final” risk
transfer.141
3.3 Defining Risk
Before explaining the pre-contractual PRM process in detail, it is important to
develop a sound definition of risk. P3 PRM literature contains varying definitions of risk,
some of which reference risk as a function of uncertainty. Al-Bahar and Crandall define
risk as “the exposure to the chance of occurrences of events adversely or favorably
affecting the project objectives as a consequence of uncertainty.”142 Dennis De Clerck
defines risk as “a function of the uncertainty of an event and the potential loss or gain
resulting from the event.”143 From a theoretical level, however, there are fundamental
differences between uncertainty and risk. It is important to demarcate risk from
uncertainty, as the two separate concepts have different applications to P3 PRM.
3.3.1 The Problem of Uncertainty
Uncertainty lies at the heart of managing risk in P3 infrastructure procurement
projects, as it affects projects in a plethora of ways. There is uncertainty concerning
adverse selection of project partners, uncertainty concerning contemporary and future
project conditions, and uncertainty concerning asymmetric information sharing between
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project partners. This includes uncertainty – both during the procurement phase and
throughout each interim period of a contract’s lifespan – of an actor’s efficiency and
efforts to deliver on contractually agreed upon responsibilities.144
This risk of uncertainty concerns “hidden” actions, features, or characteristics of
actors regarding their potential to garner maximum project benefits at minimal costs. As
mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 3, when features of uncertainty are coalesced with
asymmetric information sharing, they can culminate into problems of adverse selection
during a P3 project’s procurement phase. Uncertainty creates concern over an agent’s
proclivity towards moral hazards and strategic conduct or optimism bias and subjective
projections or estimations.145
3.3.2 Distinguishing between Risk and Uncertainty
While the aforementioned examples of uncertainty may be considered in
conjunction with project risks, they differ in an important respect – uncertainties are
much more difficult to forecast with respect to both their probability of occurrence and
potential cost or impact on a project. An uncertainty’s capacity to be empirically assessed
and quantifiably forecasted is considerably lower than a risk’s. Unlike uncertainties, risks
can be measured and forecasted to a degree based on past empirical observations.
Accordingly, risks can be more appropriately mitigated through PRM strategies than
uncertainties.
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A key component of PRM deals with the attempt to objectively quantify varied
levels of chance. Objective quantification is computed by noting the empirical
frequencies of variables and, in turn, developing a probability of occurrence for a risk.
“Uncertainty” – conversely – has traditionally dealt with degrees of randomness.146 This
traditional demarcation between risk and uncertainty has advanced towards a modern
definition of risk premised on subjective distributive probabilities: “each person is able to
represent his [or her] beliefs as to the likelihood of the different states of the world… by a
‘subjective’ probability distribution.”147 Thus, by definition, “all probabilistic situations
[objective or subjective] are a matter of risk.”148
In the context of procuring infrastructure with P3s, risk is associated with
distributive probabilities. In short, distributive probabilities link possible project risks
with various probabilities via ‘ranges’ based on past empirical events. The main
probabilities assessed are: (i) probability of occurrence and (ii) probability that the value
of a variable falls within a certain range (e.g. regarding its potential cost for risk bearers
or project impact). This is an important component of P3 PRM, which is looked at more
specifically in Chapter 4. For now, it suffices to say that risks are broadly defined by their
probability of occurrence and their potential to impact a project, both of which can be
forecasted significantly more accurately for risks than for uncertainties. Accordingly, the
potential consequences of risks can be better projected – and mitigated – through PRM.
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For context, consider a sports betting simulation. Assume that a renowned
professional soccer team – Team 1 – and its academy squad of youth reserves – Team 2 –
are to play a forthcoming match against each other. Obviously, the outcome of this match
cannot be certainly known until the final whistle blows. However, by assessing the
reputation of each squad (i.e. their past performances and the efficacy of their players)
through empirical observation and statistical analysis, an estimated result of the match
can be made to propose a favoured team and an underdog team through betting odds.
Team 1 may be given 3/17 odds, where every seventeen dollars bet for their
victory yields a three-dollar return. Conversely, Team 2 may be given 17/3 odds, where
every three dollars bet for their victory yields a seventeen-dollar return. Clearly, a
successful bet on Team 2 winning yields a higher rate of return than a successful bet on
Team 1 winning, but Team 2’s probability of winning the game is significantly lower
than Team 1’s. From a cost-benefit perspective, a bet placed on either team will consider
the bet’s estimated probability in conjunction with its associated payoff – this is a
calculated risk for which distributive probabilities can be assigned based on the past
performances of each team.
Now consider if this soccer team decides to play a charity match comprised of an
amalgamation of both its senior squad and academy youth reserves. Assume that the
charity match’s two highest-contributing donors – both being fans of the team – are
rewarded for their patronage by playing the role of manager for the charity match. Tasked
with ‘drafting’ their own half of the team, and subsequently managing it during the
match, Donor A and Donor B will take turns selecting players one at a time until every
player on the squad is assigned to one of the two temporary teams.
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If bets are placed before this draft, they will lack rationale based on empirical data
because the teams have not been selected yet and, thus, no probabilities for a winner or
loser can be assigned. Donor A and Donor B could select any combination of senior and
youth squad players for their temporary charity match team. Without knowledge of which
players are playing for which side, bets will be grounded in uncertainty. Only after the
teams are selected will bets be grounded in risk.
3.3.3 Assessing and Affecting Risk
There is, however, one factor that can theoretically influence the charity match’s
probabilities before team selections take place – the aptitude of Donor A and Donor B to
select and manage his or her half of the squad. If Donor A has extensive knowledge of
the team’s players – including its youth academy – and Donor B is merely a casual soccer
fan, than Donor A will be able to make optimal selections that take into consideration
team chemistry, player capabilities, strategic formations, and managerial tactics. Donor A
will be able to directly influence Team A’s odds of winning the game. Thus, the
probability of Team A’s victory becomes more tangible and accessible to betters.
By the same vein, when public and private actors forecast and manage a risk, they
must also consider expectations of: (i) their own potential to influence future situations
and (ii) the behaviour of other influential actors. Thus, risk is assessed not only with
reference to empirical data, but also to the capacities and proclivities of project actors
themselves. This is important to consider, as probabilities of occurrence and potential
costs of risks can be influenced by principals and agents over a project’s lifecycle. This
means that P3 principals and agents have an active role in influencing the risk
probabilities they forecast. Public authorities and private partners are actively assessing
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probabilities while simultaneously protecting themselves against extreme events and
pernicious strategic moves from other actors.149
Risk probabilities change as policies or contracts change (e.g. if the capacity of an
actor to deliver its contractual services increases or decreases). When actors assume risk,
their assumptions are limited to the range of consequences calculated from their
projections. All project stakeholders develop their own individual interpretations and
measurements of risk due to the aforementioned issues of subjectivity and asymmetric
information acquisition.150 Because of this, the assessment and allocation of subjectively
quantified risks – along with associated risk premiums – is regularly contested in P3
negotiations.
Consider, for example, that a project’s risk is calculated through taking its
estimated probability of occurrence multiplied by its estimated project impact. Suppose
an impartial advisory unit undertakes a geological survey of a project’s site and claims
the site has a 1/1000 chance of requiring additional geotechnical engineering before
construction due to poor soil. Suppose the cost of mitigating this risk, if it occurs, is 1000
units. With a cost of 1000 units and a 1/1000 chance of occurrence, the baseline
assessment for this risk is 1.151
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However, risk probabilities are assessed from multiple project angles and multiple
project actors. Depending on which actor is transferring a risk and which party is
receiving a risk, judgments over their probabilities may be swayed due to a plethora of
variables (e.g. different parameters of measure, different calculations, subjective biases,
strategic behaviour, etc.). Often potential risk receivers will evaluate risks with higher
associated premium costs than risk senders.152 So, in the case of the simplified example
provided above, the risk’s receiver may assess the risk with a greater score than one,
indicating a higher premium for bearing it, and the risk’s sender may assess the risk with
a smaller score than one, indicating a lower premium for bearing it.
3.4 Conclusion
It is important to know that if “the probability of occurrence as well as the impact
can be quantified, this event is called a risk.” 153 Conversely, uncertainties are not
quantifiable, only foreseeable. Thus, it is difficult to transfer uncertainties, and their
associated premiums, to private clients – public authorities will often ‘bear the brunt’ of
most project uncertainties.154 Where risks can be transferred, public authorities attempt to
establish well-organized contracts to regulate their principal-agent relationship with
SPVs, acknowledging that private agents are self-interested, risk averse, and susceptible
to bounded rationality.
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The uncertainties of subjective assessment (e.g. optimism bias) and moral hazards
(e.g. asymmetric information sharing) can lead to adverse selection of risk bearers and, in
turn, suboptimal risk allocation. It is important to understand PRM as a dynamic, ongoing
P3 process that can be viewed from many different, and often conflicting, perspectives
between principals and agents.
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CHAPTER 4
PROJECT RISK MANAGEMENT
4.1 Introduction
Risk allocation is typically a more complex endeavor for P3s than for
conventional public infrastructure procurement projects because risks formerly borne by
the government are transferred to the private sector. Thus, identifying, assessing,
classifying, allocating, mitigating, and monitoring risk becomes a crucial component to a
P3 project’s success. To avoid suboptimal risk treatment, scholars suggest PRM should
invoke transparent and systematic procedures, many of which are delineated throughout
this chapter. Chapter 4 expands on the PRM process, introducing key features in PRM
such as the cost-oriented considerations that drive risk allocation in P3s. The two main
factors that drive risk allocation strategies are agents’: (i) risk-bearing capacities and (ii)
cost-effectiveness measures.155
These “strategies” – or the specific measures adopted to manage project risks –
are referred to as risk mitigation alternatives (RMAs), of which risk transfer is only one
of many RMAs used to arrive at optimal risk allocation (albeit a largely significant
one). 156 Because risk management in P3s is a complex, multidimensional issue, its
intricacies can be divided into specific sub problems, which are often propelled by
different perspectives. PRM literature primarily focuses on the perspective of public
155

Lucky Bryce Jatto, “A Review of the Impact of Canadian Law, Policy and P3 Practice on the
Case for Procuring Capital-Intensive Infrastructure Services via P3s” (The University of
Manitoba, 2011), 71-72,
https://mspace.lib.umanitoba.ca/bitstream/handle/1993/4830/Jatto_Lucky.pdf?sequence=1.
156
Jennifer Firmenich, “Risk Allocation Decision-Making Concept for PPP Projects” (Zurich,
Switzerland: Institute of Construction and Infrastructure Management, 2013), 4,
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010127060.
62

authorities. Significantly less research focuses on private stakeholders. Scholars who
explicitly acknowledge this fact attribute it to the scarcity of empirical data on contractual
P3 agreements, which is itself a consequence of the competitive nature of P3s: “SPVs are
often reluctant to share information about their strategies.”157
Empirical research on P3s often attempts to provide descriptive models of the
broad contexts of project risk management, demarcated project stages, and the many
actors involved, with special focus on the conflicting motivations of agents within the
private sector working alongside a public authority. These descriptive models can include
decision models, where possible options and decisions for P3 actors are outlined between
different project stages.158 Chapter 4 focuses on explaining P3 PRM through the lens of
agency theory, which is geared towards the goal of achieving optimal risk allocation
during a principal-agent relationship between a public authority and SPV consortium.
4.2 The State of Research for P3 Project Risk Management
Due to the unique nature of P3 projects – i.e. long-term, multi-agent, publicprivate relations providing public infrastructure and services – their “resulting complexity
can only be managed with an appropriate project risk management.”159 The literature
review of PRM in P3 projects assumes that PRM can be analyzed by assessing public and
private documents that – in conjunction – provide interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed,
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scientific input pertaining to various takes on P3 PRM. In Canada, a central role for
various public committees (e.g. TBS), crown corporations (e.g. PPP Canada), and nonpartisan organizations (e.g. CCPPP) is to develop common, consistent methods to
approach risk allocation for P3s.
The key objective for optimizing risk allocation between the public and private
sector is, as mentioned previously, to achieve VFM with P3 projects.160 Because risk
transfer to the private sector is among the greatest arguments in favour of P3-induced
VFM, suboptimal allocation of risk has great potential to deteriorate a P3’s value. This is
evident especially during risk devolution (i.e. attempts to default risk back to the
government), and subsequent contract renegotiations or legal disputes.161
The most commonly cited risk criterion in P3 PRM literature is the ability and
capacity of a potential risk-bearer to manage project risks. Other significant criteria
include: minimizing foreseeable project costs, assessing the potential impact of risks,
ensuring proper incentive standards are in place for bearing risks, lowering risk
premiums, and awareness of the government’s role as the residual risk holder of P3
projects – often being held ultimately accountable when hidden liabilities arise.162 Some
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scholars argue that broad standards and methodologies for optimal risk allocation have
extended application to P3s in general, 163 while others argue against universally
applicable PRM recommendations, citing that optimal risk allocation is too project and
agent specific to develop generalized standard methodologies for PRM.164
Scholars consider the main contributors to P3 project risk to be the long-term
commitment of project lifecycles165 and the complex nature of contractual relationships.166
The literature presents an overarching criticism against a lack of public transparency, as
well as avoidable project costs associated with both excessive risk transfer and long,
bureaucratic tender developments.167 These issues are often cited in literature aimed at
making recommendations to improve Canada’s longstanding P3 procurement framework.
P3 literature on project risk cites the importance of effective PRM and optimal
risk allocation as preemptive tools against opportunistic behaviour.168 Academics have
observed that risks are allocated for maximal efficiency in theory, but – in practice – risks
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allocation is often premised on variables contributing to the bargaining strength of P3
actors, which is often uneven during contract negotiations.169 Bargaining asymmetries
arise due to multiple factors and, accordingly, they can negatively affect both public and
private actors depending on their context. 170 Further suggestions from the literature
contend that all P3 risks that are not quantifiable – e.g. uncertainties – should be shared or
solely retained by the public sector. Also, contracts should be malleable enough to allow
risk to be assessed – and possibly modified – throughout different stages of a project’s
timeline.171
4.3 Pre-Contractual and Post-Contractual Project Risk Management
The resulting complexities that can ensue within a P3 arrangement – be it DBF,
DBFO, DBFM, or DBFOM – necessitate appropriate levels of PRM. As stated in
Chapters 2 and 3, PRM can be defined by two distinct stages: pre-contractual and postcontractual. In essence, pre-contractual PRM produces optimal risk management schemes
from which public and private partners are in mutual agreeance (i.e. financial close and
final contract), and post-contractual PRM produces managerial oversight to ensure that
the contractual allocation of responsibilities is executed efficiently and viably.172
For the public sector, pre-contractual PRM begins from the moment a P3 is
considered as a potential procurement option (e.g. P3 screening). For the private sector,
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pre-contractual PRM begins during the public sector’s preliminary development of a
potentially forthcoming P3’s competitive selection process (e.g. RFQ). For both sectors,
pre-contractual PRM ends once a P3 contract is signed. A signed final contract marks the
inception of post-contractual PRM, which covers the management of both foreseen and
unforeseen risks during a P3’s entire lifecycle, from the design of a project’s
infrastructure to the end of the private sector’s operational responsibilities (see Figure
2.5).173
For post-contractual PRM, scholars conduct ex post studies of P3 PRM efficacy,
typically focusing on the governing schemes public authorities used that contributed to
either the success or failure of completed P3s. This includes: (i) the management of a
project itself (i.e. the execution of DBFOM phases) and (ii) the public management of a
project’s stakeholder relations (i.e. ensuring responsibilities of SPVs, lenders, and equity
investors are upheld). P3 literature on the former is scarce, which suggests that P3 PRM
literature adopts theoretical frameworks from general project management literature,
extending theories to P3 projects as necessary.174 Scholars provide summaries of public
sector management schemes that are conducive to successful projects.
Public authorities are advised to: (i) provide clear output specifications during
pre-contractual PRM (i.e. to avoid agent subjectivity), (ii) implement symmetrically
transparent performance-monitoring checks to avoid strategic behaviour from the private
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partner (e.g. asymmetric information sharing),175 and (iii) provide equitable payment
schemes to incentivize private partners, establishing united project agendas between
public and private sectors.176
While pre-contractual PRM typically lasts only a few years, post-contractual
PRM can potentially span decades. Despite this temporal disparity, the efforts invested in
the former largely influence the proficiency of the latter. To achieve VFM, precontractual PRM entails rigorous risk analyses to avoid consequential issues that may
arise during post-contractual PRM. P3 practitioners adopt a cost-benefit approach to
optimally allocate project risks, which – in theory – “allow[s] for the management of
risks by the party best able to handle them.”177 However, scholars note that, in practice,
past P3 projects have developed a precedent to suboptimally manage risks during precontractual PRM due to the short-term pressures of project financing and timelines. Thus,
the remainder of a project’s post-contractual phases suffers.178
Chapters 2 and 3 elucidate broad pre-contractual arrangements between relevant
P3 actors. Chapter 4 operates in the same vein, though with a specific focus on precontractual PRM. From a holistic perspective, optimally executed P3s require proactive
risk management during the pre-contractual phase. Because pre-contractual PRM can
‘make or break’ a P3 project, the steps involved in achieving optimal risk allocation
175
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before financial close are critical. Risk allocation entails the transfer of risk, which
undergoes two main levels in P3s: first-step and second-step risk transfer.
4.4 First-Step and Second-Step Risk Transfer
Chapter 2 heavily revolves around the broad relationship between public
authorities and SPV consortiums – i.e. the main ‘partnership’ in P3s. More specifically,
Chapter 2 explains that public authorities utilize P3s to transfer many project risks to SPV
consortiums. This broad transfer of risk, from the public sector to the private sector, is
known as first-step risk transfer. However, P3s are monolithic, complex arrangements;
they entail too many risks and responsibilities to hold only two main actors accountable
for the management of various risks associated with the DBFOM of large-scale
infrastructure projects.
While SPVs are technically liable for risks transferred from public authorities
during first-step risk transfer (and liable to be punished accordingly through pre-agreed
contract stipulations), it is important to remember what an SPV is – a consortium of
multiple joint venture (JV) companies that offer distinct expertise under an array of fields
required to complete P3 projects (i.e. DBFOM responsibilities). While SPVs represent
one distinct firm – in the form of a consortium – their DBFOM responsibilities, alongside
the various risks associated with them, are allocated to various JVs on a multidimensional
level through second-step risk transfer.
To ensure that distinct P3 project tasks – and the risks associated with them – are
accounted for, SPVs must transfer project risks alongside tasks. Thus, SPVs experience
two risk transfer levels: (i) on a macro level, the initial risk transfer comes from a public
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authority to a private SPV consortium and (ii) on a micro level, the secondary risk
transfer comes from an SPV consortium to multiple JVs.179 Figure 4.1 represents firststep and second-step risk transfer between a public authority, SPV, and multiple JVs.
Figure 4. 1: Model of First-Step and Second-Step Risk Transfer180

A benefit of second-step risk transfer for SPVs is that it makes it more difficult
for private JV partners to default risks back to the SPV (i.e. second fall-back level). This
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is also meant to aid in preventing risk devolution from the SPV to the public authority
(i.e. first fall-back level). However, private parties – both SPVs and JVs – frequently
attempt to renegotiate risk allocation post-contractually, and thus risk devolution
frequently takes place, at least partially, in P3 projects.181 Therefore, second-step risk
transfer necessitates careful monitoring and oversight from risk senders during postcontractual PRM.
After the government transfers risks and responsibilities to the SPV, the SPV will
allocate as many risks amongst its JVs as possible (i.e. specific risks dealing with design,
construction, financing, and – if the P3 contract permits – the continued operation and
maintenance of the infrastructure). This protects the SPV, making JVs liable for potential
mishaps or suboptimal performances that fall under their specific responsibilities. 182
However, even after transferring risks, primary risk senders are still primary risk
holders.183 As Jennifer Firmenich and Marcus Jefferies note, even “after risk transfer, the
risk sender bears the ultimate responsibility.”184
While concerted efforts are put into pre-contractual PRM to achieve optimal risk
allocation,185 risk recipients may still default risks back onto risk senders. This creates the
potential for legal conflicts between JVs, SPVs, and public authorities. These issues can
last for years – well after the completion of a project’s construction phase – and they can
181
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be very expensive, costing millions of dollars. Consider, for example, an SPV needing to
replace constructed girders for a highway because one of its JVs fails to meet the public
sector’s quality regulations. This issue arose during the construction of a P3 project in
Windsor, Ontario – the Right Honourable Herb Gray Parkway.
4.4.1 Case Study: The Right Honourable Herb Gray Parkway
During the construction of the Right Honourable Herb Gray Parkway, the
engineering and construction firm Freyssinet Canada Ltd. – a JV under the project’s SPV
consortium, the Windsor Essex Mobility Group (WEMG) – produced 500 girders for the
project that were deemed unacceptable by the government’s Independent Expert Review
Committee (IERC).186 The IERC cited “serious financial implications, time delays, and
impacts associated with the [girder] issues.”187 There were also issues with connector
bearings not meeting the Ontario Ministry of Transportation’s (MTO) standards.188
These construction mishaps led to larger financial problems down the line for the
WEMG. Because construction controversies threw the parkway’s schedule “out of
kilter,” the WEMG failed to meet its deadlines with the government, putting the SPV “in
a penalty situation and paying in the order of $100 000 plus per day to Infrastructure
Ontario.”189 Unfortunately, due to the respective levels of bureaucracy and transparency
in P3 contracts – that is, the extensive amount of the former and the general lack of the
186
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latter – this project is presently still in dispute with little knowledge divulged to the
general public regarding the status of these heavy fines.
A WEMG spokesperson responded to this incident with secrecy, stating that the
SPV’s “construction team does not discuss internal contractual matters.”190 That being
said, if “Infrastructure Ontario lets the penalty slide, it would set a dangerous precedent
for other… [P3] projects should they also not be completed on time.”191 Freysinet, the
WEMG’s JV company responsible for the parkway’s faulty girders, “may be targeted
legally by [the] WEMG to take some financial responsibility for the penalties owed to the
government.”192
Because of second-step risk transfer between the WEMG and Freysinet, the
WEMG is not immediately responsible for paying the government fines associated with
the project. However, ultimate accountability for the project’s mishaps must be settled in
court proceedings, which have been ongoing for roughly half a decade. This short case
study outlines the potential for dispute between public authorities, SPVs, and JVs by
adverse risk threats being realized during post-contractual PRM. Due to discrepancies
between parties over pre-contractual agreements and post-contractual occurrences (i.e. ex
ante risk allocation and ex post risk treatment), legal disputes like this are common
during P3 project lifecycles.193
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Thus, pre-contractual PRM does not preclude post-contractual renegotiation,
mediation, or – in this case – legal dispute. Further, this case study highlights the
importance of optimally mitigating risks early on by transferring responsibilities only to
actors that have the capacity to manage them.194 Often, it is safer for SPVs to pay
appropriate insurance and risk premium fees than it is to take chances transferring risks to
JVs that may default on them due to insufficient risk-bearing capacities.195
4.5 Risk Identification, Assessment, Classification, and Mitigation
The oversight of P3 infrastructure projects that necessitate lifecycle PRM must
constantly consider various project actors, phases, and assignments. Foreseeable risks,
which are assigned distributive probabilities of occurrence, will have generally known
causes and measurable impacts. Hypothetically, if a P3 project’s planned phases and
assignments carry out ideally without risk-induced deviation, this project would mirror its
“reference scenario.”196 Practically all P3 projects experience some form of deviation
from their original reference scenario, however, so reference scenarios are used as
benchmarks to calculate the degree to which certain risks have impacted a project.
Potential deviations may be positive (i.e. opportunities) or negative (i.e. threats).
While ‘risk’ is often connoted with adversity in P3 literature, it can also present
opportunities to increase project profitability beyond original reference scenario
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estimations. 197 This double-sided nature of risk provides potential for P3 actors to
experience a higher rate of returns than original reference scenarios predict due to, for
example,

higher-than-expected

efficiency

gains

(e.g.

through

innovation

or

entrepreneurship). To comprehend a risk – and its potential to present an opportunity or
threat – its cause and impact must be assessed in relation to the project’s different actors,
phases, and assignments. More specifically, a risk must be measured in relation to which
actors, phases, and assignments are likely to affect, or be affected by, it.
Once risks are identified in infrastructure projects, they are assessed either
qualitatively or quantitatively.198 Literature on P3 project trends suggests that the latter is
used in most risk assessments. 199 For quantitative risk assessment, a P3’s reference
scenario and its various levels of risk analyses are combined to facilitate optimal risk
allocation. Different levels of risk analyses between the public and private sector include
PSCs or shadow bids. The deterministic method is a simplified means of quantitatively
assessing risk, where the probability of event A occurring (0 < A < 1) and its potential
cost or impact (C) are multiplied to determine the risk’s value (V). Thus, V = A x C. This
deterministic methodology can be applied to the hypothetical site from Chapter 3, where
poor ground conditions may require extra geotechnical engineering. The risk value of 1 is
197
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derived from a risk assessment where the probability of the risk occurring is 1/1000 and
its cost, or impact on the project, is 1000. Thus, V = 0.001 x 1000 = 1.200
The probabilistic method of assessing risk – which is both more complex and
accurate than the deterministic method – is the prevailing means of risk assessment in
P3s. First, P3 practitioners determine a risk’s probability of occurrence akin to that of the
deterministic method (e.g. the probability of a site’s soil being poor is 1/1000). Second,
the risk’s potential cost, or impact, on the project is assessed by expert estimates using
three separate values – opposed to just one value in the deterministic method – pertaining
to the potential impact’s: minimal value, modal value, and maximal value. Third,
practitioners utilize computational software by inputting the three separate risk impact
values and turning them into aggregated distributive probability functions. The
aggregated values associated with each individual risk, a combination of risks, or the
whole project itself can then be derived via computational simulations (e.g. Monte
Carlo).201
Both scholars and practitioners use computational simulations like Monte Carlo to
assess the plethora of probabilities associated with P3 risks. They require advanced
expertise as well as advanced software and are conducted throughout a project’s lifecycle
to account for the constantly malleable landscape of P3 PRM. During risk assessment –
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or, more broadly, PRM in general – misconceptions often arise due to humanity’s
cognitive, error-prone limitations. 202 The principal-agent relationship between public
authorities and SPVs faces many limiting impediments against optimal risk allocation,
especially pertaining to subjective assessment (e.g. optimism bias) and strategic
behaviour (e.g. asymmetric information sharing).
Thus, to achieve optimal risk allocation, P3 PRM requires the interdisciplinary
input of both public and private sector practitioners to develop systematic, standard
procedures for risk assessment and, accordingly, risk allocation. 203 Of course, risk
allocation must still consider the self-interest of principals and agents. For risk
assessment and allocation specifically, finding middle ground can be a timely and costly
endeavor mired in conflicting motives. Opportunism – be it through willful ignorance or
intentionally pernicious strategy – remains a genuine concern for both public and private
actors. Figure 4.2 demonstrates the pre-contractual PRM process, which mitigates the
potential for suboptimal risk treatment in P3 projects.
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Figure 4. 2: Pre-Contractual Project Risk Management Cycle204

204

Summative adaptation of Ibid., 82 and VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A
Guide,” 16.
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the typical processes taken by public and private sector
actors in identifying, assessing, classifying, and mitigating risks so that they can be
properly accounted for before a P3 contract is signed. Because only identified risks can
be assessed and managed, PRM typically begins with identifying risks. Following the
identification of risks is risk assessment. As mentioned above, risk assessment can be
complex and multifarious, especially when developing aggregated probabilities and
appropriate premiums for risks. Final risk assessment proposals to project partners should
be “as detailed, as necessary and as simple as possible.”205 Because P3s generally require
long lifecycles and complex agreements, they benefit from early risk assessments using
refined quantitative methods such as probabilistic assessment and Monte Carlo
simulations.206
After risks are identified and assessed, they are classified. Risk classification
associates risks with their respective probability of occurrence, potential for project
impact, and – subsequently – a range of appropriate premiums for potential risk bearers.
This process hastens risk transfer by providing the information necessary to begin
considering risk mitigation alternatives and, accordingly, relevant parties that may bear
respective risks. In summation, risk classification schemes alleviate public authorities
from the potential of recurrent renegotiation and mediation pertaining to which parties are
responsible for – and the degree to which parties are responsible for – specific risks.207
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Together, risk identification, assessment, classification, and mitigation proposals
represent the pre-contractual risk management cycle, which deals with a party’s ability to
assess risks based on their current knowledge of the project’s landscape. In practice,
many of these steps do not occur in isolation. 208 Nonetheless, Figure 4.2 serves as a useful
framework in providing a template for pre-contractual P3 PRM steps. These steps occur
repeatedly throughout a project’s phases well before contract negotiation and financial
close (e.g. during preliminary testing, PSCs, and shadow bids). The aforementioned
principal-agent issues of moral risks and optimism bias are common threats during the
pre-contractual risk management cycle.
Figure 4.3 presents more in-depth explanations for the pre-contractual PRM
cycle’s stages. As a P3 project gets closer to financial close, these steps become more
meticulous and detailed to ensure discrepancies between public and private parties over
risk treatment can be mediated accordingly. Scholars vary in their identification and
demarcation of PRM steps, but their alternative titles label the same general practices.209
Ultimately, the pre-contractual PRM cycle’s main goal is to elicit the appropriate
treatment of risks. The official treatment option for a risk is referred to as its selected
‘risk mitigation alternative’ (RMA). After the contract is signed, proactive RMAs are
implemented and reactive RMAs for future risks are prepared. Different RMA strategies
are delineated in Figure 4.4.
208
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Figure 4. 3: Pre-Contractual Project Risk Management Cycle – Clarified Steps210
STEP

Risk Identification

Objective Consider all plausible
risks and their costs

Risk
Assessment

Risk
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Evaluate
identified risks
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their cost
Assessed risk
inventory
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Input
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Output
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Risk impact
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organized risks
RATIONALIZING PROCESS ELEMENTS
Process
i.e. documentation; project analysis; HR qualification check; selection of methods
Risk structuring;
Identify risk
Methodical
Methodically identify
project-specific risk
factors;
analyses of
risk mitigation
analysis;
aggregate data; project risks
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repeat
(computation) probability/impact
Subjective
Analyses:*
Methods:**
Methods Contract analysis;
Risk checklists
expert analysis ABC; equidecision table;
risk-contour;
decision-tree, utility
impact;
analysis, simulations
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(e.g. Monte Carlo)
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Inaccurate risk Misinterpretat- Inappropriate risk
Threats
assessment
ion of risk
assessment/allocation
severity
due to strategic
behaviours or
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* Various methodical analyses used in P3 projects. These processes are not made public; like
most pre-contractual work in P3s, their distribution is tightly constrained under contractual
agreements between and within government entities and private companies.
** Various methodical identification schemes used in P3 projects. This process is also mired in
transparency issues, though scholars have applied such schemes to their publications on P3 risk
assessment and allocation for hypothetical projects.

For pre-contractual PRM, risk assessment is not conducted with finite numbers
and variables. While PRM benefits from repeated expert correspondence, which is
continually aggregated and reappraised, it still ultimately relies on subjective judgments.
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This requires the acquisition of qualitative information that, upon continual assessment
and data aggregation, becomes progressively quantitative. Figure 4.3 presents a general
outline of the methodologies utilized in pre-contractual PRM. These steps present their
own unique objectives and processes, which are critical to developing optimal RMAs.
PRM requires RMAs for most risks, and a RMA should be developed for any
relevant risk taker to ensure that risk is optimally allocated. More specifically, by
providing RMAs for all potential risk bearers, the risk bearing capacity of competing risk
takers – as well as their accompanying risk premium offers – can be compared. This is
how optimal risk allocation is achieved; the actor best equipped to handle a risk is
considered via its risk-bearing capabilities and its associated risk premium costs.211 Thus,
RMAs are considered in conjunction with: (i) a risk’s probability of occurrence, (ii) a
risk’s potential to impact a project, (iii) the capacity of potential risk senders and bearers
to influence a risk, and (iv) the risk premium associated with transferring a risk to
potential bearers. The main strands of RMAs include risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk
transfer, and risk acceptance.
The underlying assumption during pre-contractual PRM is that the government
retains all risks by default until risks are transferred.212 Though, in some instances, public
authorities may make contractual clauses that stipulate that the private sector must bear
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unforeseen or unspecified risks.213 If the government transfers a risk to an SPV, the SPV
transfers all risks it can amongst its various JVs under the consortium through secondstep risk transfer. The processes involved in each main type of RMA are outlined in
Figure 4.4.
Figure 4. 4: Risk Mitigation Alternatives for a P3214
Risk Mitigation
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Ultimately, some party must accept each project risk. If a risk has not undergone
specific RMA treatment in the P3 contract – i.e. residual risk – the government typically
assumes responsibility for bearing it.215 If risk transfer is chosen to be the optimal RMA
for a risk, its bearer will try to decrease its potential impact, or cost, and probability of
occurrence, if possible. In theory, each RMA action – be it avoidance, transfer, reduction,
213
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or acceptance – should be less costly to the risk sender than the sum of gross risk cost
subtracted by net risk cost.216
4.5.1 Risk Transfer
As shown in figure 4.4, risk transfer is just one of several RMA options under P3
PRM; avoidance, reduction, and acceptance are also feasible RMAs that are implemented
aside from – or alongside – risk transfer. If risk transfer is selected as an optimal RMA,
its sender – be it a public authority, SPV, or JV – should assume that the risk has been
allocated optimally and at a fair cost. 217 The more risks a project transfers optimally, the
more likely it will achieve VFM.
In theory, all plausible RMAs should be evaluated for every individual project
risk so that: (i) all plausible RMAs for all potential risk recipients can be compared and
(ii) the best RMA can be adopted to achieve optimal risk allocation. In practice, however,
a thorough evaluation of plausible RMAs only transpires for risks that are: (i)
quantifiable and (ii) able to be influenced by potential risk recipients.218 The reason for
this is because thorough pre-contractual PRM cycles – i.e. repeated risk identification,
assessment, classification, and mitigation considerations – is expensive and timeconsuming. The procedures outlined in Figures 4.2 And 4.3 require repeated data
aggregation before optimal RMAs become apparent.
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From a cost-benefit perspective, the resources required to select a preferred RMA
should not outweigh that RMA’s eventual payoff for being managed optimally. If a risk
is not quantifiable and unable to be influenced by risk recipients, there is little point in
investing the resources required to develop an optimal RMA strategy during precontractual PRM stages. In fact, if a risk is not quantifiable, it is considered an
uncertainty and it is unlikely that it has a foreseeably optimal RMA strategy to begin
with. 219 In Chapter 3, risk was distinguished from uncertainty because it could be
quantified using distributive probabilities. More specifically, risk is quantified in relation
to both its probability of occurrence and potential project costs or impact, both of which
are measured between risk senders and risk bearers.
Uncertainties may be foreseeable (e.g. hypothetically conceiving that a natural
disaster would damage a P3 infrastructure project during post-contractual PRM); these
are referred to as first-degree uncertainties. If a first-degree uncertainty is identified as a
potential threat to the project, it will still likely lack thorough RMA consideration
because of its unpredictable probability of occurrence and impact on the project.220
Second-degree uncertainties are uncertainties that remain unidentified and, accordingly,
left out of a P3’s contract altogether. Second-degree uncertainties leave projects
susceptible to increased contract mediation and legal disputes depending on the severity
of their impact.221
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In theory, to reduce the potential impact of project uncertainties, P3 scholars
advise the insurance of all insurable risks and first-degree uncertainties.222 In practice,
some insurable risks and first-degree uncertainties are overlooked due to cost-oriented
strategies on behalf of public and private actors.223 Public authorities pay risk premiums
and insurance fees indirectly through their payment mechanisms with SPVs.224 SPVs pay
risk premiums and insurance fees directly through monetary agreements with project
lenders and equity investors.225
If project risks or uncertainties are uninsurable, the next step is to assess if they
are quantifiable.226 As stated previously, uncertainties are unquantifiable and risks are
quantifiable. The general principle in P3 PRM is that public authorities should retain the
threats of all uncertainties to a degree – either the public authority solely bears the
uncertainty or it shares this responsibility with the private SPV. If a project uncertainty is
shared, it should contain a risk cap for the private actors involved.227
The last main consideration for risk transfer pertains to the ability of potential risk
senders and receivers to influence the risk or uncertainty (i.e. measurable means of
reducing their impact, cost, and/or probability of occurrence). With regard to
uncertainties, as stated above, the public sector should bear an uncertainty’s potential
222
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‘opportunities’ or ‘threats’ in all instances, and the private partner should only share this
responsibility with the public sector if it has the capacity to influence potential
outcomes.228 Risks that cannot be influenced by either party, which are generally taken by
the public sector, are considered “exogenous risks.”229 The aforementioned considerations
for uninsurable risks and uncertainties – during first-step risk transfer – are expressed in
Figure 4.5.
Figure 4. 5: Risk Transfer Principles for Uninsurable Risks and Uncertainties in P3s
Risk/Uncertainty
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Risk
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Public
Private
Compare
Shared; Public
Shared;
of Allocation
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no cap
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* These general principles relate to first-step risk transfer between the public and private sector.
To apply to second-step risk transfer, the figure’s considerations would have to be modified so
that the default risk sender is an SPV in lieu of a public authority.
** Further assessment of potential RMAs is required. Potential RMAs are compared so that an
optimal RMA is selected.

The treatment of risks and uncertainties expressed in Figure 4.5 can be visualized
by a decision-tree, which is one of the RMA methodologies expressed in Figure 4.3.
Decision-trees are commonly used during pre-contractual PRM for classifying multiple
variables that must be considered before selecting an optimal RMA for P3 risks. Figure
4.6 provides a broad template for P3 decision-tree methodology in pre-contractual PRM
for first-step risk transfer.
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Figure 4. 6: P3 Decision-Tree for First-Step Risk Transfer

Risk decision-trees, along with a multitude of other PRM methodologies, are used
to rationally choose RMAs after continuously aggregated quantitative expert input.230
While Figure 4.6 deals with first-step risk transfer, this methodology applies to both: (i)
first-step risk transfer, to decide which risks are allocated to which sector, and (ii)
second-step risk transfer, to decide which risks are allocated to which JVs within an SPV
consortium. Figure 4.7 represents the final steps taken before allocating P3 risks in precontractual PRM (i.e. first-step risk transfer).
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Figure 4. 7: Broad Risk Allocation Template for Pre-Contractual P3 PRM231

The consideration of actors’ risk-bearing capacities is especially applicable during
second-step risk transfer because the list of potential risk recipients increases from a mere
public-private demarcation to an array of competing JVs. Remember, in second-step risk
transfer, the default risk senders are SPVs instead of governments and potential risk
recipients expand to include all applicable JVs under the SPV consortium. Thus, there are
more potential risk bearers brought into consideration for risk transfer.
231
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The respective capacities of potential risk recipients are contingent on their ability
to handle risks and the risk premium fees they negotiate. As stated previously, a risk’s
associated premiums are generally contingent on the risk’s probability of occurrence and
its potential for impact. Save for deviations in the assessment of a risk’s premium value
between actors, these two factors have the largest effect on a risk’s associated premiums.
If a risk premium is too high, either: (i) the risk transfer should be increased or (ii) fees
should be decreased. If a risk premium is too low, either: (i) the risk transfer should be
decreased or (ii) fees should be increased.232
To avoid risk defaults, and subsequent legal disputes, risk senders should only
transfer risks to recipients that can handle them ‘best.’ 233 While cost-optimization is a
large consideration for arriving at the ‘best’ risk transfer, risk senders should not be
parsimonious and merely allocate risks to agents willing to bear them at the lowest cost.
Suitable risk premiums should be paid to suitable risk bearers who in turn will do a
suitable job of post-contractual PRM. 234 Risk defaults have harmful impacts on P3
projects and should be avoided through appropriate payment and accountability
mechanisms. Unfortunately, it is difficult to gain contextual insight into how
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governments create risk pricing and risk premium models, as “risk compensation
calculations in the particular P[3] context are lacking.”235
4.5.2 Insuring Risk
Typically, both public and private parties are required to maintain insurance
policies with respect to a large portion of P3 project risks. P3 contracts stipulate required
insurance coverage up to a minimum amount for both public and private parties, and
sometimes a maximum amount for private parties (i.e. insurable risk caps). As noted in
Section 4.5.1, not all P3 project risks are insurable; these risks are heavily borne by
public authorities. For risks that are insurable, it is “common practice… [to include]
minimum insurance package[s]” during early stages of P3 PRM. 236 In fact, public
authorities request that SPVs include proposed insurance policies for transferrable risks
as early as the RFQ stage. SPVs are typically asked to include cost estimations for their
respective insurance partners on insurable risks that cover “physical damage during
construction, loss of revenue due to delays… third-party liabilities, as well as
performance guarantees required by the P[3] contract” in their RFP submissions.237
The involvement of insurance companies is not limited to a financier role; they
are often included in the provision of RMAs as risk management consultants. Thus,
insurance practitioners provide specialized insurance advice that transcends its field and
permeates into the fields of risk delegation itself and PRM as a whole. During precontractual PRM, insurers may assume a consultant role over risk transfer and RMA
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selection. During post-contractual PRM, insurers will provide advice over the treatment
of risks associated with insurance costs. Insurance risk “refers to the risk of the price for
the insurance developing in a different way than anticipated, such that it is not
compensated for by the indexation of the service payment.”238 When insurable coverage
requirements deviate significantly from final contract projections, insurance policies
present a risk threat or risk opportunity to public and private partners.239
Pending provisions in the final P3 contract, where insurance costs present a risk
threat (i.e. insurance costs exceed projections by a stipulated amount), private partners
are entitled to compensation equivalent to the amount insurance costs exceed initial
projections with reference to a benchmark. Similarly, where insurance costs present a risk
opportunity (i.e. insurance costs fall short of projections by a stipulated amount), public
authorities are entitled to symmetrically equivalent compensation in the form of a credit
paid back by private partners who received insurance premiums in excess of what was
required.240
4.6 Conclusion
In theory, a P3 achieves optimal risk allocation through the selection of
appropriate RMAs – derived from a thoroughly exhaustive pre-contractual PRM cycle –
followed by post-contractual PRM, where each actor manages its project responsibilities
and risks as expected. Under the principal-agent framework, the interdependency of a
P3’s execution between public principals and private agents requires trust and
238
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cooperation. To be charitable to the P3 process, most public and private actors have the
mutual incentive of creating optimal risk transfer under a “common destiny…[where]
every player has an interest in the other players not failing.”241
While a ‘common destiny’ – a reciprocal objective to create a sound project
through the optimal treatment of risk – is a theoretical ideal, it is mired in obstructive
constraints. During pre-contractual PRM, optimal risk allocation is threatened by issues
like bounded rationality (e.g. asymmetric information acquisition), subjectivity (e.g.
optimism bias), and moral hazards (e.g. strategic behaviour).242 Together, these threats
can spur opportunistic behaviour from private partners, whereby project bids and precontractual agreements do not align with post-contractual performance. In turn,
premeditated contract renegotiations can occur. 243 To this end, governments must
promote incentive schemes, aligning and uniting the strategic motivations of private
partners and public authorities.
As mentioned earlier, it is important for governments to ensure that P3 projects
are conducted with transparency. To this end, it is difficult to offer further insight on
moral risk. Scholars regularly note that issues of this vein – for example, moral hazards
and adverse selection – exist in P3s, but they are difficult to identify due to a general lack
of contractual transparency.244 Legal disputes and contractual renegotiations of P3s are
241
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tightly confined procedures. Major disputes eventually become publicly known (e.g.
between the Canadian Government, WEMG, and multiple JVs over the Right Honourable
Herb Gray Parkway’s faulty girders). However, their legal intricacies and financial
resolutions remain elusive to the general public.
Moral risks aside, the success of a P3 project is also threatened by subjectivity in
PRM; decision-making modules for P3s necessitate the subjective, albeit expert, input of
practitioners. Scholars offer various measures to combat practitioner subjectivities that
hamper PRM procedures and RMA selection: (i) systematic decision-making modules;
(ii) transparent documentation of decisions; (iii) exhaustive qualification measures to
validate the status of experts that quantify risk and risk premiums; (iv) adequate size of
expert teams; (v) the use of multiple methodologies during pre-contractual PRM; and,
most relevant to the next chapters, (vi) a multidimensional, interdisciplinary approach to
risk allocation.245
Ultimately, considering the treatment of risk over a P3 project’s lifecycle, it is
imperative that this interdisciplinary procurement method is studied through an
interdisciplinary vein.246 Successful P3s require the coalescence of multiple agents from
diverse areas of expertise. Further, the development of P3 literature stands to benefit from
a holistic approach that considers the expertise and concerns of practitioners and scholars
245
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from a multitude of disciplines: political science, law, engineering, mathematics, finance,
business, management science, geography, and economics, among others.247
PRM, as an applied science, must utilize cooperative efforts to present diverse
expert input that can be readily transferred to the P3 industry itself. PRM literature should
develop a systematic transfer of knowledge to real-life P3 infrastructure procurement –
one that considers the input of all aforementioned fields. In light of this idea, the
following chapters present research that revolves around original input from public and
private P3 practitioners from a wide range of professional backgrounds. Their input
specifically pertains to risk allocation preferences during first-step risk transfer.
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CHAPTER 5
RISK ALLOCATION RECOMMENDATIONS IN P3 LITERATURE
5.1 Introduction
The centered focus of Chapter 5 deals with risk allocation during the P3
procurement phase. This entails either: (i) the public sector retaining risks or (ii) first-step
risk transfer – either fully or partially – to SPVs. As noted in Chapters 2 and 4, the P3
procurement phase requires years of pre-contractual considerations from the public sector
– i.e. P3 screening processes – and negotiations both within and between public and
private sectors. Poor pre-contractual PRM, resulting in suboptimal risk allocation, has the
potential to create irreparable opportunity costs in P3s. The significance of planning and
managing risk allocation during this phase cannot be overestimated.248
Chapter 5 complements P3 literature on risk allocation by offering theoretical
insight, and potential guidance, towards first-step risk transfer during the procurement
phase. Research on the public-private relationship is steered by expert practitioner
feedback in Chapter 6, drawing from an interdisciplinary research network of both public
and private sector P3 practitioners. Thus, this research’s strength lies in its multifaceted
focus on risk allocation between public authorities and SPVs.
To recap, the literature reviews of Chapters 3 and 4 – which draw from scholarly
insights and principal-agent considerations – provide broad guidelines for first-step risk
transfer: (i) risks that are solely influenced by the public sector should be retained by the
public client; (ii) risks that are solely influenced by the private sector should be
248
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transferred to the private client; (iii) risks that are partially influenced by both clients can
be shared; and (iv) regardless of the private sector’s influence on uncertainties, the public
client should bear them either in full or to a degree.249 Further, when a risk is being
allocated through an optimal RMA, risk bearers should be able to foresee the risk, gauge
the risk’s potential project impact or cost, mitigate the chances of the risk occurring,
assess whether it can bear the risk if it arises, and receive a reasonable risk premium for
bearing it.250
With gained insight on P3 procurement and PRM processes – supplemented by
principal-agent risk allocation frameworks – Chapter 5 builds on previous chapters by
presenting a core literature database comprised of a dozen articles that focus on risk
allocation between public and private P3 partners. This core database is used to execute
an original study premised on the allocation of contentious risks in P3 projects in Canada.
A cross-comparative analysis of the core literature is conducted to arrive at sound risk
preferences and contentious risk preferences.
In this study, ‘sound’ risk preferences are defined as those that were given the
same allocation preferences across all articles where they are mentioned in the core
literature database.251 Sound risks are not assessed for further research; it is assumed that
their conclusive allocation preferences within the literature signifies a lessened need to
249
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conduct original research on their allocation. Conversely, contentious risk preferences are
defined as those risks that have been allocated to different preferential sectors at least
once amongst the articles where they are mentioned in the core database. 252 The
preferential sectors of allocation for risks in the P3 literature include a spectrum denoting:
sole public allocation, different degrees of shared allocation, and sole private
allocation.253
5.2 Literature Review
The dozen pieces of P3 literature in the core database – comprised of ten
scholarly articles and two central government agency primers – were selected and crossreferenced to arrive at common risk allocation preference schemes and a common
methodological framework for the study. The selected pieces of literature all evaluate P3
risk allocation schemes and were published between 1998 and 2013. Figure 5.1 presents a
geographical depiction of the literature consulted. 254 Figure 5.2 classifies the core
literature database according to the research’s sector of interest, stakeholder perspective,
type of research used, data sources used, subject of study, and methodologies used.
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Figure 5. 1: Geographical Representation of Core Literature Database’s Origins

Figure 5. 2: Classification of Core Literature Database
Classification
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5.2.1 Risk Allocation in the Melbourne City Link Project
Ardnt analyzes a transportation P3 project – the Melbourne City Link (MCL),
worth 1.8 billion dollars255 – from a public-private stakeholder perspective. He assesses
the MCL’s risk allocation scheme using secondary sources under the widely-accepted
principle that “the government intends to allocate risks to those parties it considers best
positioned to assess and manage them.”256 Arndt adopts a qualitative methodological
approach, assessing the project’s risk allocation in light of the MCL’s material adverse
effect (MAE) regime, which “is a tool that helps allocate and share risks.”257
By accessing reports on ministerial portfolios, Arndt notes that “a closer reading
of the documents indicates a further shift of risk to the private sector” compared to
previous P3 projects in Australia.258 He develops an MCL risk matrix for the project’s
risks, noting where the public authority and private partner have: (i) accepted the majority
of a risk, (ii) partially accepted a risk, or (iii) not taken a risk.
In line with the MCL’s MAE clauses, Arndt identifies the following risk
categories: design and construction risks (e.g. design, construction, site, approvals, and
completion);

operation

risks

(e.g.

production,

asset

upgrades,

maintenance,

environmental, and insurance); market risks (e.g. demand, volume, and revenue); sponsor
risks (e.g. consortium, commercial, finance, default, and condition at transfer); sovereign
risks (e.g. legislation, policy, and residual value); network risks (e.g. access regime and
linked infrastructure); and external risks (e.g. force majeure and financial). In total, 26
255
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risks – along with their preferred allocation schemes – are identified under these
categories.
5.2.2 Case Study of Government Initiatives for PRC's BOT Power Plant Projects
Wang and Tiong analyze an energy infrastructure project – the Laibin B Power
Plant – from a public-private stakeholder perspective. While the cost of the project is not
publicly available, the project was solely financed by the private sector.259 It uses the
power plant as a case study to conduct qualitative research on the risk allocation schemes
of build-operate-transfer (BOT) concessions in China. The study adopts a factor analysis
methodology to assess the Laibin B Power Plant’s risk allocation scheme.260 Wang and
Tiong draw from the following data sources: (i) secondary sources (i.e. Laibin B’s
concession agreement, power purchase agreement, and fuel supply and transportation
agreement); (ii) interviews with Laibin B project practitioners (i.e. public officials and
private managers); (iii) literature reviews on BOT-esque procedures and regulations (e.g.
BOT, BOO, and BOOT projects); and (iv) an expert questionnaire.261
After a case study on the Laibin B Power Plant, Wang and Tiong create a risk
allocation matrix for the project. They identify the following risk categories: political
risks, construction completion risks, operating risks, market and revenue risks, finance
risks, legal risks, and competition risk (i.e. adverse selection during project tender). In
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total, 53 risks – along with their preferred allocation schemes – are identified under these
categories.
5.2.3 Partnerships Victoria: Risk allocation and Contractual Issues
The Government of Victoria’s Department of Treasury and Finance (VDTF)
provides an exhaustive three-part primer to guide practitioners in implementing P3s
under the Partnerships Victoria policy framework. The primer’s scope encompasses a
wide range of P3 procurement matters relating to risk allocation and contractual
practices.
Throughout the primer, multiple stakeholder perspectives are considered (i.e.
public-private, public, private, and subcontracted third parties), multiple subjects of study
are considered (e.g. P3 governance, ex post evaluations, key success factors, pre-tender
and tender stages, risk identification and assessment, and risk transfer), multiple
approaches to research are used (i.e. quantitative, qualitative, and theoretical), and
multiple methodologies are adopted (e.g. financial analysis via usage fee reduction [UFR]
formulas and common area payment reduction [CAPR] formulas). For the sake of
brevity, only relevant sections of this primer are identified and classified in Figure 5.2.262
Part One establishes a policy framework with reference to guiding principles for
providing public infrastructure via P3s. Part Two provides the foundations of risk
identification, assessment, and allocation with reference to generic examples of past P3
projects. Part Three focuses on the main contractual concerns of P3 project risk
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allocation. Special attention is paid to Part One, Chapter 4, which develops a risk
allocation framework, and Part Two, Chapters 8-17, which identify a plethora of P3related project risks alongside their respective allocation preferences.
Part Two, Chapters 8-17 proves useful for identifying and defining various
contentious risks for the forthcoming study. Part One, Chapter 4 summarizes much of
what has already been covered in this thesis. Specifically, its covers risk allocation
concepts such as: optimal risk allocation, risk-bearer influence, risk premiums, risk
‘threats’ and ‘opportunities,’ pre-contractual PRM, post-contractual PRM, and the factors
influencing RMA selection.263
Part One, Chapter 4 concludes with reference to an appended standardized risk
matrix that provides a framework for the Victorian Government’s risk allocation
preferences. The following risk categories are identified: site risks; design, construction,
and commissioning risks; sponsor and financial risks; operating risks; market risks;
network and interface risks; industrial relations risks; legislative and government policy
risks; force majeure risks; and asset ownership risks.264 In total, 42 risks – along with
their preferred allocation schemes – are identified under these categories.
5.2.4 PPP Manual Module 4: PPP Feasibility Study, South Africa
In the same vein as the VDTF, the National Treasury of South Africa (NTSA)
provides another comprehensive primer – National Treasury’s PPP Manual – as a
systematic guide to regulate the practices of both public and private P3 practitioners
263
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during P3 project lifecycles. The manual contains nine modules in total. However,
Module 4 is the focus of this literature review. Similar to the VDTF’s primer – which
models its risk allocation recommendations with reference to the Partnership Victory
policy framework – Module 4 of the NTSA’s primer models its risk allocation
recommendations with reference to a national policy framework: Treasury Regulation 16
of the Public Finance Management Act of 1999.265 Treasury Regulation 16 is the chief
legislation governing national and provincial P3s in South Africa. It provides
practitioners with meticulously crafted legal parameters and contains hundreds of
provisions for public and private actors to follow during P3 project delivery.266
Thus, the NTSA’s Module 4 is largely explicative in nature; it provides readers
with precise, detailed instructions on P3 procurement with the goal of aiding in “the
effective and efficient management and use of financial resources.” 267 Module 4
summarizes much of what has already been covered in this thesis. It considers:
preplanning and options analysis (e.g. needs analysis, feasibility analysis, P3 screening,
PSCs, and preliminary VFM using shadow bids); preliminary project drafts (e.g.
developing output specifications, a project reference scenario, and early competitive
process documents); competitive selection processes (e.g. due diligence from the private
sector, developed VFM tests, and RFPs); and, eventually, a final risk allocation scheme.
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Like the VDTF’s primer, the NTSA’s Module 4 covers multiple stakeholder
perspectives, subjects of study, approaches to research, and methodologies. While the
module covers the P3 process broadly, it draws a specific sector of interest – the health
sector – via a case study of a construction project for a hypothetical hospital.268 Specific
attention is paid to the module’s matrix approach “to weigh up the evaluation of…
option[s]… to assist in the choice of the best one[s].”269 The module considers possible
project impacts on both public and private stakeholders when constructing the matrix.
The NTSA notes the value of risk matrices during all P3 procurement phases: “A
comprehensive risk matrix is a fundamental component of P[3] procurement as it is used
to identify and track risk allocation throughout the drafting of the P[3] agreement, the
bidding process, P[3] agreement negotiation and financial closure.”270
Its standardized P3 risk matrix for the hypothetical hospital identifies the
following risks: availability risks, completion risks, cost overrun risks, design risks,
environmental risks, exchange rate risks, force majeure risks, inflation risks, insolvency
risks, insurance risks, interest rate risks, latent defect risks, maintenance risks, market
demand and volume risks, operating risks, planning risks, political risks, regulatory risks,
residual value risks, resource input risks, subcontractor risks, tax rate change risks,
technology risks, and utilities risks. Unlike most pieces of literature in this study’s core
database, the NTSA does not classify project risks under broad categories. Thus, the

268

For example, Module 4 uses financial analysis to arrive at the net present value (NPV) of the
hospital’s projected cash flow during the PSC phase. Its PSC reference model of the case study
adopts a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis to arrive at an NPV calculation to determine the
case study’s project costs. See NTSA, “National Treasury PPP Manual - Module 4 : PPP
Feasibility Study National Treasury PPP Practice Note,” 55.
269
Ibid., 13.
270
Ibid., 27.
105

aforementioned 24 risks – along with their preferred allocation schemes – are identified
independently.271
5.2.5 The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Construction Projects in the UK
Li et al. take a generalized focus on P3s without a specific industry of interest.
They develop a risk allocation framework for public authorities under the United
Kingdom’s private finance initiative (PFI), adopting a public-private stakeholder
perspective. They use an expert questionnaire to arrive at risk allocation preferences for
various P3 project risks (i.e. between public, private, and shared sectors of allocation).
Their respondent pool comprises expert practitioners from both the public and private
sector.272 They adopt a meta-classification approach to risk identification, assorting risks
by their respective levels: macro, meso, and micro.
Macro level risks are exogenous risks (i.e. external project risks that cannot be
influenced). Meso level risks are project-related risks occurring within a P3’s “system
boundaries” (e.g. foreseen project risks during DBFOM implementation processes).
Micro level risks are party-related risks that arise due to stakeholder relationships during
PRM (e.g. moral hazards or optimism bias); these risks arise due to the aforementioned
principal-agent relationship between public authorities and SPVs, where it is assumed
that the public principal is driven by providing social services and the private agent is
driven by maximizing profits. 273
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The three meta-classification categories contain sub-categories that classify risks
of a specific nature (i.e. akin to the previous literature from Arndt, Wang and Tiong, and
the VDTF). Li et al. note that, by adopting these sub-categories to classify project risks,
“it facilitates a strategic approach to risk management for public and private sector
project stakeholders… [and] indicate[s] situations where common approaches to risk
analysis, risk treatment, and subsequent risk monitoring and control, can be adopted in
the risk management process.”274
Li et al’s risk catalogue classifies macro level risks as: political risks (e.g.
unstable government), macroeconomic risks (e.g. inflation and interest rates), legal risks
(e.g. legislation changes), social risks (e.g. public opposition to a project), and natural
risks (e.g. force majeure). It classifies meso level risks as: project selection risks (e.g.
land acquisition), project finance risks (e.g. potential investor attraction), residual risk,275
design risks (e.g. delay in project approvals and permits), construction risks (e.g.
construction cost overrun), and operation risks (e.g. operational revenues below project
projections). It classifies micro level risks as: relationship risks (e.g. organization and
coordination risk) and third party risks (e.g. third party tort liability). In total, 46 risks –
along with their preferred allocation schemes – are identified under these categories.
5.2.6 Role of PPPs to Manage Risks in Public Sector Projects in Hong Kong
From the onset of their study, Shen et al. note how the complex, interdisciplinary
nature of P3 megaprojects puts a premium on achieving optimal risk allocation for
project success. Further, they note how potentially divisive principal-agent relationships
274
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between public authorities and private partners compound the significance of optimal risk
allocation:
… construction activity is usually subject to more risk than other business
activities because of its complexity particularly in coordinating a wide
range of disparate and interrelated skills and activities. This complexity is
further compounded in implementing public sector projects where multiple
project objectives are expected by a wide range of stakeholders who have
different interests associated with the projects.276
Shen et al. analyze the Hong Kong Disneyland (KDLD) P3 project from a public-private
stakeholder perspective. They assess the KDLD’s PRM scheme, with particular focus on
its risk allocation framework, to “examin[e]… the ways that the application of P[3s] can
effectively manage risks in project delivery.”277 They adopt a qualitative methodological
approach, assessing the KDLD’s risk allocation framework by means of semi-structured
interviews with senior public officials, followed by factor analysis on the KDLD case
study to provide recommendations on risk allocation preferences for P3 projects in the
recreational sector in Hong Kong.
Akin to Chapter 4 of this thesis, Shen et al. review pre-contractual and postcontractual P3 PRM. They arrive at similar conclusions over the mutual incentive of
collaboration between P3 actors, noting that P3 partners “have an incentive to work
together at an early stage to decide the best way to deliver the required service over the
contract life… This results in minimum lifecycle cost… and… less [project] changes…
during the construction process.”278 Through their own literature review, Shen et al.
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identify the following major risk categories: project-related risks, government-related
risks, client-related risks, design-related risks, contractor-related risks, consultant-related
risks, and market-related risks.279 In total, 13 risks – along with their preferred allocation
schemes for the KDLD – are identified under these categories.280
5.2.7 Risk Allocation in the Private Provision of Public Infrastructure
Ng and Loosemore conduct an ex post case study on a transportation P3 project –
the New Southern Railway (NSR), worth 920 million dollars281 – from a public-private
stakeholder perspective. They analyze the rationale behind the NSR’s risk allocation
scheme, highlighting the project’s “complexity and obscurity of risks… and the
difficulties in distributing them appropriately.” 282 They employ a qualitative factor
analysis methodology by highlighting the main risks associated with the NSR project and
critiquing the RMAs selected during PRM. Ng and Loosemore utilize a range of data
sources, including: semi-structured interviews with senior public and private
practitioners, primary analysis of publicly available contract documentation, secondary
analysis of public and private sector reports and documents, conferences, newspaper
reports, and P3 journal articles.283
This literature review focuses specifically on Ng and Loosemore’s risk
identification and allocation schemes. Instead of allocating project risks to a sector of
preference (i.e. public or private), they recommended risk transfer to specific project
279
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actors (e.g. government, construction contractor, insurer, etc.). By demarcating JVs,
equity investors, and lenders as separate actors under the private sector, Ng and
Loosemore arrive at more specific risk allocation recommendations than their peers.
They adopt major risk categories from Grimsey and Lewis, who identify the
following main types of risk categories: site risks, technical risks, construction risks,
operating risks, revenue risks, financial risks, force majeure risks, political risks, project
default risks, and asset risks.284 In total, Ng and Loosemore identify 36 risks – along with
their preferred allocation schemes for the NSR – under these categories.
5.2.8 Modeling Risk Allocation Decision in Construction Contracts
From the onset, Lam et al. recognize the unavoidable issue of subjective expert
assessment – mentioned in Chapter 4285 – in allocating P3 project risks: “allocation of risk
among the contracting parties… requires qualitative judgment and experiential
knowledge of construction experts. However, it is subjective and implicit.”286 To mitigate
the widely recognized issue of expert subjectivity, Lam et al. deploy a systematic fuzzy
logic analysis, converting private expert input into quantitatively based risk allocation
preferences between the public and private sector. Thus, Lam et al. adopt a public-private
stakeholder perspective, using private stakeholder input and fuzzy logic methodology to
provide a template quantitative model for P3 project risk allocation.
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To recap a major theme of Chapter 4, no matter how many quantitative PRM methodologies
are adopted – and no matter how many times data is aggregated – risk allocation schemes are
always subject to expert input and interpretation, which suffer from degrees of subjectivity. See
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Lam et al. also note the significance of pre-contractual PRM in providing optimal
RMAs, so that “litigation of contractual claims… [do not] come after… in court. The
allocation of risks is thus one of the important decision-making processes leading to
project success.”287 Expert input during pre-contractual PRM suffers from issues like
linguistic vagueness, imprecision, and partiality.
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Fuzzy logic tackles project

complexities that arise from these issues by taking natural language and computing it
quantitatively to arrive at precise, certain variables based on semantics.
Lam et al. take expert practitioner input – i.e. linguistic variables, which are
imprecise qualitative values – and convert it to precise quantitative values by means of
“membership functions.” Membership functions denote “various degrees of membership”
– from 0 to 1 – to a variable (e.g. inflation risk) and a member (e.g. public authority).
Because membership functions are non-binary, Lam et al. are able to model risk
allocation preferences by degrees.289 For example, if fuzzy logic is applied to personal
risk allocation preferences of expert practitioners for inflation risks, and inflation risk’s
membership function is calculated to be 0.20 for the private sector and 0.80 for the public
sector, then it follows that the public sector should retain inflation risks either majorly or
solely.
Lam et al. use a case study model of a railway P3 project issued by the Hong
Kong Government. They assess a contract issued by a private railway company
responsible for the project’s DBFO. The authors obtain expert input for each risk
287

This assertion signifies the importance of optimal risk allocation during pre-contractual PRM
as a means of mitigating risks during post-contractual PRM. See Ibid., 485-486.
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As noted in Chapter 4, this is especially prevalent during the pre-contractual PRM cycle.
Transparency issues like information asymmetry should also not be ignored. See Ibid., 486.
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stipulated under the contract before fuzzifying the data.290 The contract identifies five
main risk categories: capability risks, contractual and legal risks, economic risks, physical
risks, and political and societal risks. In total, 16 risks – along with their preferred
allocation schemes for the railway project – are identified under these categories.
5.2.9 Preferred Risk Allocation in China’s PPP Projects
Ke et al. adopt a public-private stakeholder perspective to analyze risk allocation
preferences in Chinese P3 projects. Similar to scholars before them, they note “each risk
should be allocated to the party best able to manage it and at the least cost.” Ke et al.
conduct a comprehensive literature review to identify common P3 project risks. Their
literature review is supplemented by telephone interviews with P3 practitioners to collect
data on sixteen P3 projects in China.291
Based on the risks identified in their literature review and interviews, Ke et al.
administered a two-round Delphi questionnaire survey to P3 practitioners in China. The
first round asked participants to allocate risks between public and private sectors based
on a five-point scale.292 The second round asked first round respondents to reassess their
original scores after being provided with feedback of the first round’s results.293
Ke et al. apply various quantitative methods (e.g. mean score methodology) to the
survey results to arrive at respective risk allocation preferences to aid public and private
290

This includes the degree to which a risk is foreseeable, assessable, controllable, manageable,
and sustainable to a contractor. See Ibid., 490.
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sector partners in achieving “a balance of distribution of responsibilities and risks and
thus reduce the time and cost of contract negotiation.” 294 They identify seven risk
categories: political risks, construction risks, operation risks, legal risks, market risks,
economic risks, and “other” risks. 295 In total, 37 risks – along with their preferred
allocation schemes – are identified under these categories.
5.2.10 Empirical Study of Risk Assessment and Allocation of PPP Projects in China
Chan et al. adopt a public-private stakeholder perspective to identify, assess, and
allocate principle risks during P3 project delivery in China. They conduct a literature
review of previous studies on P3 PRM, identifying two broad risk classifications:
systematic/country risks and specific project risks. Systematic/country risks include
macroeconomic variables that are beyond the scope of SPV influence. Specific project
risks include microeconomic variables of a specific project that are within the scope of
SPV influence.296 Once all project risks are identified, Chan et al. administer an expert
questionnaire to measure each risk’s weighted significance to P3 projects and arrive at a
preferred allocation scheme.
Each risk’s weighted significance is calculated by multiplying its probability of
occurrence with its potential impact on a project, both of which are measured using a
five-point Likert scale.297 Each risk’s preferred allocation scheme is calculated via mean
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score methodology from a three-point semantic differential scale.298 Chan et al. note that
the questionnaire’s empirical results provided a “general consensus” among public and
private sector practitioners, with slight deviations regarding the degree to which some
risks should be allocated to their respective sectors.299
Chan et al. identify subcategories within the two broad classifications of
systematic/country risks and specific project risks. Systematic/country risks deal with:
political risks, economic risks, legal risks, social risks, and nature risks. Specific project
risks deal with: construction risks, operation risks, market risks, relationship risks, and
“other specific project risks.”300 In total, 34 risks – along with their preferred allocation
schemes – are identified under these categories.
5.2.11 PPP Projects in Singapore: Critical Risks and Preferred Risk Allocation
The purpose of Hwang et al.’s research is twofold. First, they conduct ex post
research on P3 projects in Singapore, identifying positive and negative risk factors that
influence their national feasibility.301 Second, they employ an expert questionnaire survey
to identify both the degree of each identified risk’s criticality and the preferred sector of
allocation for each risk. 302 Thus, the research takes a public-private stakeholder
perspective. Hwang et al. use quantitative methodology to conduct a content analysis,
along with statistical hypothesis testing, on critical success factors and risk allocation
preferences for P3 projects.
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Where “1 = mainly to the public sector, 2 = equally shared between the public and private
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Hwang et al. note that appropriate risk allocation and PRM is “critical for both
public and private parties in P[3] projects to attain their objectives.”303 As is the case with
most literature on P3 risk allocation, they explicitly note the widely accepted principle
that a risk should be allocated “to the party best able to manage it at least cost.”304 They
provide a literature review and subsequent research on: (i) the status of P3s in Singapore,
(ii) the critical success factors of P3s, (iii) positive and negatives factors of using P3s to
provide public infrastructure in lieu of conventional procurement models, (iv) risk
identification, and (v) risk allocation. 305 Specific attention is paid to the latter two
sections – i.e. risk identification and risk allocation – because they are directly relevant in
scope to the forthcoming research.
After creating a catalogue of P3 project risks through their literature review,
Hwang et al. administer their expert questionnaire. Their respondent pool consists of P3

303

Note that risk allocation is merely one element of PRM, albeit a largely significant one. At
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demarcation between the two separate stages of PRM.
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See Ibid., 425, 427-428.
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practitioners whose positions include: project directors, senior managers, junior
managers, quantity surveyors, and “others.” 306 The respondents evaluate each risk’s
criticality by means of a five-point Likert scale and select a sector of preference for each
risk’s allocation. 307 Hwang et al. identify four risk allocation categories: (i) public sector
allocation, (ii) private sector allocation, (iii) shared sector allocation, and (iv) negotiable
risks based on circumstantial project conditions.308 In total, 42 risks are identified and
allocated between these categories.
5.2.12 An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in PPPs in Nigeria
Tolani analyzes risk allocation preferences of P3 actors through a public-private
stakeholder perspective.309 Early on, he stresses that a P3’s VFM hinges on optimal risk
allocation, or “allocating risks to the party best able to manage them optimally.”310 He
also notes agency theory’s affects on risk allocation between public authorities and
private partners. His principal-agent analysis, however, also considers the role of
taxpaying citizens in addition to public authorities and SPVs.311 This observation opens
up a new theoretical framework for conceptualizing principle-agent relationships under
P3s. Moreover, it presents an alternative means of assessing the forthcoming study. This
observation is considered in detail in Chapter 7.
Tolani’s quantitative study utilizes expert P3 practitioner feedback through a
questionnaire. He employs a convenience sampling method to obtain suitable expert
306
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participants ranging from the fields of banking, construction, and public sector agencies.
Tolani notes that public and private practitioners have different perceptions of risk due to
different “risk priorities and mitigation strategies.”312 Accordingly, Tolani demarcates
public and private expert feedback on each risk’s: allocation preference, probability of
occurrence, and potential for impact.
Tolani uses an ordinal scale to measure each identified risk’s preferred sector of
allocation, probability of occurrence, and potential project impact. 313 Like Ng and
Loosemore before him, Tolani distinguishes financiers from SPVs as separate potential
risk bearers.314 However, his study’s risk allocation categories remain broad; Tolani’s
ordinal scale for measuring risk allocation preferences provides the selection options of:
the public sector, the private sector, or “equally shared.”315 In total, 46 risks – along with
their preferred allocation schemes – are identified and allocated between these categories.
5.3 Conclusion
After an extensive review of the core literature database, seven broad risk
categories have been adopted: political risks, construction risks, operation risks, legal
risks, market risks, macroeconomic risks, and ‘other’ risks. A content analysis of the core
database presents 54 identified project risks under these broad categories. To fit the
criterion of an identified risk, a risk must appear in at least two of the dozen pieces of
literature examined.
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The average identified risk appears in half of the literature examined.316 One
identified risk appears in all twelve of the literature pieces examined.317 Two identified
risks appear in just two of the twelve literature pieces examined. 318 A comparative
analysis of the literature shows that, of the 54 identified risks, exactly half – 27 – were
found to be controversial. Controversial risks are described as risks that do not have
conclusive allocation recommendations throughout the core database in which they
appear. Figure 5.3 presents these results.
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I.e. The average risk is mentioned six times throughout the dozen pieces of literature
comprising the core database. This statistic is rounded up from 5.98/12.
317
I.e. ‘change in law.’
318
I.e. ‘protection of geological/historical objects’ and ‘condition of facility.’
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Figure 5. 3: Comparing Risk Allocation Preferences in Core Literature Database
Subgroup
Political

Risk
Termination of concession by government
Expropriation and nationalization
Political/public opposition
Change in law
Unstable government
Project approval and permit
Land acquisition
Influential economic events
Changes in industrial code of practices
Construction
Availability of finance
Improper design
Insolvency of subcontractors
Quality risk
Site safety
Availability of labour/materials
Ground conditions
Site availability
Construction/design changes
Environmental Protection
Labour disputes and strikes
Land use
Waste of materials
Construction cost overrun
Construction completion
Supporting utilities risk
High financial cost
Unproven engineering techniques
Protection of geological/historical objects
Operation
Operation cost overrun
Organization and coordination risk
Operator default
Quality of operation
High maintenance cost
Frequency of maintenance
Low operating productivity
Residual value risk
Residual assets risk
Condition of facility
Legal
Excessive contract variation
Third party tort liability
Asset ownership
Insolvency of Concession company
Market
Income risk
Public fluctuation of material costs
Private fluctuation of material costs
Tariff change
Tax Regulation Changes
Market demand change
Exclusive right/competition
Macroeconomic Inflation risk
Interest rate
Foreign currency risk
Other
Force majeure
Weather conditions

A

B
Public
Public
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A = Arndt (1998); B = Wang & Tiong (2000); C = VDTF (2001); D = NTSA (2004); E = Li et al.
(2005); F = Shen et al. (2006); G = Ng & Loosemore (2007); H = Lam et al. (2007); I = Ke et al.
(2010); J = Chan et al. (2011); K = Hwang et al. (2013); L = Tolani (2013).
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CHAPTER 6
RISK ALLOCATION PREFERENCES OF P3 PRACTITIONERS
6.1 Introduction
The main purpose of Chapter 5 is twofold: firstly, through content analysis of the
core literature database, it develops a risk identification catalogue of 54 project risks;
second, through cross-referencing of the database, it evenly demarcates ‘sound’ and
‘contentious’ risks, where contentious risks are subject to further analysis. Figure 6.1
presents the list of contentious risks assessed for further study.
Figure 6. 1: Contentious Risks Definitions
Contentious Risk
Expropriation and nationalization
Political/public opposition
Change in law
Project approval and permit
Land acquisition
Influential economic events
Changes in industrial code of practices
Availability of labour/materials
Ground conditions
Site availability
Construction/design changes
Environmental protection
Supporting utilities risk
Residual value risk
Residual assets risk
Excessive contract variation
Third party tort liability
Asset Ownership
Income risk
Tariff change
Market demand change
Exclusive right/competition
Inflation risk
Interest rate
Foreign currency risk
Force majeure
Weather conditions

Risk Definition
Due to socioeconomic pressures, the government overtakes a project before the end of
its lifecycle. The private consortium is subsequently not compensated in full.
Project experiences prejudicial backlash from factions in local community
New laws and regulations result in their inconsistent application to project
Unanticipated delay or refusal of required project approvals and/or permits
Unanticipated delay in, or refusal against, procuring land that is required for project
Macroeconomic anomalies on a national or global scale adversely affect local market
Amendments or revisions to industrial code of practice affect project’s development
Subcontractors and/or suppliers are unable to supply staff and/or materials punctually
Unforeseen poor ground conditions result in additional geotechnical engineering
Unanticipated delay in accessing land and/or resources already procured for project
Changes to project terms due to poor preliminary investigation/improper design
Project impinges on environmental regulations; legal ramifications ensue
Required local utilities (e.g. electricity and gas) are unavailable or unfairly priced
After concession period, assets transferred from private to public hands are impaired
After concession period, some assets on project land remain undesignated in contract
Inappropriate contract delegation at financial close, subsequently resulting in excessive
contract mediation/arbitration during the project
A third party breaches project obligations; compensation for damages is required
Costs for owning, operating, and maintaining infrastructure during concession period
Projected income for private sector (toll revenue or government payout) is not met
Insufficient project income due to improper and/or inflexible tariff design framework
Demand, and price, for a service transcends forecasted levels resulting in less revenue
Government revokes exclusivity rights from its selected private consortium, creating a
new competitive project with open to other competitor firms
Unanticipated rise in inflation rates under local economy
Unanticipated rise in interest rates under local economy
Exchange rate fluctuations create unforeseen difficulties converting currencies
Severe events outside of a party’s control (e.g. natural disasters, terrorism, war, etc.)
Unfavourable weather conditions result in project delay and/or impairment
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The general principle driving risk allocation scholarship in P3 literature has been
repeated throughout Chapter 5: every risk should be allocated to the party best able to
manage it and at the least cost. In theory, this concept seems rational and simple. In
practice, as previous chapters have indicated, it can be difficult to follow. Several reasons
have been provided to explain why suboptimal risk allocation occurs (e.g. bounded
rationality,

asymmetric

information

sharing,

opportunism,

strategic

behaviour,

incomplete contracts, optimism bias, etc.), however none explicitly factor into the
research reviewed in Chapter 5.
While these impediments to P3 PRM are frequently cited in the core literature
database, they are not an explicit function of the database’s actual research. The dozen
pieces of literature reviewed do not replicate conditions conducive to – for example –
moral hazards or asymmetric information sharing, because they are conducted in a low
stakes environment with the impartial goal of obtaining scholarly insight into P3 risk
allocation frameworks. In short, the scholars and P3 practitioners who contributed to the
core database’s findings were not operating under principal-agent relationships.
Thus, the bulk of optimal risk allocation impediments linked to agency theory do
not apply to the research findings. Yet, exactly half of the 54 identified project risks are
deemed contentious via cross-examination of the core literature database. This suggests
another major influence is at hand – differing perceptions and, accordingly, differing
preferences amongst P3 practitioners. The literature review from Chapter 5 provides a
solid foundation for identifying contentious P3 risks. It both develops and validates the
selection of the 27 risks included in the expert questionnaire so that their selection for
assessment in Chapter 6 is non-arbitrary.
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6.2 Research Design
Chapter 6’s research adopts psychometric methodology to arrive at a proposed
risk allocation decision model through a diverse research network of P3 practitioners via
expert questionnaire. Insight gained on risk allocation preferences from the core literature
database is supplemented by the interdisciplinary, multifaceted input of in-field public
and private practitioners. Tolani notes, “Questionnaire survey is the most common
research method used to obtain risk allocation scheme[s] in P[3]s.”319 However, this type
of scholarly assessment has yet to take off in Canada.320 The expert questionnaire was
conducted from February 2017 to April 2017 with a sampling frame comprised of
Canadian P3 practitioners equally divided between public and private sector positions.
6.2.1 Application of Expert Questionnaire
A non-probability purposive sampling method was used to develop the sampling
frame of recognized expert practitioners qualified to take part in the study.321 To fulfill
the eligibility criterion, participants had to have in-field experience as a P3 practitioner
from at least one of an array of applicable fields, many of which are identified in Chapter
4 (e.g. financial, legal, political, among others). Potential respondents were sought out
through membership directories of P3 organizations,322 P3 certification programs,323 and
319

Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in
Nigeria,” 211.
320
This is to the author’s knowledge based on an extensive literature review of studies providing
P3 risk allocation decision models premised on expert questionnaire input.
321
This is also known as convenience sampling technique, where the principal investigator knows
the identity of his or her potential sampling frame. One of its benefits – compared to probability
sampling – is that expert respondents can be recruited who are recognized as knowledgeable in
specialized fields. Thus “purposive sampling… can… focus on quality over quantity” when
developing a smaller sampling frame to extract data. See Lisa O’Halloran et al., “Doing
Descriptive Phenomenological Data Collection in Sport Psychology Research,” Sport in Society,
2016, 6, doi:10.1080/17430437.2016.1159199.
322
For example, the CCPPP membership directory.
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known partners under Canadian SPV consortiums or public authorities.324 Practitioners all
hold, or previously held, various roles dealing with P3 risk allocation from distinct
stakeholder perspectives and from distinct industries of expertise.325
In total, 58 practitioners were invited to participate in the research and 24
completed the expert questionnaire. This represents a 41 percent response rate. While 24
samples do not cover a large respondent pool, the number is comparably sufficient when
considering previous studies of a similar nature. For example, Li et al. collected 53 valid
responses with an 11 percent response rate;326 Ke et al. collected 47 responses with a 23
percent response rate; Hwang et al. collected 48 responses with a 40 percent response
rate; and Tolani collected 45 responses with a 16 percent response rate.327
It is believed this study’s high response rate is attributed to the personal method
employed when reaching out to participants. Great care was taken to research the
backgrounds of potential respondents before contacting them, and emails explaining the
study’s purpose and scope included personalized additions explaining why each
practitioner was singled out as an eligible candidate for the project. To encourage a
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For examples from the private sector – JV practitioners under the Gordie Howe Bridge’s three
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higher respondent rate, participants were given the option of remaining anonymous; 11 of
the 24 respondents chose to remain unidentified.
For respondents who filled out personal identifiers, the sampling frame’s
practitioner positions include: a Certified Public Accountant, Chief Administration
Officers, a Chief Executive Officer, a Chief Financial Officer, Chief Procurement
Officers, a Contract Innovations Engineer, Executive Directors, Managing Directors,
Project Directors, a Canadian Senator, and Vice Presidents of firms. To respect the
privacy of participants who withheld their personal information, their specific
occupations have been withheld from this study. The respective profiles of respondents,
regarding their sectors of affiliation, years of experience, and general fields of
specialization, are presented in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6. 2: Background Information of Sampling Frame
Respondent
Profiles
Sector of
Employment
Years of
Experience

Private
Experience
Public
Experience

Category
Public
Private
Withheld
1-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
20 <
Advisory/consulting/legal
Design/build/operate/maintain
Financing/investing/insurance
P3 Agency Employee
Public Servant
Other
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Number of
Respondents
12
12
4
4
4
9
2
1
2
3
7
4
6
2

Percentage of
Respondents
50%
50%
16.67%
16.67%
16.67%
37.50%
8.33%
4.16%
8.33%
12.50%
29.17%
16.67%
25%
8.33%

The questionnaire was divided into three main sections. The first section briefly
explained the research’s scope, purpose, and instructions. The second section obtained
profiles of respondent backgrounds. Optional background questions included the
respondent’s name and years of P3 industry experience. Mandatory background questions
included the respondent’s sector of employment and general field of specialization. The
third section asked respondents to allocate the 27 contentious P3 risks identified from the
study’s core literature database to a sector of preference according to a five-point publicprivate spectrum on a semantic differential scale.
Due to aforementioned issues related to risk allocation in Chapter 4 – namely, the
subjectivity and potential vagueness of risk assessment – a psychometric methodology
was employed to apply quantitative values to the otherwise qualitative linguistic
terminology used to garner expert opinion.328 Thus, the five-point semantic differential
scale was adopted to evaluate the degree to which contentious risks should be allocated
between public and private sectors (i.e. 1 = solely public; 2 = mostly public; 3 = equally
shared; 4 = mostly private; and 5 = solely private).329 Definitions for each project risk
were provided alongside their respective five-point allocation scales to ensure uniformed
comprehension of each risk amongst respondents (see Figure 6.1).
6.2.2 Assuming Equidistance of Semantic Differential Scales
Several methodologies – both parametric and nonparametric – were applied to the
questionnaire’s results, which were calculated via mean score analyses. Mean score
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Firmenich and Jefferies, “Risk Management in PPPs: Emerging Issues in the Provision of
Social Infrastructure”; Lam et al., “Modelling Risk Allocation Decision in Construction
Contracts.”
329
There was also a sixth option offered for each question: ‘not applicable’ (n/a).
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analysis on Likert scales and semantic differential scales necessitates an assumed
equidistance between variables.330 However, Likert and semantic differential scales use
ordinal levels of measurement, which do allow variable values to be rank ordered, but not
in a way that the “distances between the values of… variable[s] are equal and
mathematically

meaningful.”

Equidistant

variables

include

interval levels

of

measurement, where each point on a scale represents a quantifiably equal numerical
difference, contra ordinal variables.331
Dispute over the use of mean score analyses on ordinal data – i.e. the assumed
equidistance of ordinal data – is longstanding between scholars. Because this issue
continues to be “extensively debated among researchers,” the use of mean score analyses
on this study’s ordinal respondent input is recognized as a methodological limitation in
Chapter 7. However, psychometrician Stanley Smith Stevens himself – founder of the
nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio levels of measurement taxonomy – deemed the
interval treatment ordinal data as permissible, stating that “in numerous instances it leads
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Almost all P3 literature employing point scale methods to assess risk allocation claim the use
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to fruitful results.” Thus, this study affirms the use of mean score analyses on its ordinal
data, recognizing the practice as a “pragmatic sanction,” in the words of S.S. Stevens.332
6.2.3 Methodologies for Data Analyses
To calculate the mean scores and standard deviations for each risk according to
public respondents and private respondents, an independent two-sample t-test was
conducted. Before combining the total mean scores of both public and private
respondents to arrive at a total mean score for each risk, the degrees of agreeance within
the public and private sector sample groups had to be assessed to ensure the
questionnaire’s feedback was valid.
The degrees of agreement within both independent sample groups (i.e. public
respondents and private respondents) were measured using nonparametric statistics.
Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance (W) and Chi-square tests validated the hypothesis
that both groups contained significant agreement patterns between their respective
respondents over the allocation preferences of the 27 contentious P3 project risks.
Statistically significant agreement within respondent groups is a necessary prerequisite to
conducting further analysis using the group’s total mean scores as valid data.333
Once the mean values within both public and private sector samples were
verified, the degrees of agreement between these groups was also measured using
nonparametric statistics to see which risks, if any, held statistically significant differences
of perspective between public and private respondents. A Mann-Whitney U test showed
332
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that 5 out of 27 contentious P3 risks held statistically significant differences between the
public and private sector. The independent two-sample t-test identified a sixth risk with
statistically significant sectorial disagreement. This suggests a future research opportunity
in settling the preferred allocations of these six risks. The Kendall’s W, Chi-square, and
Mann-Whitney U, and t-tests were all performed at a 95 percent confidence level.
To arrive at a proposed risk allocation decision model, four types of analyses were
considered: majority opinion analysis, half-adjusting principle analysis, a formula based
on an assumed normal distribution curve, and an original hybrid adjusting principle
model in conjunction with lower and upper confidence levels for each risk. Ultimately,
the latter was adopted in lieu of the first three analyses, all of which are still included in
this study to reflect the limitations they pose for future literature that may otherwise
consider adopting these methods.
Of selected questionnaire-based articles within the core literature database, Li et
al. and Hwang et al. employed a majority opinion analysis to arrive at a proposed risk
allocation decision model for P3s in the United Kingdom and in Singapore, respectively.
These studies recognize four possible risk allocation categories: (i) public sector risks, (ii)
private sector risks, (iii) shared risks, and (iv) negotiable risks contingent on “project
circumstances.” Based on majority opinion analysis, if more than 50 percent of
respondents choose to allocate a risk to either the public sector, private sector, or ‘equally
shared’ categories, then the risk is put in that category. If none of a risk’s percentages
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reach over 50 percent, then its proposed allocation preference is ‘negotiable’ based on
specific project circumstances.334
Majority opinion analysis was one of several methodologies applied to this study.
However, scholars question the reliability and accuracy of studies that use majority
opinion analysis to identify risk preferences between sample groups. Both Chan et al. and
Tolani criticize majority opinion analysis, which is premised on “preponderance of
opinion,”335 arguing that it is “hypothetical and does not [accurately] reflect the industry
practice.”336
Both Li et al. and Hwang et al. use a three-point semantic differential scale to
conduct a majority opinion analysis – without ‘mostly public’ or ‘mostly private’
allocation options – because lower scales are more conducive to definitive selection
preferences. While higher-point scales provide more information than lower-point scales,
a higher percentage of respondents are inclined to “discriminate among categories” with
lower-point scales because options are less dispersed.337 Due to the aforementioned
limitations of majority opinion analysis, its inclusion is not the focal point of this study.
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Thus, while three-point scales are more suited for this type of analysis, this study’s fivepoint scale was retained as the basis for all analysis methods, including majority opinion.
Ke et al. employed a half-adjusting principle to their five-point semantic
differential scale questionnaire to arrive at a risk allocation framework for Chinese P3s.
For their study, risks with total mean scores falling under 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, and 4.5 should be
allocated solely to the public sector, mostly to the public sector, equally between sectors,
and mostly to the private sector, respectively. Finally, risks with a total mean score above
4.5 should be allocated solely to the private sector.338 Like majority opinion analysis, the
half-adjusting principle relies on relatively rudimentary methodology and, ultimately,
presents a lack of conclusive evidence for proposed risk allocation decision models.
The most glaring limitation of using the half-adjusting principle to propose a risk
allocation decision model is that it only allots the ‘solely public’ and ‘solely private’ risk
categories with half a point of space on the five-point scale’s spectrum while allotting a
full point of space to ‘mostly public,’ ‘equally shared,’ and ‘mostly private’ risk
categories. This means that ‘solely public’ and ‘solely private’ each only account for 12.5
percent of the five-point scale’s space while ‘mostly public,’ ‘equally shared,’ and
‘mostly private’ each account for 25 percent of the five-point scale’s space.
This uneven distribution between risk categories becomes blatantly evident when
reviewing Ke et al.’s results. Only one risk out of a possible 37 fell into the ‘solely
public’ category and no risk fell into the ‘solely private’ category. The remaining 36 risks
fell between the other three categories with a full point allotted on the spectrum. Ke et al.
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do not address this limitation. Firstly, they do not directly address the peculiarity of the
‘solely public’ category receiving only one project risk. Second, they suggest that the
‘solely private’ category potentially received zero risks because “respondents may still
believe that private investors will encounter many problems caused by government or
government officers and their actions… [or] due to the sample of survey respondents.”339
To arrive at their risk allocation decision model, Chan et al. and Tolani adopt a
formula based on the assumed distribution of a normal distribution curve:
X10% = U ± Z*σ
Under this formula, X10% = the upper and lower limits within the range from which a risk
should be allocated to either the public sector, private sector, or shared between sectors.
U = the population’s mean value. Z = the corresponding mean value taken from the
normal curve table. Finally, σ = the prescribed standard deviation for the population.340
Here, Chan et al. and Tolani both ‘force’ a normal distribution of their assessed P3
project risks, where a range for categorizing ‘equally shared’ risks is applied,
demarcating an equal share of public and private sector risks to either side of the
distribution curve.341
There are two issues with Chan et al.’s and Tolani’s methodology. First, it
necessitates an arbitrary range (i.e. X10%) of a selected percentage of risks – in this case 10
percent – to be categorized as ‘equally shared.’ Thus, while the means of risks deemed
339
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‘equally shared’ in both studies do gravitate towards the middle of both studies’ scales,
the ‘cut-off’ point between an equally shared category and a public-private category is
based on the personal selection of the researcher.
Second, this methodology requires the assumption that the data analyzed is
normal; that is, the assumption that the combined scores of every risk’s mean equal their
median, that 68 percent of the data falls under one standard deviation, and that the first
and second half of the distribution, on either side of the median, are symmetrical. Neither
Chan et al.’s nor Tolani’s study contain an authentic normal distribution of data. The
fundamental issue with assuming a normal distribution on non-normally distributed mean
values is that it ‘forces’ an equal share of risks to fall into either public or private
categories.
To understand the implications of a forced distribution, consider an extreme
instance where over three quarters of a study’s risks are given a value above 4. Clearly,
over three quarters of the study’s risks should fall under categories denoting a major
degree of private allocation. However, under a forced normal distribution, a third of these
‘private’ risks will be ‘pushed’ to the left of the curve, falling under either ‘shared’ or
‘public’ categories depending on the size of the study’s arbitrary selected range (e.g.
X10%).
To account for the methodological flaws of works cited in the core literature
database, this study employs a hybrid adjusting principle analysis on the upper and lower
confidence levels for each risk. The methodological flaw of using majority opinion
analysis – i.e. preponderance of opinion – is bypassed by analyzing mean scores in lieu of
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their modes. To account for the issue of variance when assessing means, each risk’s range
based on its lower confidence level (LCL) and upper confidence level (UCL) is analyzed
opposed to using a crisp mean value on its own (e.g. for the risk of ‘influential economic
events,’ its LCL/UCL range of 2.610 – 3.473 is applied to the proposed risk allocation
decision model opposed to its mean value of 3.042).
To account for the methodological flaw of using the half-adjusting principle on a
five-point scale – namely, that the ‘extreme’ risk categories of 1 and 5 are each allotted
half the space allotted to their central counterparts, 2, 3, and 4 – this study’s categorical
demarcations are equally divided so that each point receives 20 percent of the space on
the five-point scale. Accordingly, (i) < 1.8, (ii) 1.8 < 2.6, (iii) 2.6 < 3.4, (iv) 3.4 < 4.2, and
(v) 4.2 < represent the categories of (i) ‘solely public,’ (ii) ‘mostly public,’ (iii) ‘equally
shared,’ (iv) ‘mostly private,’ and (v) ‘solely private,’ respectively.
This hybrid adjusting principle, in conjunction with LCL/UCL ranges, also avoids
the methodological limitations of employing a formula based on an assumed normal
distribution of means. Firstly, there is no arbitrary range for which risks should be placed
under an ‘equally shared’ category. Second, because each risk is assessed based on its
own independent mean value and variance, the proposed risk allocation decision model
represents an ‘authentic’ distribution of risks that does not ‘force’ an equal distribution
between publicly and privately allocated risks.342
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Consider, for example, the aforementioned hypothetical situation where over three quarters of
risks are given combined mean values over 4. By assessing each risk independently – opposed to
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Despite their methodological flaws, the majority opinion analysis, half-adjusting
principle, and forced normal distribution formula are all left in this study’s analysis
because of their potential contribution – namely, to start a precedent for future P3 risk
allocation literature to eradicate such imprecise methods from their proposed risk
allocation decision models. This study should catalyze the notion that such analyses are
outdated means of arriving at proposed risk allocation decision models based on expert
questionnaire input, despite the popularity of using such methods in P3 literature.343 Stark
comparisons of results derived between these three methods and this study’s hybrid
distribution model should illuminate the respective shortcomings of the former.
6.3 Assessment of Respondent Groups
Results presented throughout the remainder of this chapter have been calculated
using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and StatPlus software. Microsoft
Excel was also used to: (i) calculate the total mean scores for each risk after calculating
their independent mean scores for public sector respondents and private sector
respondents and (ii) present figures for SPSS and StatPlus-derived results.
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6.3.1 Mean Values within and between Sectors
The independent two-sample t-test does more than provide the 54 independent
and 27 combined mean scores for the 27 contentious P3 risks between sample groups. It
provides context into the degree to which: (i) mean value responses within public and
private respondent groups are similar (i.e. through standard deviations for each mean
score); and (ii) mean value responses between public and private respondent groups are
significantly different (i.e. through the t-statistic and test significance levels). Performed
at a 95 percent confidence level, the t-test shows 6 of 27 risks fall below the significance
level of 0.05. This is shown on the last column of Figure 6.3.

135

Figure 6. 3: Independent Two-Sample t-Test for Risk Allocation Preferences 344
Risk

Group
Public
Expropriation and nationalization
Private
Public
Political/public opposition
Private
Public
Change in law
Private
Public
Project approval and permit
Private
Public
Land acquisition
Private
Public
Influential economic events
Private
Public
Changes in industrial code of practices
Private
Public
Availability of labour/materials
Private
Public
Ground conditions
Private
Public
Site availability
Private
Public
Construction/design changes
Private
Public
Environmental protection
Private
Public
Supporting utilities risk
Private
Public
Residual value risk
Private
Public
Residual assets risk
Private
Public
Excessive contract variation
Private
Public
Third party tort liability
Private
Public
Asset ownership
Private
Public
Income risk
Private
Public
Tariff change
Private
Public
Market demand change
Private
Public
Exclusive right/competition
Private
Public
Inflation risk
Private
Public
Interest rate
Private
Public
Foreign currency risk
Private
Public
Force majeure
Private
Public
Weather conditions
Private
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N
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12

Mean
2.167
1.25
2
1.917
2.333
1.75
2.917
2.583
1.917
1.75
3.416
2.667
3.5
2.5
4.083
4.583
2.917
2.75
2.667
1.75
3.083
3.167
3.083
3
3.583
2.417
3
2.75
2.833
2.25
2.833
2.583
3.833
3.083
4.083
4.333
4
3.917
3.583
3.417
3.417
3.75
2.833
1.333
3.833
3.583
3.917
3.917
4
4.167
2.5
2.333
3.417
3.5

Figures are presented up to three decimal places.
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SD
0.937
0.622
0.853
0.669
0.888
0.866
0.996
1.084
0.793
0.754
0.996
1.371
1.087
1.087
1.084
0.515
0.515
1.215
0.985
0.754
1.379
1.337
1.311
1.044
0.793
1.165
1.128
1.288
0.577
1.288
0.389
0.793
0.718
0.515
0.793
0.651
0.853
0.793
0.996
1.084
0.9
0.965
0.937
0.651
1.03
1.379
1.084
1.379
1.044
0.937
0.674
0.985
0.793
1.243

Mean Dif. Mean Total t Statistic Sig.
0.917

1.708

2.823

0.011

0.083

1.958

0.266

0.792

0.583

2.042

1.629

0.117

0.333

2.75

0.784

0.441

0.167

1.833

0.528

0.603

0.75

3.042

1.533

0.139

1

3

2.253

0.035

0.5

4.333

-1.444

0.163

0.167

2.833

0.437

0.666

0.917

2.208

2.561

0.018

0.083

3.125

-0.15

0.882

0.083

3.042

0.172

0.865

1.167

3

2.869

0.01

0.25

2.875

0.506

0.618

0.583

2.542

1.432

0.166

0.25

2.708

0.98

0.338

0.75

3.458

2.941

0.008

0.25

4.208

-0.844

0.408

0.083

3.958

0.248

0.807

0.167

3.5

0.392

0.699

0.333

3.583

-0.875

0.391

1.5

2.083

4.552

0

0.25

3.708

0.503

0.62

0

3.917

0

1

0.167

4.083

-0.411

0.685

0.167

2.417

0.484

0.633

0.083

3.458

-0.196

0.847

6.3.2 Agreement within Respondent Groups
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) was conducted to measure the internal
agreement of both public and private respondent groups on their respective ratings of risk
allocation. Kendall’s W is a nonparametric test that evaluates the degree of association or
agreement amongst mean values assigned by different respondents (e.g. P3 practitioners)
over the same variables (e.g. P3 project risks). If the value for W exceeds its
corresponding critical value, then there is significant agreement amongst the group in
question over its risk allocation preferences. The critical value is found by connecting the
value’s degrees of freedom (DOF) and significance level. Critical values for Kendall’s W
are presented in Siegel and Castellan’s textbook on page 365.345
At 26 DOF346 and a 0.05 significance level,347 the critical value for W is 0.280.
Kendall’s W for the public and private sector respondent groups is 0.365 and 0.527,
respectively. Thus, while the private sector group of respondents shows more agreement,
both results show significant agreement among respondents over risk allocation
preferences at a 95 percent confidence level. Siegel and Castellan warn that, when the
number of variables being assessed – in this case, risks – exceeds seven, Chi-square is a
more accurate method of gauging the degree of agreement amongst respondent groups.348
Because 27 risks are being assessed, Chi-square analysis was also conducted to
ensure both the public and private sector respondent groups showed significant
345
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agreement at a 95 percent confidence level. If the Chi-square value for a respondent
group is higher than its corresponding critical value, then there is significant agreement
amongst the group in question over its risk allocation preferences. Like the critical value
for Kendall’s W, the critical value for Chi-square is also found with reference to a table
of critical values connecting DOF with significance levels.
At 26 DOF and a 0.05 significance level, the critical value for Chi-square is
38.885.349 The Chi-square value for the public and private sector respondent groups is
113.988 and 164.283, respectively. This reinforces the results from Kendall’s W; there is
statistically significant agreement within the public and private sector respondent groups.
Accordingly, both sample groups can be assessed further under the assumption that they
contain risk allocation preferences indicative of the views of their respective sectors.
6.3.3 Agreement between Respondent Groups
A Mann-Whitney U test was conduced to evaluate whether significant differences
exist between the risk allocation preferences of this study’s public sector respondents and
private sector respondents. Mann-Whitney U is a nonparametric test that takes mean
values assigned to ordinal data (e.g. P3 project risks) from two independent samples (e.g.
public and private P3 practitioners) and tests whether the two independent samples
represent two distinct populations with significantly different perceptions of the data.
Referring back to Figure 6.3, 6 of 27 risks fell below the significance level of 0.05 based
on the independent two-sample t-test. This means, according to the t-test, 6 risks show a
significant statistical difference between public and private sector respondents at a 95
percent confidence level. These risks are: (i) expropriation and nationalization, (ii)
349
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changes in industrial code of practice, (iii) site availability, (iv) supporting utilities risk,
(v) third party tort liability, and (vi) exclusive right/competition.
According to the Mann-Whitney U test, if the significance level (p-value) falls
below the significance level of 0.05, then there is significant disagreement between the
two independent groups over a risk’s allocation preference at a confidence level of 95
percent. Figure 6.4 shows that, according to the Mann-Whitney U test, 5 of 27 risks show
a statistically significant difference between the public and private sector over their
allocation preferences based on the five-point semantic differential scale questionnaire
(i.e. 5 risks have a p-value under 0.05). Every risk that was statistically significant
according to the t-test – except ‘changes in industrial code of practice’ – was statistically
significant for the Mann-Whitney U test. Figure 6.4 shows the mean ranks of risks
according to the public sector respondents and private sector respondents alongside the
results of the Mann-Whitney U test.350
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respondents are to allocate it to the public sector; the closer a risk’s mean rank leans towards 27,
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Figure 6. 4: Mann-Whitney U Test for Risk Allocation Preferences
Risk

Public Sector
Mean Rank

Private Sector
Mean Rank

Z Statistic

p-value

Expropriation and nationalization

7.63

4.5

-2.674

0.014

Political/public opposition

5.33

8.5

-0.065

0.977

Change in law

8.75

7.04

-1.55

0.143

12.46

12.33

-0.78

0.478

6.04

7.5

-0.527

0.63

15.33

12.08

-1.393

0.178

Changes in industrial code of practices 15.88

12.54

-2.024

0.052*

Project approval and permit
Land acquisition
Influential economic events

Availability of labour/materials

19.96

24.08

1.023

0.378

Ground conditions

11.75

13.38

-0.507

0.671

Site availability

10.63

7.54

-2.348

0.024

Construction/design changes

12.46

16.42

0.119

0.932

Environmental protection

14.13

14.42

-0.12

0.932

Supporting utilities risk

16.96

11.54

-2.405

0.02

Residual value risk

12.25

13.88

-0.535

0.63

Residual assets risk

10.75

10.92

-1.735

0.101

Excessive contract variation

11.54

12.5

-0.974

0.443

Third party tort liability

18.46

15.58

-2.574

0.02

Asset ownership

20.29

22.79

0.784

0.478

Income risk

20.08

20.5

-0.334

0.799

Tariff change

16.54

16.75

-0.391

0.713

Market demand change

15.58

19.46

1.027

0.347

Exclusive right/competition

12.08

5.13

-3.403

0.001

Inflation risk

18.75

18.38

-0.329

0.755

Interest rate

19.29

19.83

0.215

0.843

Foreign currency risk

19.92

21.5

0.371

0.755

9.42

11

-0.439

0.713

15.75

17.92

0.476

0.671

Force majeure
Weather conditions

* This risk lies just above the 0.05 significance level for the Mann-Whitney U test, but below the
0.05 significance level for the independent two-sample t-test.
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It is of note that the Mann-Whitney U test and independent two-sample t-test
present slightly different results at a 95 percent confidence level. The t-test reveals 6 risks
with contentious allocation preferences, all falling under the test’s 0.05 significance level.
The Mann-Whitney U test, however, recognizes only 5 of these 6 risks falling under its
0.05 significance level. The sixth ‘would be’ significantly different risk – ‘changes in
industrial code of practices’ – just exceeds the Mann-Whitney U test’s significance level
of 0.05 by 0.002 with a p-value of 0.052. Previous studies that have yielded a p-value of
0.052 at a 95 percent confidence level have referred to that value as “approaching
prognostic significance.” 351 Because the t-test’s results were more sensitive at a 95
percent confidence level, its results have been adopted for further analysis over the
Mann-Whitney U test to account for the sixth risk that shows a relatively weak degree of
agreement over its allocation between public and private sector respondents.
6.4 Previous Methodologies used to propose a Risk Allocation Decision Model
After the mean scores of risks were analyzed both within and between sample
groups via t-test, Kendall’s W, Chi-square, and Mann-Whitney U, the risks could be
assessed further to prescribe a risk allocation decision model based on expert
questionnaire input. Two important factors were learned in Section 6.3: (i) both the
public and private sector respondent groups provided enough statistical significance to be
assessed as ideologically unified, representative samples; and (ii) at least 6 of 27 risks
should be assessed with caution when proposing a risk allocation model due to
statistically significant disagreement between sectors over their allocation.
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Rajan Sarin et al., “Treatment Results and Prognostic Factors in 101 Men Treated for
Squamous Carcinoma of the Penis,” International Journal of Radiation Oncology Biology
Physics 38, no. 4 (1997): 713, doi:10.1016/S0360-3016(97)00068-0.
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6.4.1 Majority Opinion Analysis
As noted in Section 6.2, majority opinion analysis – when risks are allocated to
categories where they have received more than 50 percent of sample votes – has been
criticized by scholars. Further, it is usually deployed alongside a three-point ordinal scale
in lieu of a five-point scale because lower-point scales are more conducive to definitive
selection preferences.352 When used in conjunction with higher-point scales, majority
opinion analysis may be less effective due to sparser selection preferences. This appears
to be the case with this study’s majority opinion analysis, as only 8 out of 27 risks are
given a definitive risk allocation preference, as shown in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6. 5: Majority Opinion Analysis for Risk Allocation Preferences
Contentious Risk
Expropriation and nationalization
Political/public opposition
Change in law
Project approval and permit
Land acquisition
Influential economic events
Changes in industrial code of practices
Availability of labour/materials
Ground conditions
Site availability
Construction/design changes
Environmental protection
Supporting utilities risk
Residual value risk
Residual assets risk
Excessive contract variation
Third party tort liability
Asset ownership
Income risk
Tariff change
Market demand change
Exclusive right/competition
Inflation risk
Interest rate
Foreign currency risk
Force majeure
Weather conditions

352

Public Sector Respondents
Private Sector Respondents
Total Respondents
Suggested
SPu % MPu % ESh % MPr % SPr % SPu % MPu % ESh % MPr % SPr % SPu % MPu % ESh % MPr % SPr % Risk Allocation
25 41.66
25 8.33
83.33 8.33 8.33
54.16
25 16.66 4.16
Solely Public
25 58.33 8.33 8.33
25 58.33 16.66
25 58.33 12.5 4.16
Mostly Public
16.66 41.66 33.33 8.33
50
25
25
33.33 33.33 29.16 4.16
Negotiable
8.33
25 33.33 33.33
16.66 33.33
25
25
12.5 29.16 29.16 29.16
Negotiable
33.33 41.66
25
41.66 41.66 16.66
37.5 41.66 20.83
Negotiable
16.66 41.66
25 16.66
25
25 16.66
25 8.33 12.5 20.83 29.16
25 12.5 Negotiable
16.66 41.66 16.66
25 16.66 41.66 16.66
25
8.33 29.16 29.16 20.83 12.5 Negotiable
8.33
25 16.66
50
41.66 58.33 4.16 12.5 29.16 54.16
Mostly Private
16.66
75 8.33
16.66
25 33.33 16.66 8.33 8.33 20.83 54.16 12.5 4.16 Equally Shared
8.33 33.33
50
8.33 41.66 41.66 16.66
25 37.5 33.33
4.16 Negotiable
8.33 33.33
25 8.33
25 8.33 33.33 8.33 33.33 16.66 8.33 33.33 16.66 20.83 20.83 Negotiable
8.33 33.33 16.66
25 16.66 8.33
25
25 41.66
8.33 29.16 20.83 33.33 8.33 Negotiable
8.33 33.33
50 8.33
25 33.33 16.66
25
12.5 20.83
25 37.5 4.16 Negotiable
8.33
25 33.33
25 8.33 16.66 33.33 16.66
25 8.33 12.5 29.16
25
25 8.33 Negotiable
25 66.66 8.33
33.33 33.33 16.66 8.33 8.33 16.66 29.16 41.66 8.33 4.16 Negotiable
16.66 83.33
8.33 33.33
50 8.33
4.16
25 66.66 4.16 Mostly Private
33.33
50 16.66
8.33
75 16.66
4.16 54.16 33.33 8.33 Equally Shared
25 41.66 33.33
8.33
50 41.66
16.66 45.83 37.5 Negotiable
8.33 8.33 58.33
25
8.33 8.33 66.66 16.66
8.33 8.33 62.5 20.83 Mostly Private
16.66
25 41.66 16.66
25
25 33.33 16.66
20.83
25 37.5 16.66 Negotiable
16.66 33.33 41.66 8.33
16.66 8.33 58.33 16.66
16.66 20.83
50 12.5 Negotiable
8.33
25 41.66
25
75 16.66 8.33
41.66 20.83
25 12.5
Negotiable
8.33 33.33
25 33.33 8.33 16.66 16.66
25 33.33 4.16 12.5
25
25 33.33 Negotiable
8.33 33.33 16.66 41.66 8.33 8.33 16.66 16.66
50 4.16 8.33
25 16.66 45.83 Negotiable
8.33
25
25 41.66
33.33 16.66
50
4.16 29.16 20.83 45.83 Negotiable
8.33 33.33 58.33
25
25 41.66 8.33
16.66 29.16
50 4.16
Negotiable
75 8.33 16.66 8.33 8.33 33.33
25
25 4.16 4.16 54.16 16.66 20.83 Equally Shared

McLafferty, “Conducting Questionnaire Surveys,” 81.
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The risks with definitive selection preferences based on majority opinion analysis
– i.e. those with over 50 percent of its respondents in favour of allocating the risk to a
particular sectorial category – are as follows: ‘expropriation and nationalization,’
‘political/public opposition,’ ‘availability of labour/materials,’ ‘ground conditions,’
‘excessive contract variation,’ ‘third party tort liability,’ ‘income risks,’ and ‘weather
conditions.’ Their suggested risk allocation preferences, based on majority opinion
analysis, are: solely public, mostly public, mostly private, equally shared, mostly private,
equally shared, mostly private, and equally shared, respectively.
6.4.2 Half-Adjusting Principle
As noted in Section 6.2, Ke et al.’s “half-adjusting principle” – like majority
opinion analysis before it – rests on questionable methodology. This is made most
apparent when perusing their proposed risk allocations. Based on a five-point semantic
differential scale assessment of 37 P3 project risks, only one risk is allocated solely to the
public sector and zero risks are allocated solely to the private sector; the remaining 36
risks are dispersed throughout the remaining three risk allocation categories: ‘mostly
public,’ ‘equally shared,’ and ‘mostly private.’353
Similar articles that employ the half-adjusting principle to develop risk allocation
models also present comparably imbalanced results. 354 It is hypothesized that this is due
in part to the aforementioned issue of uneven distribution between risk categories while
353

Ke et al., “Preferred Risk Allocation in China’s Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects,”
487-488.
354
Y Chen, “Pricing Mechanism and a Framework of Public-Private Partnership Financing Risk
Allocation for Public Rental Project,” Applied Mechanics and Materials, 2013,
doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.256-259.2989; Akintayo Opawole and Godwin Onajite
Jagboro, “Benchmarking Parties’ Obligations in the Execution of Concession-Based PPP Projects
in Nigeria,” Journal of Place Management and Development 9, no. 1 (2016): 27–46,
doi:10.1108/JPMD-08-2015-0029.
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employing the half-adjusting principle. For instance, ‘solely public’ and ‘solely private’
each make up 12.5 percent of a five-point scale’s space, while the remaining three
categories comprise 25 percent of a five-point scale’s space. Thus, Figure 6.6, like Figure
6.5 before it, presents an alternative means of arriving at a proposed risk allocation
decision model, but it rests on flawed methodology.
Figure 6. 6: Half-Adjusting Principle for Risk Allocation Preferences
Contentious Risk
Expropriation and nationalization
Political/public opposition
Change in law
Project approval and permit
Land acquisition
Influential economic events
Changes in industrial code of practices
Availability of labour/materials
Ground conditions
Site availability
Construction/design changes
Environmental protection
Supporting utilities risk
Residual value risk
Residual assets risk
Excessive contract variation
Third party tort liability
Asset ownership
Income risk
Tariff change
Market demand change
Exclusive right/competition
Inflation risk
Interest rate
Foreign currency risk
Force majeure
Weather conditions

Total Mean
1.708
1.958
2.042
2.75
1.833
3.042
3
4.333
2.833
2.208
3.125
3.042
3
2.875
2.542
2.708
3.458
4.208
3.958
3.5
3.583
2.083
3.708
3.917
4.083
2.417
3.458

Public Mean
2.167
2
2.333
2.917
1.917
3.417
3.5
4.083
2.917
2.667
3.083
3.083
3.583
3
2.833
2.833
3.833
4.083
4
3.583
3.417
2.833
3.833
3.917
4
2.5
3.417

Private Mean
1.25
1.917
1.75
2.583
1.75
2.667
2.5
4.583
2.75
1.75
3.167
3
2.417
2.75
2.25
2.583
3.083
4.333
3.917
3.417
3.75
1.333
3.583
3.917
4.167
2.333
3.5

Suggested Allocation
Mostly Public
Mostly Public
Mostly Public
Equally Shared
Mostly Public
Equally Shared
Equally Shared
Mostly Private
Equally Shared
Mostly Public
Equally Shared
Equally Shared
Equally Shared
Equally Shared
Equally Shared
Equally Shared
Equally Shared
Mostly Private
Mostly Private
Mostly Private
Mostly Private
Mostly Public
Mostly Private
Mostly Private
Mostly Private
Mostly Public
Equally Shared

Figure 6.6 (i.e. half-adjusting principle) does present more conclusive results than
Figure 6.5 (i.e. majority opinion analysis) in that it does not categorize any risk as
‘negotiable’ based on specific project circumstances. ‘Negotiable’ risks aside, there is
discrepancy between the majority opinion analysis’ risk allocation scheme and the half144

adjusting principle’s risk allocation scheme: (i) ‘expropriation and nationalization’ is
given a ‘mostly public’ allocation preference according to the half-adjusting principle and
a ‘solely public’ allocation preference according to majority opinion analysis and (ii)
‘excessive contract variation’ is given an ‘equally shared’ allocation preference according
to the half-adjusting principle and a ‘mostly private’ allocation preference according to
majority opinion analysis.
Figure 6.6’s results, like other half-adjusting principle-derived results before it,
present an imbalanced risk allocation decision model where ‘solely public’ and ‘solely
private’ categories remain vacant as risk means congregate towards the ‘middle’ three
categories of the five-point scale, each taking up double the allotted space over the
‘solely public’ and ‘solely private’ categories. As mentioned in Section 6.2, this study
requires a more reliable and accurate means of developing a risk allocation model based
on mean ratings from expert questionnaire input.
6.4.3 Hypothetical Normal Distribution Curve Formula
A formula based on an assumed normal distribution curve – presented in Section
6.2 – is applied to calculate a specified range that allocates contentious P3 risks under: (i)
‘mostly public,’ (ii) ‘equally shared,’ and (iii) ‘mostly private.’ Based on the formula’s
calculated range, risks falling under the range should be borne mostly by the public
sector, risks falling within the range should be borne equally by both sectors, and risks
falling over the range should be borne mostly by the private sector. It is important to
relay that this methodology forces a normal distribution on non-normally distributed data,
which does not reflect the true distribution of this study nor the true distributions of other
questionnaire-based studies in the core literature database.
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Figure 6.7 presents a normal distribution curve and its associated standard
deviations (i.e. the ’68-95-99.7’ rule). A normal distribution is a continuous probability
distribution that represents the distribution of variables through a symmetrical bellshaped curve on a graph. In short, approximately 68 percent of observations fall within
one standard deviation of the mean, 95 percent of observations fall within two standard
deviations of the mean, and 99.7 percent of observations fall within three standard
deviations of the mean under a normal distribution. Further, in an authentic normal
distribution, both the mean and median are equal because data under and above the
median are symmetrically opposed to one another under a continuous probability
distribution.355
Figure 6. 7: Normal Distribution Curve

The formula used to arrive at Chan et al.’s and Tolani’s proposed risk allocation
decision model is again as follows:

355

S. Narayan Rao, Educational Psychology (New Delhi: New Age International (P) Limited,
2002), 399, https://books.google.ca/books?id=Huz5gasACqEC.
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X10% = U ± Z*σ
With reference to Figure 6.7, this formula provides a specified range over an assumed
normal distribution curve (i.e. finding X10%) where X10% = the upper and lower values of
the set range on the normal distribution curve, filling an area comprising 10 percent of the
distribution near the centre of the curve as demonstrated in Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8’s mean value (U) remains steady at 3 to reflect a five-point scale’s
median of 3 (i.e. ‘equally shared’ risks).356 To find X10%, the range must occupy an area of
the curve that covers 5 percent of the distribution below U and 5 percent of the
distribution above U. In order to find this range, a table of normal distribution must be
consulted to arrive at a corresponding Z value for 45 percent of a normal distribution
curve (i.e. X10%’s lower limit) and 55 percent of a normal distribution curve (i.e. X10% ‘s
upper limit) to arrive at a 10 percent range evenly distributed between the hypothetical
normal distribution curve’s mean. Because Chan et al. and Tolani both use one standard
deviation to conduct their analyses, their corresponding Z value for the formula is
0.125.357 Neither article provides reference to how they arrived at this Z value, but it is
understood that they consulted a table of normal distribution to arrive at the
corresponding 0.125 Z value for a standard deviation of one.

356

Though they do not explicitly explain their justifications for using their respective U values,
this point makes it clear that Chan et al. use a mean population value of three because their risk
allocation scheme is premised on a five-point semantic differential scale and Tolani uses a mean
population value of two because his risk allocation scheme is premised on a three-point semantic
differential scale.
357
Chan et al., “Empirical Study of Risk Asessment and Allocation of Public-Private Partnership
Projects in China,” 143; Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in PublicPrivate Partnerships in Nigeria,” 211-212.
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After perusing the normal distribution table, however, it is found that a standard
deviation of one actually presents a Z value of 0.1256613. Thus, Chan et al. and Tolani
incorrectly used 0.125 for their formulae’s Z values when they should have used a Z
value of 0.126. Statisticians at the University of Windsor have verified this misstep,
which has the potential to contaminate study results. Thus, while this thesis criticizes the
use of forced distribution methodology, it still aims to bolster academic literature that
employs forced distribution models by setting a precedent for rounding Z values correctly
where previous studies by established authors with scholarly influence have rounded
incorrectly.358
Figure 6.8 provides a standard normal distribution curve with a 10 percent range
equally distributed between a mean of 3 over one standard deviation, thus providing a
range of 2.874 – 3.126 on a five-point scale. Again, this range is found by adding and
subtracting a 0.126 Z value – which has been multiplied by one to account for the
standard deviation of one – to a mean of 3.
Figure 6. 8: X10% over Normal Distribution Curve at One Standard Deviation

358

For example, Tolani’s study is based in large part on Chan et al.’s. Thus, his incorrect use of
0.125 as a corresponding Z value for one standard deviation under the normal distribution
formula is not surprising, as Chan et al. set a precedent to copy this miscalculation. It is important
to correct misshapes like this early, because scholars may continue to be influenced by the flawed
methodologies of their established peers without questioning their peer’s practices or results.
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With reference to Figure 6.8, the assumed normal distribution formula mentioned
in Section 6.2 is applied as follows:
X10% = U ± Z*σ
X10% = 3 ± 0.126*1
X10% = 3 ± 0.126
X10% = 2.874 – 3.126
Because 3 is the value attributed to an ‘equally shared’ risk allocation on a five-point
scale, by adopting a standard deviation of 1 and its corresponding Z value of 0.126, the
mean range limits for this calculation are 2.874 to 3.126, as shown in Figure 6.9.
Figure 6. 9: X10% over Forced Normal Distribution at One Standard Deviation
Risk Allocation Scheme
Sector of Allocation Contentious Risk
Public
Expropriation and nationalization
Land acquisition
Political/public opposition
Change in law
Exclusive right/competition
Site availability
Force majeure
Residual assets risk
Excessive contract variation
Project approval and permit
Ground conditions
Equal
Residual value risk
Changes in industrial code of practices
Supporting utilities risk
Influential economic events
Environmental protection
Construction/design changes
Private
Third party tort liability
Weather conditions
Tariff change
Market demand change
Inflation risk
Interest rate
Income risk
Foreign currency risk
Asset ownership
Availability of labour/materials
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All Respondents Public Sector
N
Mean N
Mean
24
1.708 12
2.167
24
1.833 12
1.917
24
1.958 12
2
24
2.042 12
2.333
24
2.083 12
2.833
24
2.208 12
2.667
24
2.417 12
2.5
24
2.542 12
2.833
24
2.708 12
2.833
24
2.75
12
2.917
24
2.833 12
2.917
24
2.875 12
3
24
3
12
3.5
24
3
12
3.583
24
3.042 12
3.417
24
3.042 12
3.083
24
3.125 12
3.083
24
3.458 12
3.833
24
3.458 12
3.417
24
3.5
12
3.583
24
3.583 12
3.417
24
3.708 12
3.833
24
3.917 12
3.917
24
3.958 12
4
24
4.083 12
4
24
4.208 12
4.083
24
4.333 12
4.083

Private Sector
N
Mean
12
1.25
12
1.75
12
1.917
12
1.75
12
1.333
12
1.75
12
2.333
12
2.25
12
2.583
12
2.583
12
2.75
12
2.75
12
2.5
12
2.417
12
2.667
12
3
12
3.167
12
3.083
12
3.5
12
3.417
12
3.75
12
3.583
12
3.917
12
3.917
12
4.167
12
4.333
12
4.583

Due to the aforementioned limitations of forced distribution methodology –
namely, the (i) arbitrary selection of a range to indicate ‘equally shared’ results and (ii)
the assumed normal distribution of non-normally distributed data – Figure 6.9 does not
represent an ‘authentic’ output of expert questionnaire input. It is worth noting that, for
this particular study, the mean values of each risk do represent a quasi-normal
distribution (see Figure 6.10): the mean value is 3.01 (opposed to 3), twelve risks fall
below the mean and thirteen risks fall above the mean (opposed to an even split of
thirteen risks falling both below and above the mean),359 and 59 percent of variables fall
within one standard deviation of the mean (opposed to 68 percent of variables). Thus, this
particular distribution of risks passes the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality.
Nonetheless, a forced normal distribution still does not accurately reflect this
study’s true respondent input and – more importantly – this methodology still suffers
from the selection of an arbitrary range to demarcate public, private, and equally shared
risk categories. Further, this method necessitates the use of only three risk allocation
categories, which detracts from the level of sectorial allocation specificity offered by this
study’s five-point scale. More specifically, this approach fails to account for the different
degrees of preferred risk sharing offered by the five-point scale, where point two’s
‘mostly public’ allocation preference and point four’s ‘mostly private’ allocation
preference allow respondents to differentiate between allocating risks solely and
allocating risks partially. Thus, a forced normal distribution should not be adopted to
assess this study’s questionnaire-based mean scores.

359

The reason for this study’s uneven split of twelve risks falling below the mean and thirteen
falling above the mean is because two risks – ‘changes in industrial code of practice’ and
‘supporting utilities risk’ – opposed to one risk, each share a mean of 3.
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Figure 6. 10: Distribution of Total Mean Scores for Contentious P3 Risks360

360

The x-axis represents this study’s selected P3 risks and the y-axis represents their total mean
scores based on the expert questionnaire’s respondent input. To represent the quasi-normal
distribution intuitively, the risk mean scores have been organized as such: the lowest mean score
is placed in the left-most column, the second lowest mean score is placed in the right-most
column, the third lowest mean score is placed in the second left-most column, the fourth lowest
mean score is placed in the second-right most column, and so on until the risk with the highest
mean score – ‘availability of labour/materials’ – is placed directly in the middle.
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6.5 Proposed Risk Allocation Decision Model: Hybrid Adjusting Principle with Ranges
In light of the aforementioned drawbacks to using majority opinion analysis, the
half adjusting principle, and a forced normal distribution curve, this study adopts a hybrid
adjusting principle in conjunction with risk ranges based on their LCLs and UCLs. As
noted in Section 6.2, this preferred methodology bypasses the key limitations offered in
previous questionnaire-based studies on P3 risk allocation, and it accounts for both the
size and input variance of this study’s respondent pool by offering a proposed risk
allocation decision model based on confidence intervals for each risk’s mean score.
By incorporating ranges based on confidence intervals, it is proposed that this
study’s risk allocation decision model reflects the potential views of the population of P3
practitioners more accurately than previous studies (i.e. rather than merely the views of
the sample of P3 practitioners consulted). Confidence intervals are estimations of a
population’s parameters based samples. Thus, it is estimated that the population’s mean
score for every risk would fall above each LCL and below each UCL. Figure 6.11 shows
the LCL and UCL of each risk at a 90 percent confidence level alongside the sectorial
categories each risk’s range falls into based on the adjusted scale where values falling
under: < 1.8 = solely public allocation; 1.8 < 2.6 = mostly public allocation; 2.6 < 3.4 =
equally shared allocation; 3.4 < 4.2 = mostly private allocation; and 4.2 < = solely private
allocation.
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Figure 6. 11: Lower and Upper Confidence Levels of Contentious P3 Risks
Contentious Risk
Expropriation and nationalization*
Land acquisition
Political/public opposition
Change in law
Exclusive right/competition *
Site availability*
Force majeure
Residual assets risk
Excessive contract variation
Project approval and permit
Ground conditions
Residual value risk
Changes in industrial code of practices*
Supporting utilities risk*
Influential economic events
Environmental protection
Construction/design changes
Third party tort liability*
Weather conditions
Tariff change
Market demand change
Inflation risk
Interest rate
Income risk
Foreign currency risk
Asset ownership
Availability of labour/materials

Mean
1.708
1.833
1.958
2.042
2.083
2.208
2.417
2.542
2.708
2.75
2.833
2.875
3
3
3.042
3.042
3.125
3.458
3.458
3.5
3.583
3.708
3.917
3.958
4.083
4.208
4.333

LCL-UCL
1.391 - 2.026
1.567 - 2.100
1.696 - 2.221
1.724 - 2.359
1.698 - 2.468
1.867 - 2.550
2.126 - 2.707
2.185 - 2.899
2.490 - 2.927
2.389 - 3.111
2.513 - 3.154
2.458 - 3.292
2.587 - 3.413
2.600 - 3.400
2.610 - 3.473
2.636 - 3.448
2.660 - 3.590
3.206 - 3.711
3.101 - 3.815
3.143 - 3.857
3.258 - 3.908
3.290 - 4.127
3.492 - 4.341
3.676 - 4.240
3.742 - 4.424
3.956 - 4.461
4.030 - 4.637

Sector of Allocation
Solely Public; Mostly Public
Solely Public; Mostly Public
Solely Public; Mostly Public
Solely Public; Mostly Public
Solely Public; Mostly Public
Mostly Public
Mostly Public; Equally Shared
Mostly Public; Equally Shared
Mostly Public; Equally Shared
Mostly Public; Equally Shared
Mostly Public; Equally Shared
Mostly Public; Equally Shared
Mostly Public; Equally Shared; Mostly Private
Equally Shared
Equally Shared; Mostly Private
Equally Shared; Mostly Private
Equally Shared; Mostly Private
Equally Shared; Mostly Private
Equally Shared; Mostly Private
Equally Shared; Mostly Private
Equally Shared; Mostly Private
Equally Shared; Mostly Private
Mostly Private; Solely Private
Mostly Private; Solely Private
Mostly Private; Solely Private
Mostly Private; Solely Private
Mostly Private; Solely Private

* Risks that showed significant sectorial disagreement between public and private practitioners
based on the independent two-sample t-test and Mann-Whitney U test.

As previously stated, the proposed allocation of the six risks that showed
significant sectorial disagreement should be viewed more skeptically than the risks that
passed both the independent two sample t-test and Mann-Whitney U test at a 95 percent
confidence level. To gauge sectorial disagreement over the allocation of these six risks,
their LCLs and UCLs are computed independently between sectors. Figure 6.12 reveals
the preferred sector of allocation between public and private respondents based on ranges
derived from the LCLs and UCLs of public and private sector respondents separately at a
90 percent confidence level.
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Figure 6. 12: Separate Ranges for Risks with Significant Sectorial Disagreement
Mean
LCL-UCL
Public Private Public
Private
Expropriation and nationalization 2.167 1.25 1.681 - 2.653 1.000 - 1.572
Exclusive right/competition
2.833 1.333 2.347 - 3.319 1.000 - 1.671
Site availability
2.667 1.75 2.156 - 3.177 1.359 - 2.141
Changes in industrial code of practices 3.5 2.5 2.936 - 4.064 1.936 - 3.064
Supporting utilities risk
3.583 2.417 3.172 - 3.994 1.813 - 3.020
Third party tort liability
3.833 3.083 3.461 - 4.205 2.816 - 3.350
Contentious Risk

Sector of Allocation
Public
Private
Solely Public; Mostly Public; Equally Shared Solely Public
Mostly Public; Equally Shared
Solely Public
Mostly Public; Equally Shared
Solely Public; Mostly Public
Equally Shared; Mostly Private
Mostly Public; Equally Shared
Equally Shared; Mostly Private
Mostly Public; Equally Shared
Mostly Private; Solely Private
Equally Shared

At least one of the proposed sectors of allocation for every risk with significant
sectorial disagreement in Figure 6.11 falls under the proposed sectors of allocation from
both public and private respondents in Figure 6.12. For half these risks, all proposed
sectors of allocation offered in Figure 6.11 fall under the proposed sectors of allocation
offered by both public and private respondents in Figure 6.12 (i.e. site availability,
changes in industrial code of practices, and supporting utilities risk).
To be charitable to the risk allocation decision model proposed in Figure 6.11,
this partial congruity can be viewed as a redeeming sanction. While the risks assessed in
Figure 6.12 may require additional negotiation between sectors to arrive at optimal – or at
least agreeable – RMAs, the public-private divide over their preferred allocation is close
enough to expect relatively straightforward sectorial compromise between public and
private P3 practitioners. Like any partnership, compromise is at the heart of P3
agreements. Further, the 27 risks assessed in this study are deemed contentious based on
the core literature review. Thus, it is unsurprising that sectorial compromise is necessary
to arrive at a proposed risk allocation decision model; unanimous agreement between
sectors over the treatment of all contentious P3 project risks should not be expected.
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6.5.1 Membership Functions and Membership Degrees
Now that preferred sectors of allocation for each risk have been proposed, the
degree to which P3 practitioners associate these risks with their preferred sectors of
allocation should be analyzed. By doing so, this study recaptures information otherwise
lost by merely proposing allocation categories for risks based on crisp mean values. Each
risk allocation category can be viewed as a “membership function” (m) to which each risk
carries an associated agreement level – or “membership degree” – between 0 to 1.361
Thus, each risk’s range – based on LCLs and UCLs at a 90 percent confidence level – can
be assessed under pairs of values denoting five possible membership functions alongside
their associated membership degrees. Let mSpub = solely public, mMpub = mostly public, mES
= equally shared, mMpri = mostly private, and mSpri = solely private.
For example, land acquisition risk’s range, at a 90 percent confidence level, is
1.567 to 2.1. Thus, it falls under both ‘solely public’ (< 1.8) and ‘mostly public’ (1.8 <
2.6) risk allocation categories. Land acquisition’s LCL, 1.567, falls under mSpub at 0.233
units (i.e. 1.8 – 1.567 = 0.233). Land acquisition’s UCL, 2.1, falls above mSpub at 0.3 units
(i.e. 2.1 – 1.8 = 0.3). Because 0.3 + 0.233 = 0.533, and 0.233 divided by 0.533 = 0.437,
44 percent of land acquisition risk’s range falls within the ‘solely public’ category,
representing a membership degree of 0.44 to membership function mSpub. Because 0.3
divided by 0.533 = 0.563, 56 percent of land acquisition risk’s range falls within the
‘mostly public’ category, representing a membership degree of 0.56 to membership
function mMpub. Because none of land acquisition risk’s range of 0.533 falls within
membership functions mES, mMpri, or mSpri, its membership degree for all three is 0.
361

Qing Li, “A Novel Likert Scale Based on Fuzzy Sets Theory,” Expert Systems with
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Where CI = the confidence interval – or range – based on each risk’s LCL and
UCL, land acquisition risk’s membership degrees can be modeled as follows:
mSpub(CI) = 0.44; mMpub(CI) = 0.56; mES(CI) = 0.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; and mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
Here, land acquisition’s range of 0.533 was found by: (i) subtracting land acquisition’s
LCL (1.567) from mSpub’s limit (1.8) to arrive at 0.233; (ii) subtracting mSpub’s limit (1.8)
from land acquisition’s UCL (2.026) to arrive at 0.3; and (iii) adding the results, 0.233
and 0.3, to arrive at a range – or confidence interval – of 0.533 at a 90 percent confidence
level. Land acquisition risk’s range can be verified by simply subtracting its LCL from its
UCL: 2.1 – 1.567 = 0.533.
By demarcating land acquisition’s range of 0.533 into two segments, that which
falls under 1.8 and that which falls between 1.8 and 2.6, its membership degrees towards
‘solely public’ and ‘solely private’ membership functions are found. Note that these
degrees are relative to the size of land acquisition’s range of 0.533. This means, no matter
how high a risk’s range is, its combined membership degrees for all membership
functions will always equal 1 (e.g. 0.44 + 0. 56 + 0.0 + 0.0 + 0.0 = 1).
Because all risks’ combined membership degrees will equal 1 regardless of the
size of their range, the size of their range must be noted when assigning them to risk
allocation categories. The higher a risk’s range between its LCL and UCL, the higher its
variance will be. Respondent variance shares an inverse relationship with the
conclusiveness and confidence of population predictions based on a sample’s input. Thus,
the higher a risk’s range is, the less conclusive its results are for this study. Conversely,
the lower a risk’s range is, the more conclusive its results are for this study.
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Because each risk’s range is directly tied to its membership degrees for the five
membership functions, the range of risks with high variance can encompass a greater
portion of a risk allocation category (e.g. ‘equally shared’) under this study’s adjusted
scale while simultaneously holding a comparably lower or equal membership degree
towards membership functions than risks with a lower variance.
For example, Figure 6.11 shows that site availability risk and supporting utilities
risk both fall under one risk category, thus both hold a membership degree of 1.0 for their
respective membership functions. However, because site availability risk’s range and
variance are lower than supporting utilities risk’s range and variance, it encompasses less
of its risk category’s space on the adjusted five-point scale. Site availability risk’s range
falls within 85 percent of the ‘mostly public’ allocation category (i.e. 1.8 < 2.6) with an
LCL of 1.867 and a UCL of 2.55. Supporting utilities risk’s range perfectly falls within
100 percent of the ‘equally shared’ allocation category (i.e. 2.6 < 3.4) with an LCL of 2.6
and a UCL of 3.4.362
At first blush, it may appear counterintuitive to believe that, by encompassing a
smaller portion of the adjusted scale’s ‘mostly public’ section, site availability risk shares
a stronger relationship with the membership function mMpub than supporting utilities risk
does with mES. An observer may say that site availability risk and supporting utilities risk
both share an equally strong relationship with their respective membership functions on
account of both holding a sole membership degree of 1. However, site availability risk’s
lower range and variance provides more conclusivity over the confidence with which it is
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Site availability risk’s range and variance are 0.683 and 0.955 respectively, while supporting
utilities risk’s range and variance are 0.8 and 1.304 respectively.
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allocated to its respective membership function. If this concept does not seem readily
apparent, it is because that – in this instance – membership degrees and functions do not
provide this information on their own.363 They do, however, in the following example.
The effect range and variance have on risk membership degrees is made blatantly
apparent when comparing the risk of changes in industrial code of practices with
supporting utilities risk and site availability risk. The risk of changes in industrial code of
practices presents a unique situation where it holds three membership degrees above zero
for three separate membership functions. Unsurprisingly, its range and variance are both
higher than the range and variance of site availability risk and supporting utilities risk.364
With an LCL of 2.587 and a UCL of 3.413, the risk of changes in industrial code of
practice’s range falls within 100 percent of the ‘equally shared’ allocation category and
less than a percent of both ‘mostly public’ and ‘mostly private’ allocation categories.
Despite encompassing the entire ‘equally shared’ category, this risk’s high range
– due to a high variance – must be accounted for. Because a high range and variance is
associated with lower conclusivity and confidence in a risk’s proposed allocation on the
adjusted scale, it shares a lower membership degree to the membership function mES than
supporting utilities risk does, despite both risks’ ranges encompassing the entire ‘equally
shared’ portion of the adjusted scale.
Due to its high range and variance, the risk of changes in industrial code of
practice actually shares a lower membership degree with mES (i.e. 0.96) than site
363

Without reference to both risk’s range and variance, their equal membership degrees of 1
incorrectly appear to denote an equally strong relationship with their respective sole membership
functions.
364
Changes in industrial code of practices risk’s range and variance are 0.826 and 1.391
respectively.
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availability risk does with mMpub (i.e. 1.0), despite the former falling within 100 percent of
the ‘equally shared’ allocation category and the latter falling within 85 percent of the
‘mostly public’ allocation category. The respective membership degrees of the three
aforementioned risks are expressed as follows.
For site availability risk,
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 1.0; mES(CI) = 0.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; and mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
For supporting utilities risk,
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 1.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; and mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
For changes in industrial code of practice,
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.02; mES(CI) = 0.96; mMpri(CI) = 0.02; and mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
These three risks are unique in holding membership degrees above zero for either
one or three membership functions – the remaining 24 risks in this study all hold
membership degrees above zero for exactly two membership functions.365 Figure 6.13
provides a conceptual illustration of the three aforementioned risks’ unique dispersions
365

Because of their unique dispersions over the adjusted scale, the membership degrees for these
three risks were calculated differently than the other 24 risks. The beginning of Section 6.5.1
provides an example with land acquisition risk to denote the method used to arrive at membership
degrees for ‘typical’ risk ranges that fall within two membership functions – by calculating the
percentage of a risk’s range that falls below and above its ‘cut off’ point of range demarcation
(i.e. 1.8, 2.6, 3.4, or 4.2). For the two risks with one membership function, no calculations are
necessary to find their membership degree – it is necessarily 1. For the risk with three
membership functions, the differences between its: (i) lowest cut off point, 2.6, and its LCL,
2.587 as well as its (ii) highest cut off point, 3.4, and its UCL, 3.413, are calculated and divided
by its range. Because both differences equal 0.013, this number is divided twice separately by
0.826 to arrive at its equal membership degrees for mMpub and mMpri – 0.02. Accordingly, 4 percent
of changes in industrial code of practices’ range falls evenly between the ‘mostly public’ and
‘mostly private’ allocation categories. Hence, 96 percent of this risk’s range falls within the
‘equally shared’ allocation category, despite encompassing its entire section on the adjusted scale.
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over this study’s adjusted scale; for context into the ‘typical’ dispersion of the remaining
24 risks, land acquisition – mentioned earlier in this section – is also included.

Changes in
industrial
code of
Supporgng
Site
Land
pracgces ugliges risk availability acquisigon

Figure 6. 13: Ranges for Select Risks over Adjusted Scale

1

1.8
Solely Public

2.6
Mostly Public

3.4
Equally Shared

4.2
Mostly Private

5
Solely Private

Note that, because of the aforementioned effects risk ranges, due to variance, have
on their membership degrees, membership functions (e.g. mES) and risk allocation
categories (e.g. ‘equally shared,’ or 2.6 < 3.4) are not synonymous. While membership
degrees do provide readers with the distribution under which each risk’s range is placed,
understanding the size of each risk’s range, and how these ranges fall under risk
allocation categories, is also a significant factor in arriving at a proposed risk allocation
decision model. In short, the shorter a risk’s range is, the more confidently it can be
placed under a proposed allocation category. Thus, it is important to view membership
degrees and functions alongside the categorical placement of risk. Figure 6.14 provides
each P3 risk’s range and degrees towards their relevant membership functions.
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Figure 6. 14: Proposed Risk Allocation Decision Model for Contentious P3 Risks366
Contentious Risk
Expropriation and nationalization
Land acquisition
Political/public opposition
Change in law
Exclusive right/competition
Site availability
Force majeure
Residual assets risk
Excessive contract variation
Project approval and permit
Ground conditions
Residual value risk
Changes in industrial code of practices
Supporting utilities risk
Influential economic events
Environmental protection
Construction/design changes
Third party tort liability
Weather conditions
Tariff change
Market demand change
Inflation risk
Interest rate
Income risk
Foreign currency risk
Asset ownership
Availability of labour/materials

LCL-UCL
1.391 - 2.026
1.567 - 2.100
1.696 - 2.221
1.724 - 2.359
1.698 - 2.468
1.867 - 2.550
2.126 - 2.707
2.185 - 2.899
2.490 - 2.927
2.389 - 3.111
2.513 - 3.154
2.458 - 3.292
2.587 - 3.413
2.600 - 3.400
2.610 - 3.473
2.636 - 3.448
2.660 - 3.590
3.206 - 3.711
3.101 - 3.815
3.143 - 3.857
3.258 - 3.908
3.290 - 4.127
3.492 - 4.341
3.676 - 4.240
3.742 - 4.424
3.956 - 4.461
4.030 - 4.637

Range
0.635
0.533
0.525
0.635
0.770
0.683
0.581
0.714
0.437
0.722
0.641
0.834
0.826
0.800
0.863
0.812
0.930
0.505
0.714
0.714
0.650
0.837
0.849
0.564
0.682
0.505
0.607

Membership Degrees Above Zero
mSpub(CI) = 0.64; mMpub(CI) = 0.36
mSpub(CI) = 0.44; mMpub(CI) = 0.56
mSpub(CI) = 0.20; mMpub(CI) = 0.80
mSpub(CI) = 0.12; mMpub(CI) = 0.88
mSpub(CI) = 0.13; mMpub(CI) = 0.87
mMpub(CI) = 1.0
mMpub(CI) = 0.82; mES(CI) = 0.18
mMpub(CI) = 0.58; mES(CI) = 0.42
mMpub(CI) = 0.25; mES(CI) = 0.75
mMpub(CI) = 0.29; mES(CI) = 0.71
mMpub(CI) = 0.14; mES(CI) = 0.86
mMpub(CI)=0.17; mES(CI)=0.83
mMpub(CI) = 0.02; mES(CI) = 0.96; mMpri(CI) = 0.02
mES(CI) = 1.0
mES(CI) = 0.92; mMpri(CI) = 0.08
mES(CI) = 0.94; mMpri(CI) = 0.06
mES(CI) = 0.80; mMpri(CI) = 0.20
mES(CI) = 0.38; mMpri(CI) = 0.62
mES(CI) = 0.42; mMpri(CI) = 0.58
mES(CI) = 0.36; mMpri(CI) = 0.64
mES(CI) = 0.22; mMpri(CI) = 0.78
mES(CI) = 0.13; mMpri(CI) = 0.87
mMpri(CI) = 0.83; mSpri(CI) = 0.17
mMpri(CI) = 0.93; mSpri(CI) = 0.07
mMpri(CI) = 0.67; mSpri(CI) = 0.33
mMpri(CI) = 0.48; mSpri(CI) = 0.52
mMpri(CI) = 0.28; mSpri(CI) = 0.72

As an educational resource, Figure 6.14’s risk allocation decision model provides
readers with an intuitive understanding of each risk’s strength of association towards both
the public and private sector – based on expert opinion – via colour accents. Where
green, purple, and blue represent public, private, and shared allocations respectively, the
darker the accent, the stronger a risk’s association with the sector to which it has a
majority membership function (i.e. m[CI] > 0.50).

366

Risks are ordered in descending order from lowest total mean score to highest total mean
score.
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Again, because this study’s respondents were confined to selecting variables on
an ordinal semantic differentiation scale, the five-point scale “tells nothing about the
intervals between responses.” This type of scale leads to “information lost during
measurement” because its discrete variables provide little means of association between
each other (i.e. other than their clear orderly ranking from one to five). Further, the
“closed response format” of semantic differential scales (i.e. truncated variables) force
respondents to make choices that may otherwise “not match their exact responses.”367 In
short, while this study’s five-point scale allows respondents to gauge allocation
preferences according to expert opinion, these opinions – on their own – come at an
informational compromise due to the drawbacks of using ordinal, truncated measurement
variables.
By treating the questionnaire’s ordinal input as interval data, mean score methods
can be applied to arrive at Figure 6.14’s proposed risk allocation decision model based on
risk ranges and their degrees of membership towards membership functions. These
degrees of membership reduce the information loss denoted with ordinal point scales,
allowing for a more fluid risk allocation decision model premised on ‘grey’ risk
categorization – opposed to ‘black and white’ – that more thoroughly accounts for the
relational strength between risks and their accompanying allocation categories.368

367

Li, “A Novel Likert Scale Based on Fuzzy Sets Theory,” 1610.
Albeit, by treating the ordinal data as interval data, two major assumptions are required: (i) the
aforementioned assumed equidistance between points on the semantic differential scale and (ii)
the assumed universality with which a point’s quality (i.e. the quality of being public, private, or
equal) applies to each risk. The limitations of these assumptions are considered in Chapter 7.
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6.6 Allocating Contentious P3 Risks
While this study’s strength lies in its fluid allocation model, its 27 contentious P3
project risks can easily be compartmentalized under three broad categories: (i) risks
leaning towards public sector allocation, (ii) risks leaning towards an evenly shared
allocation, and (iii) risks leaning towards private sector allocation. These categories are
premised on the membership function the majority of a risk’s range falls under. Because
of the ‘situatedness’ of P3s, risk allocation is a malleable process – it should never be
assumed that certain P3 risks should always be borne by a public or private party in every
circumstance. Thus, these broad categories should not be dogmatically followed, but
rather used to conceptualize the general preferences of expert practitioners over the
general treatment of contentious P3 risks.
Eight risks fall under the broad public sector allocation category. These risks
follow a general trend where their strength of public sector association falls in descending
order according to Figure 6.14. Two of these risks share membership degrees with the
‘equally shared’ membership function.
Nine risks fall under the broad evenly shared allocation category, where the
strength of equal sharing between sectors gradually increases until it climaxes two thirds
of the way down at ‘supporting utilities risk.’ The remainder of this category’s strength of
association towards an evenly shared membership stays relatively stagnant until its last
risk, ‘construction/design changes,’ which shares a small – but significant – relationship
with the ‘mostly private’ membership function. All of this broad category’s risks except
‘supporting utilities risk’ share a membership degree above zero with either the ‘mostly
public’ or ‘mostly private’ functions. This is because this category: (i) operates at the
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center of the spectrum and (ii) revolves around one risk membership function out of five
opposed to two risk membership functions out of five.
Ten risks fall under the broad private sector allocation category. These risks
follow a general trend where their strength of private sector association rises in ascending
order according to Figure 6.14. Interestingly, five of these risks share membership
degrees with the ‘equally shared’ membership function, representing half the broad
private category. Compared to the broad public category, in which only a quarter of its
risks share membership degrees with the ‘equally shared’ membership function, this trend
may indicate that P3 practitioners have stronger confidence or conviction in allocating
risks to the public sector in lieu of the private sector.
The remainder of Chapter 6 assesses this study’s proposed risk allocation decision
model reflected in Figure 6.14. P3 literature is consulted to justify, question, or
comprehend this study’s results. Original allocation preferences from the core literature
database are commonly referenced. Note, however, that some risks appear more
frequently in the database than others (see Figure 5.3).369
6.7 Risks Leaning Towards Public Sector Allocation
This study indicates that eleven risks should generally be allocated to the public
sector either fully or to a significant degree. The following ‘public’ risks – in order of
their strength of association to the public sector 370 – include: (i) expropriation and
nationalization, (ii) land acquisition, (iii) political/public opposition, (iv) change in law,

369

For example, the risk of ‘change in law’ appears in every article examined while the risk of
‘influential economic events’ appears in a quarter of the articles examined.
370
According to their total mean scores.
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(v) exclusive right/competition, (vi) site availability, (vii) force majeure, and (viii)
residual assets risk.
6.7.1 Expropriation and Nationalization
mSpub(CI) = 0.64; mMpub(CI) = 0.36; mES(CI) = 0.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
Expropriation and nationalization is the only risk in this study with the majority of
its range falling under the ‘solely private’ membership function. Its strong ties to the
public sector are likely due to expropriation traditionally being both a sole government
power and, accordingly, a sole government responsibility. Governments often retain the
right to acquire private projects or land through “compulsory acquisition” by means of
expropriation.371 By viewing expropriation as a ‘risk,’ questionnaire respondents – both
public and private – believe that governments should bear the financial consequences of
the compulsory acquisition of a project – this includes providing reasonable
compensation to their private P3 partners.
Chan et al., Hwang et al., Ke et al., Li et al., and Tolani all recommend this risk be
retained by the public sector. It should be noted, however, that public sector respondents
present a total mean of 2.167 for this risk while private sector respondents present a total
mean of 1.25. With a mean difference of 0.917, expropriation and nationalization remains
one of the most contentious risks in this study; it has the tied fourth largest mean
difference between public and private respondents (see Figure 6.3). Further, its
independent public and private ranges – derived from its public and private LCLs and
UCLs – do not overlap (see Figure 6.12). This high level of disagreement is echoed in P3
371

S. Keith et al., “Compulsory Acquisition of Land and Compensation” 1, no. 3 (2008): 1,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/011/i0506e/i0506e00.htm.
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literature, and it may be tied to the perceived conditions public and private sector
practitioners denote with expropriation risks.
Public practitioners may denote expropriation with first-step risk default where
private partners breach contractual obligations (see Figure 4.1); in such situations, private
partners should not be compensated for breaching contractual agreements.

Private

practitioners may denote expropriation with strategic behaviour from governments, where
public authorities strategically adopt PRM techniques employed by their preferred
proponents and use them to procure or manage the same facility through another contract
with separate partners (see Chapter 2, Section 2.7).372
The concept of strategic behaviour has been largely denoted with private parties
up to this point, though governments are capable of such practices too.373 However, P3s
take a wealth of resources and years of preliminary public input to initiate. Governments
do not undertake exhaustive preliminary screenings and competitive selection processes
(e.g. RFQs, RFPs, and due diligence) with the goal of expropriating land from their
preferred proponent’s concessionaire. This leaves two points to consider: (i) where
expropriation risks occur, they are likely to be caused by extreme contractual breaches
from the private sector; and (ii) according to this study’s findings, governments should
bear the risk of compensating the private parties affected by expropriation.
If these points appear contradictory, it is because they are. A commonly cited
point of contention amongst P3 literature is the fact that governments are often the
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As noted in Chapter 2, governments can use the intellectual property of preferred proponents
by ‘purchasing’ their respective PRM methods and applying them to future projects.
373
Chapter 7 will elucidate this concept further.
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residual risk holder should private parties majorly default on risks.374 While this study’s
findings on expropriation risk may seem uncharitable towards the public sector, they
parallel industry standards (albeit contentious industry standards). An example of a
brownfield P3 project going awry – and eventually leading to expropriation – is the
infamous battle between the government and its SPV partner over the mistreatment of a
water treatment facility in Hamilton in 1994.
Under the operational oversight of the project’s SPV, Philips Utilities
Management Corporation (PUMC), approximately 180 million litres of raw sewage spilt
into the city’s harbour. This mishap required additional resources for cleanup, yet half of
the PUMC’s subcontracted workforce was cut down in 1995; they cited financial strain as
the reason for the lay offs (at least two of the project’s contractors are now bankrupt and
both had dealings with the now infamous Enron corporation). The government reluctantly
put the treatment of the plant back into the hands of the public sector, consequently
accepting its large project losses.375
While it is clear that governments should reimburse private partners affected by
expropriation when contractual obligations are met, this issue remains largely projectspecific. Thus, this risk’s strong ties towards public sector allocation, while reflecting
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Boardman, Siemiatycki, and Vining, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere †”;
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Salim Loxely, “An Analysis of a Public-Private Sector Partnership : The Hamilton Wentworth - Philip Utilities Management Corporation PPP,” Canadian Union of Public
Employees (Manitoba, 1999),
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industry practices, are questionable from an ethical perspective. Degrees of sharing
expropriation risks are necessary.
6.7.2 Land Acquisition
mSpub(CI) = 0.44; mMpub(CI) = 0.56; mES(CI) = 0.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
It is unsurprising that ‘land acquisition’ falls within a public range of allocation;
internationally, governments have “shown a tendency to retain ownership of government
land and to grant leases to private parties… so that the land and any improvement on it
revert to government.”376 Curiously, however, the degree to which this study’s experts
denote land acquisition with public sector responsibility does not always correlate with
allocation suggestions based in P3 literature. The VDTF notes that, “as the major project
market has evolved, the need for government to retain a propriety interest has come
increasingly into question… It should not be automatically assumed that the underlying
land asset needs to be in government hands.”377
Perhaps this is why there is discrepancy within the core literature database over its
allocation. Chan et al., Ke et al., and Li et al. allocate land acquisition to the public sector
while Tolani recommends a shared allocation. Li et al. provides conditions under which
land acquisition should generally be borne solely by the public sector:
i.
ii.
iii.

376
377

Where the site is an existing government site, perhaps with existing
defects or environmental liabilities;
Where the government wishes to retain ownership of the underlying land
asset, or is to acquire it at the end of the contract term;
Where site approvals are likely to be particularly complex, as in the case
of linear infrastructure projects involving an environmental impact
assessment; or

VDTF, “Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues: A Guide,” 43.
Ibid.
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iv.

Where indigenous title/ownership issues arise over the land proposed for
the project.378

The VDTF provides additional conditions under which land acquisition should be borne
solely by the public sector:
i.
ii.
iii.

Sites which government clearly wants into the future, e.g. major roadways;
Sites from which government may wish to receive or deliver future
services; and
Sites in which government has no special interest and from which it can, if
need be, walk away.379

With these conditions in mind, risks associated with land acquisition (e.g. unanticipated
delay in, or extra costs associated with, procuring land that is required for a P3 project)
are still generally associated with the public sector – it appears this study’s public
allocation is sound. However, this trend may change in the future as traditional public
responsibilities and risks increasingly shift towards to the private sector.380
6.7.3 Political/Public Opposition
mSpub(CI) = 0.20; mMpub(CI) = 0.80; mES(CI) = 0.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
This risk is similarly linked with land acquisition as well as other issues that may
arise before and during the P3 tender process (e.g. environmental protection and project
approval and permit). When a P3 project experiences prejudicial backlash from factions
within its surrounding community, the general response from governments is to form a
“community liaison,” establishing a means of communication between the community
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and the crown corporation responsible for the project during early site preparation
stages.381
Of course, SPVs can form community liaisons too, especially in the name of
transparency with the general public.382 However, according to this study, the risk of
mitigating potential public backlash against P3s should generally be borne by the
government. This result runs parallel with findings from the core literature database: five
studies recommend public sector allocation and one study recommends a private sector
allocation. This study’s ‘mostly public’ allocation appears sound.
6.7.4 Change in Law
mSpub(CI) = 0.12; mMpub(CI) = 0.88; mES(CI) = 0.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
The risk of legal change received six public, five ‘shared,’ and one private
allocation recommendation according to the core literature database. It is the only risk out
of 54 to appear in all twelve pieces of literature examined in the database.383 The VDTF
defines change in law risk as “the risk that the agreed legal, policy and regulatory
framework will change during the contract term in a way not allowed for when the
contract was signed and which disadvantages or has a negative financial impact on the
project.”384
Changes in law generally affect private partners adversely during DBO phases of
a P3 project. One of this risk’s most oft-cited consequences is the need for SPV partners
381
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to undergo design modifications for the DB of infrastructure (e.g. a modification of
ventilation stacks to minimize pollution caused by traffic in tunnels in accordance with
new environmental standards). While private partners are often charged with mitigating
change in law risk, this study indicates that governments should compensate them for
doing so (pending final contract stipulations). For instance, public authorities could
compensate private partners though payment measures like increased tariffs for adapting
to project-adverse legal changes.385 This study’s public allocation appears sound.
6.7.5 Exclusive Right/Competition
mSpub(CI) = 0.13; mMpub(CI) = 0.87; mES(CI) = 0.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
Similar to expropriation, public authorities are generally the only actors with the
influence to revoke previously established exclusivity rights from their original project
partners and potentially reopen competition to other private competitors. For this risk, a
public allocation indicates some form of compensation to the private sector on behalf of
public authorities, while a private allocation would indicate a lesser degree of
compensation to no compensation at all. If a private party has its exclusive right
agreements revoked or dishonoured, it should be fairly compensated according to this
study. This result echoes the findings of the core literature database, where this risk
received three public allocation recommendations and one ‘shared’ allocation
recommendation.
Interestingly, this study’s public and private respondents gave this risk an overall
mean score of 2.833 and 1.333 respectively. This sectorial mean difference of 1.5 is the
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highest in this study (see Figure 6.3). Further, this risk’s public and private ranges do not
overlap (see Figure 6.12). It is of no surprise that the risk of exclusive right/competition
showed statistically significant difference between sectors through the independent twosample t-test and Mann-Whitney U test at a 95 percent confidence level. This suggests
sector-driven partiality; of all risks in this study, the proposed allocation of exclusive
right/competition risk needs to be viewed with the most skepticism. Further research on
sectorial agreement over its allocation is necessary. However, according to the literature,
a ‘mostly public’ allocation – for which it received a 0.88 membership degree – appears
sound.
6.7.6 Site Availability
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 1.0; mES(CI) = 0.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
Site availability is only one of two risks in this study with a range that falls within
one category – ‘mostly public.’ Like exclusive right and expropriation risks before it, site
availability is among the six risks that showed statistically significant sectorial
disagreement over its allocation. The public sector’s overall mean score of 2.667 and the
private sector’s overall mean score of 1.75 yields a significant mean difference of 0.917
(see Figure 6.3). Further, its public range and private range do not overlap; however, its
public sector LCL and private sector UCL are only 0.015 units away from meeting on the
adjusted five-point scale (see Figure 6.12). This suggests cooperative compromise over
its preferred allocation is possible.
This risk differs from land acquisition because it deals with the risk of
inaccessible land or resources already procured for a project, resulting in added delays
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and costs. This risk may intersect with availability of labour/materials, weather
conditions, environmental protection, project permits, and ground conditions – among
others – as it broadly encapsulates unanticipated delays in using resources that are
otherwise available save for specific obstacles.
Both Hwang et al. and Li et al. suggest public allocation for site availability.
Hwang et al. note that a corruption free public sector should be better able to manage this
risk to “ensure that P[3] projects are in a favourable environment for private sectors.”
Further, they note that the “public sector should also retain the risk of site acquisition as it
has higher authority to control the process of land acquisition.”386
Again, results from the core literature database are echoed in this study’s findings
– land acquisition received a larger share of public allocation preferences both within the
core literature database and within this study than site availability did. Land acquisition,
with three public and one ‘shared’ allocation recommendation, received relevant
membership functions mSpub(CI) = 0.44 and mMpub(CI) = 0.56; site availability, with three
public, two private, and one ‘shared’ allocation recommendation, received a relatively
weaker public score with no mSpub degree of membership above zero.
Site availability risk’s weaker public sector allocation likely arose in both
circumstances because such risks are connected to a wide array of different factors –
many of which may arise under private sector influence. Ng and Loosemore note that
“site risks” should be allocated to different actors from different sectors depending on
what each risk entails. For instance, should site availability risks arise due to Native title
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or cultural heritage issues, they recommend governments bear the risk; if site availability
risks arise due to the failure of supporting structures or ground conditions, they
recommend private construction contractors bear the risk; if site availability risks arise
due to pollution and discharge, they recommend private operating companies bear the
risk.387 Thus, this risk remains highly contingent on specific project circumstances.
6.7.7 Force Majeure
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.82; mES(CI) = 0.18; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
As noted in Chapter 4, large-scale, uninsurable risks that can neither be quantified
nor influenced by private actors should be borne by public authorities. Even if the private
sector has influence over such risks, unquantifiable risks should still be borne largely by
governments with a risk cap for the private sector (see Figure 4.5). The VDTF defines
force majeure risk as “the risk that a specified event entirely outside the control of either
party will occur and will result in a delay or default by the private party in… its
contractual obligations.” 388 Other force majeure definitions can be less optimistic;
Yescombe defines force majeure risk as an event where, “though neither party is at fault,
the effect of the event is so severe (and cannot be mitigated by insurance…) that the
Project Contract has to be terminated.”389
One pattern remains clear, however, and that is that force majeure risks are
exogenous – they arise from external influences, and thus no party has control over their
occurrence. In line with Chapter 4’s findings, force majeure has appropriately garnered a
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strong membership degree – 0.82 – towards ‘mostly public’ allocation on account of
Figure 4.5’s rule: risks that cannot be fully insured, quantified, or controlled to any
degree by either party should be borne by governments. Its relatively weak membership
degree – 0.12 – towards ‘equally shared’ allocation nicely accounts for the concept of
risk sharing for force majeure events with a private sector risk cap.
Force majeure takes shape in two distinct forms: political and non-political. Nonpolitical force majeure risks, often referred to as “acts of God,” include natural disasters
(e.g. earthquakes, landslides, and floods) and biological calamities (e.g. nuclear or
chemical contamination to a site). Political force majeure risks include war, terrorism,
and riots. It is generally accepted that no party has influence over these risks and,
accordingly, they should be borne by the public sector if they cannot be covered by
insurance.390
The reason events like force majeure risks – which cannot be affected by either
sector – are solely borne by public authorities, or mostly borne by public authorities with
a cap for the private sector, is twofold. Firstly, the main purpose of P3s for governments
is to develop public infrastructure and services for citizens while the main purpose of P3s
for SPVs is to make a profit. If SPVs were expected to bear a large portion of force
majeure risks, they would be less likely to participate in P3s due to the exorbitant costs
associated with bearing these risks. This would hamper the government’s ability to attract
P3 bidders and thus utilize P3 procurement to develop public infrastructure. Second,
governments have “a much higher (almost infinite) ability to absorb risk, while… private
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partner[s] ha[ve] limited legal and financial responsibility.”

391

Because of the

government’s virtually unrestrained ability to accrue continual resources via taxation, it
will be less affected than private parties in the long-term from bearing major force
majeure risks.392
6.7.8 Residual Assets Risk
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.58; mES(CI) = 0.42; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
Residual assets risks concern the designation of unspecified assets on project land
remaining at the end of a project’s lifecycle. Residual assets risks, along with residual
value risks, are considered a “handback risk” dealing with the ownership rights of either
physical or intellectual property at a project’s end.393 As mentioned in Chapter 2, asset
ownership can be temporarily transferred to the private sector over the course of a P3
project’s lifecycle in a ‘rent to own’ transaction where public authorities pay their private
partners annual fees over a specified period – generally between two to three decades – to
own the infrastructure at the end of the period.394
The end of a P3 project’s lifecycle presents two options to the government: (i)
contracts are renegotiated with the original private partner or (ii) ownership of the facility
reverts back to the government.395 In the event that public authorities select the latter
option, the terms and conditions associated with handback risks are typically covered
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under P3 contracts. Governments typically structure incentives through awards and/or
fees associated with facility upkeep to ensure that infrastructure is in suitable condition
upon transfer of ownership.396
However, in the instance that an SPV utilizes undesignated assets during the
operation and maintenance of a P3 project, this study suggests that private partners
should be able to either: (i) retain the assets upon ownership transfer or (ii) negotiate to
receive extra compensation for transferring the assets alongside ownership of the facility.
Unsurprisingly, the total mean score for public respondents was 0.583 points higher than
for private respondents (2.833 to 2.25).
6.8 Risks Leaning Towards an Evenly Shared Allocation
This study indicates that nine risks should generally be shared significantly
between sectors. With reference to the five-point semantic differentiation scale, a literal
interpretation of its third point – ‘equally shared’ – is an imprecise reflection of industry
practices. P3 contracts are long, exhaustive, and complex documents; such agreements
are not conducive to exactly equal risk sharing. The term ‘equal sharing’ comes from the
rhetorical limitations of using ordinal scales to propose risk allocation decision models in
lieu of real-life industry methods. The aforementioned studies provided by Li et al., Ke et
al., Chan et al., Hwang et al., and Tolani do not make this admission when presenting
risks they regard as ‘equally shared.’
With this in mind, the following risks that fall under the broad evenly shared risk
category include: (i) excessive contract variation, (ii) project approval and permit, (iii)
396
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ground conditions, (iv) residual value risk, (v) changes in industrial code of practices, (vi)
supporting utilities risk, (vii) influential economic events, (viii) environmental protection,
and (ix) construction/design changes.
6.8.1 Excessive Contract Variation
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.25; mES(CI) = 0.75; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
Risks associated with excessive contract variation entail inappropriate contractual
delegation at financial close (i.e. a poorly written final contract). This subsequently
results in excessive mediation or arbitration procedures. Excessive contract variation was
one of the most contentious risks recognized in the core literature database – it appeared
in six of the database’s twelve articles and received public, private, and ‘shared’
allocation suggestions. According to Ke et al., since “feasibility studies and contract
negotiation are relative to both parties, it would be the best for the public and private
sectors to share the responsibility for these risks.” 397 Hwang et al. adopt a similar
perspective for risks that arise due to the “inadequate distribution of responsibilities.”398
Hwang et al. believe risks arising from suboptimal contractual delegation are
“relationship risks… [that] can be caused by both parties in a P[3] project.” Accordingly,
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they justify their study’s allocation for this risk being ‘equally shared.’399 This study’s
public and private respondents gave excessive contract variation risk a total mean value
of 2.833 and 2.583, respectively (see Figure 6.3). While leaning towards an equal sharing
of risk, it is hypothesized that a quarter of excessive contraction variation’s range falls
within ‘mostly public’ membership because ultimately, P3 contracts are written for public
infrastructure projects where governments are principals and private parties are mere
agents. Because governments are the project principals in a principal-agent relationship,
they take on a supervisory role. Further, they are responsible for ensuring that their output
specifications are both clear and coherent to their agents.
In certain instances, public authorities protect themselves from some excessive
contract variation risks due to poorly written contracts. For example, Partnerships
Victoria – a crown corporation under Victoria’s Department of Treasury and Finance –
has set a national precedent where public authorities are only liable for risks explicitly
mentioned in P3 contracts; if risks are not identified and delegated by either sector due to
suboptimal pre-contractual PRM, they are automatically borne by private partners. This is
a risk private parties must accept upon entering any P3 contract with a Victorian public
authority. 400 To cite protection methods against excessive contract variation risk,
Canada’s Association of Consulting Engineering Companies (ACEC) refers to one P3
model “called Project Alliance, [where] parties sign a contract that states they will not
take legal action against each other.” Should unspecified cost overruns or savings occur
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under ‘Project Alliance,’ parties also agree to share these drawbacks and/or benefits over
specified ranges depending on which type of instances occur.401
In summation, excessive contract variation risks are treated differently on a
project-to-project basis. This study recognizes their ‘equal sharing’ status while still
acknowledging the principal role, and extra responsibilities, denoted with public
authorities as project supervisors. This study’s proposed allocation appears sound.
6.8.2 Project Approval and Permit
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.29; mES(CI) = 0.71; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
Project approval and permit risks deal with unanticipated delays or refusals
against acquiring official documents authorizing the use of land, labour, or other
resources that require permits or some other means of official consent from an authority.
In its most extreme form, mitigation against risks associated with project approvals may
require public expropriation (e.g. for land rights). Most commonly, however, both public
and private parties obtain project permits through relatively straightforward
administrative processes, generally before financial close.402
Yescombe notes that public authorities often obtain “key planning permits
before… bids take place” during the competitive selection process to hasten project
progress while further permits pertaining to a project’s DBOM are obtained between both
sectors, varying from project to project (e.g. construction permits and environmental
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clearances).403 Yescombe’s insights are mirrored in the WDBA’s RFQ for the Gordie
Howe Bridge:
Project Co will be responsible for: obtaining all permits and approvals
necessary for construction of the Facility, but excluding (i) those permits
and approvals which have been obtained and (ii) those permits and
approvals which are the responsibility of a WDBA Party… [which are]
Canadian Government Approvals… to proceed [with the project]… and…
zoning required to permit the Facility.404
Li et al. note that project approval and permit risks are “strongly dependent upon
projects.”405 Chan et al., Ke et al., and Tolani all allocate project approval and permit
risks to the public sector. This risk received relatively weak public mean scores from
Chan et al. and Tolani: 2.45 out of 5 and 1.66 out of 3, respectively.406 By adopting a
fluid risk allocation model based on degrees of membership, this study recognizes project
approval and permit risk’s public association while simultaneously recognizing its
generally shared nature. This type of insight is not offered in other questionnaire-based
literature on P3 risk allocation. With a relatively weak ‘mostly public’ membership of
0.29 and a strong equal sharing membership of 0.71, this study’s proposed allocation for
project approval and permit risk remains consistent with previous studies and appears
sound.
6.8.3 Ground Conditions
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.14; mES(CI) = 0.86; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
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Ground conditions deal mainly with geotechnical engineering risks. Geotechnical
engineering deals with the DB of infrastructure that is supported by, or constructed
around, soil and/or rock.407 In this study, ground condition risks pertain to unforeseen or
poorly surveyed land that requires alternative geotechnical engineering post financial
close. Thus, these risks create additional costs and delays. If given a public sector mean
rank score, public authorities should compensate private partners for this mishap; if given
a private sector mean rank score, SPVs should accept that extra costs and delays will be
borne by select JVs under its consortium. Upon review of the core literature database,
ground condition risk remains very contentious, receiving public, private, and shared
allocation suggestions over the nine times it appears (see Figure 5.3).
Yescombe seconds this contention, noting that ground condition risks may be
shared or allocated to either sector depending on project contexts:
The risks that the geology of the site is not as expected… should
preferably be passed from the Public Authority to the Project Company,
and then to the Construction Subcontractor. Site surveys may be carried
out in advance of Financial Close to reduce this risk… [and] one
possibility is that the bidders collectively share the cost, another is that the
Public Authority pays for them… this is a difficult area of risk transfer.408
Yescombe notes that public authorities should bear ground condition risks for brownfield
projects, where “access for [site] surveys may be difficult because there are old buildings
on the site.” Greenfield projects, conversely, provide easier access for private parties to
assess ground conditions before financial close (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2 for a summary
of greenfield and brownfield projects). If ground condition risks are to be shared in the
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final contract, private lenders and equity investors usually request a risk cap on the
private sector to ensure that SPVs are only liable for a portion of potentially exuberant
losses denoted with additional geotechnical engineering RMAs.409
While receiving a strong ‘equally shared’ membership function of 0.86, it is
believed that ground conditions risks retain a slight public membership function of 0.14
because – in this study – such risks are specified as those which are unforeseen or
undelegated post financial close. Thus, this reflects the general consensus amongst P3
practitioners that there is an expectation from public authorities to ensure contracts are
tightly constrained to include foreseeable risks that may arise (i.e. because governments
are project principals).410 Just like the risk of excessive contract variation before it, this
study’s expert respondents appear to be charitable towards the private sector for mishaps
involving undelegated responsibility, even when that responsibility may be shared with or
delegated towards the private sector. This risk’s recommended allocation appears sound,
albeit malleable, pending unique project specificities.
6.8.4 Residual Value Risk
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.17; mES(CI) = 0.83; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
Another “handback risk,” residual value risks deal with the transfer of ownership
from private partners to public authorities at the end of a P3 project’s lifecycle. These
risks include provisions regarding the “terms, conditions, requirements and procedures
governing the condition in which a private partner is to deliver an asset to the public
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sector… as set forth in… [a P3 project’s] contract.”411 As noted in Chapter 2, public
authorities provide incentive mechanisms – typically through awards and penalties –
associated with the condition of public facilities to encourage the suitable maintenance of
public infrastructure under temporary private control.412
Over the six times residual value risk appears in the core literature database, it is
given one public sector allocation, one shared allocation, and four private sector
allocations. Results from this study suggest a shared allocation for residual value,
meaning both public and private authorities should bear potential losses associated with
the transfer of a devalued facility from private partners. Hwang et al.’s study suggests a
shared allocation “because the ability to operate the project transferred to the public
sector at the end of the concession period is concerned with not only the operation
responsibility of the private sector but also the work of the public sector.”413
Even if a facility is not impaired, public authorities are still exposed to residual
value risks when, upon transfer back to the government, a facility “does not have the
value originally estimated by [the] government at which the private party agreed to
transfer it to [the] government.” This issue may arise if capital investments are used to
upgrade a piece of infrastructure that has since depreciated or been removed, demolished,
or not in use. Because private capital will likely be used for these investments, public
authorities should compensate SPVs where these specific forms of residual value risks
occur. Further, because governments commission regular inspections of P3 facilities
411
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during private operation, it is fair to assume that risks associated with discrepancies found
between lifecycle inspections and final inspections upon transfer of ownership should not
be borne solely or majorly by private partners. In this case, a public allocation is
warranted.414
However, if private partners transfer an impaired facility to the public sector, they
should be responsible for bearing costs associated with the facility’s condition. Thus,
depending on the context of a residual value risk, both the public and private sector may
be the justified risk receiver. Accordingly, this study’s ‘shared’ allocation preference is
sound, while noting the risk may shift towards either sector depending which of the
individual project circumstances mentioned above arise.
6.8.5 Changes in Industrial Code of Practices
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.02; mES(CI) = 0.96; mMpri(CI) = 0.02; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
As noted in Section 6.5.1, the risk of changes in industrial code of practices
presents a unique scenario where it shares degrees of membership above zero towards
three membership functions. Albeit, this risk’s association with ‘mostly public’ and
‘mostly private’ membership functions is marginal; its membership degree for both is
0.02. It is hypothesized that this risk’s unique association towards three membership
functions is attributed to its relatively large range of 0.826. Section 6.5.1 also notes that
range shares a positive relationship with variance; because a high variance means less
conclusivity amongst respondents, the confidence with which a risk’s range is predicted
decreases.
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Accordingly, risks with high respondent variances require higher ranges to
confidently predict where they will fall under. Consider, at the most extreme level,
respondents were asked to assign a number on the questionnaire’s five-point scale to a
28th variable with no title or definition. Because this variable would be given arbitrary
respondent input, it would likely yield an extremely high variance between respondents –
so much so that its predicted range for a population could not be accurately predicted at
all. In this hypothetical scenario, the variable’s range may theoretically fall under all
membership functions on the five-point adjusted scale (see Figure 6.13).
Because of its high range and association to three membership functions, it is
unsurprising that the risk of changes in industrial code of practices was one of six project
risks showing a statistically significant disagreement between public and private sector
respondents over its allocation. With a public mean score of 3.5 and a private mean score
of 2.5, its mean difference between sectors represents an entire point on the
questionnaire’s five-point semantic differentiation scale. A small sanction may be
offered, however, in citing the intersection of this risk’s public CI range and private CI
range, which overlap at 0.128 units (see Figure 6.13).415
This risk is equally split between three private and three shared allocation
preferences amongst its six appearances in the core literature database. While Li et al.’s
study – based on majority opinion analysis – recommends private allocation for changes
in industrial code of practices, they note that “risk[s] of industrial regulation change
attracted [a significant] preference for shared allocation… This reflects the fact that…
415
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private contractors may endeavor to have the public client bear part of any extra costs due
to regulation change.”416
Industrial code change risks differ in scope from general law change risks in that
they seldom involve regulation from political bodies tied to P3 projects (hence this
study’s more preferred public allocation of the latter and more equally shared allocation
of the former). More specifically, risk associated with ‘changes in law’ deal with “strictly
legal requirements… [or] policy requirements,” which emanate from common law and
statute law, both of which are within Parliament’s – or a governmental department’s –
power to change or influence.
Conversely, changes in industrial code of practices refer to “regulatory
requirements set by… independent” firms. While governments ultimately influence
private practices through legislation, “their operation is otherwise self-sufficient” in this
respect.417 Thus, when commercial industries experience changes in their industrial codes,
P3 crown corporations are seldom tied to these changes and, accordingly, “government
generally does not accept the risk of change in… [these] regulatory requirements.”418
The VDTF’s primer, which was included in this study’s core literature database,
believes such risks should be borne solely by the private sector:
A private party should not be shielded from changes in law which apply
generally to the business environment or to which its particular industry
sector would ordinarily be subject, merely because it has entered [into] a
contract with [the] government. Accordingly, costs arising from any
change in law which applies universally to the business environment… or
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to the project's particular industry sector, should be borne by the private
party.419
It is possible that this study’s expert respondents prefer an equally shared allocation for
this risk because they inflate the degree to which public authorities are responsible for
changes in industrial practices and codes. While a shared allocation preference for this
risk runs consistent with a large portion of P3 literature, its allocation scheme remains
contentious even after this study.
However, to be charitable to this study’s findings, a clear demarcation can now be
made between the risk allocation of: (i) changes in law that emanate directly from
common law and statute law, which should be borne mostly by the public sector, and (ii)
changes in law that apply directly to regulatory practices of commercial industries, which
should include private sector allocation to some degree.
6.8.6 Supporting Utilities Risk
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 1.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.0; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
Like site availability risk before it, supporting utilities risk presents a special
situation where it falls under only one membership function. However, the confidence for
supporting utilities risk’s strength of association with ‘equally shared’ is less than the
confidence for site availability risk’s strength of association with ‘mostly public.’ This is
due to supporting utilities risk’s higher range of 0.8 compared to site availability risk’s
range of 0.683. As mentioned above, a risk’s degrees of membership for a function must
be viewed alongside its range to account for variance between respondents. Higher
ranges create a relatively lower strength of association towards a membership function.
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Section 6.5.1 uses the examples of site availability, changes in industrial code of
practices, and supporting utilities risks to explain why degrees of membership alone do
not provide a holistic conception of this study’s results for this reason.420
Supporting utilities risk deals with the availability and/or price of a P3 project’s
required local utilities (e.g. electricity, gas, and water supply). This risk was among the
six contentious risks that experienced a statistically significant difference in allocation
preferences between public and private sector respondents. With a public mean score of
3.583 and a private mean score of 2.417, its mean difference between sectors is the
second largest in the study at 1.167. Of the four times this risk appeared in the core
literature database, its suggested allocation preference was split evenly between ‘shared’
and public allocation preferences.
For the Laibin B Power Project case study in Chapter 5, Ke et al. note that the
public sector retained risks associated with supporting utilities to aid the project’s SPV.
The public sector was responsible for:
…providing the Project Company with the transmission line and providing
start-up electricity and steam and all fuel for testing… Government
support would also be offered to ensure that no similar competitive project
will be approved so that the market volume would not be undermined by
the other projects.421
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This method is mirrored in the Gordie Howe Bridge project, where the WDBA’s RFQ
states that early works towards facilitating the availability and relocation of project
utilities are “the responsibility of [the] WDBA and will be undertaken at the expense of
[the] WDBA. [The] WDBA’s expenses… will be recovered through tolls.”422
There are instances in P3 literature where supporting utilities risks are given
public sector allocation preferences,423 private sector allocation preferences,424 and shared
allocation preferences. 425 Yescombe notes that supporting utilities risks – such as
relocating gas, sewage, or water pipelines – may generally be transferred to JV private
partners because they entail “relatively routine requirement[s] in construction, although
[they] may be treated as… Relief Event[s].”426
‘Relief events’ are agreements created during pre-contractual PRM that specify
events for which, if certain risks occur, SPVs are to be pardoned from otherwise breached
responsibilities (e.g. if a water treatment plant’s water supply becomes contaminated for
reasons beyond an SPV’s control, JV operators may be afforded extra time by the
government to provide the public with suitable drinking water). While relief events
provide no financial compensation, they allot private partners with extra time to complete
project tasks affected by certain risks. 427 Thus, while Yescombe largely denotes
supporting utilities risks with private sector allocation, he recognizes a form of ‘shared’
422
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allocation preference – to a degree – as well. Considering the combination of supporting
utilities risks’ (i) inconclusive allocation preferences within P3 literature, (ii) high degree
of sectorial disagreement in this study, and (iii) the relative frequency with which its
allocation is expressly designated under a ‘project-to-project’ basis, its ‘shared’ allocation
preference from this study is subject to scrutiny. Further research is required.
6.8.7 Influential Economic Events
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 0.92; mMpri(CI) = 0.08; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
For this study, the broad risk of influential economic events is defined as
‘macroeconomic anomalies on a national or global scale that greatly affect local market
conditions.’ It appears thrice under the core literature database with two private sector
allocation preferences and one shared allocation preference. It passed both the
independent two-sample t-test and Mann-Whitney U test at a confidence level of 95
percent. However, this risk presents a considerably higher mean score difference between
sectors compared to the other 21 risks that showed statistically significant agreement
between sectors over their allocation. Its public mean total is 3.416 and its private mean
total is 2.667, creating a large – albeit not statistically significant – mean score difference
of 0.75.428
Ibrahim et al.’s and Roumboutsos’ and Anagnostopoulos’ studies on P3 project
risk allocation also suggest a ‘shared’ allocation preference for influential economic
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events.429 While neither article is included in the core literature database, their findings
echo the opinions of this study’s expert respondents. As mentioned in Chapter 4,
uninsured large-scale risks that can be quantified – but not influenced by public or private
actors – should be shared without a cap for the private sector (see Figure 4.5). Thus, this
study’s ‘shared’ allocation recommendation between public and private parties for
influential economic events – such as ‘booms’ or recessions – is considered sound.430
6.8.8 Environmental Protection
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 0.94; mMpri(CI) = 0.06; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
Environmental protection risk concerns events where a P3 project impinges on
environmental regulations and, subsequently, legal ramifications ensue. This risk boasts
one of the highest levels of agreement between sectors over its allocation with a public
mean score of 3.083 and a private mean score of 3. Ke et al. also denote environmental
protection risk with a ‘shared’ allocation. However, they further note that, “if the
invitation of bidding has stated the environment standards required for the project,
additional measures undertaken to protect the environment by the private sector due to
changes of the requirements should be rationally compensated.”431
For the Gordie Howe Bridge, the WDBA worked alongside the state of Michigan
to conduct a coordinated environmental assessment to determine the project’s potential
429
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environmental impact, potential RMAs to minimize this impact, and environmental
commitments and regulatory approvals identified under the United States Environmental
Protection Agency’s Record of Decision (ROD) for the project.432 Although the WDBA
already obtained early project approvals concerning environmental regulations before
issuing an RFP, it specifies in the project’s RFQ that some “environmental
commitments… and… regulatory approvals identified in the ROD… are to be obtained
by Project Co.”433
While the WDBA provides guideline resources for prospective private bidders
(e.g. a link to the Gordie Howe Bridge’s ROD), it states that prospective project bidders
are ultimately “responsible for obtaining [their] own independent… environmental…
advice, and making [their] own investigations with respect to the Project.”434 Thus, while
environmental responsibilities for the Gordie Howe Bridge are generally ‘shared,’ its
public authority puts a considerable onus on the private sector to ensure it comprehends
environmental regulations pertaining to the project (for which it may receive potential
awards for upholding or penalties for ignoring). Ultimately, this study’s ‘shared’
allocation for environmental protection risks appears sound.
6.8.9 Construction/Design Changes
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 0.80; mMpri(CI) = 0.020; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
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Project risks associated with construction and design changes are defined in this
study as ‘changes to project terms due to poor preliminary investigations resulting in
improper design.’ These risks may be linked to geological P3 project risks, such as
environmental protection and ground conditions, or to general DB project phases that
exclusively deal with the engineering and construction of infrastructure. For most
projects, “[d]esign, construction and commissioning risk[s]… [are] implicitly allocated to
the private party… provided that the ability of the government to interfere with the
design, construction and commissioning processes is then extremely limited.”435
Recall from Chapters 2 and 3 that P3s generally operate under ‘output-based’
contracts. Because private sectors may be given considerable leeway over the ‘input’ of
the public infrastructure’s design and build, it is universally understood that mishaps
regarding the improper design or construction of infrastructure are ‘private’ risks.
Consider, for example, Chapter 5’s case study on the Right Honourable Herb Gray
Parkway. The government issued fines on the project’s SPV – the WEMG – for 500
faulty girders produced by one of its JVs, Freyssinet Canada Ltd. While the WEMG has
mitigated economic consequences associated with this risk through second-step risk
transfer, fines associated with this risk must be borne by the private sector.436 This
example presents a textbook DB risk that is justifiably allocated to the private sector.
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The risk in question, however, deals with ‘poor preliminary investigations
resulting in improper design.’ While governments may provide private partners with
considerable leeway over the DB of P3-procured infrastructure, they generally provide
guidelines associated with preliminary investigations presented in project RFQs and
RFPs. In cases where design and construction risks arise due to government-initiated
mishaps, such as the inclusion or omission of a DB specifications that adversely affect a
project, “it may be appropriate, using optimal risk allocation principles, for
government[s] to bear the cost of such [DB] changes” that result from these mishaps.437
In summation, risk allocation preferences over a P3 project’s DB changes are
contingent on the sector responsible for requiring DB changes. If such risks arise due to
poor post-contractual PRM (i.e. the ‘output’ of otherwise acceptable DB guidelines), then
private parties should bear the risks. If such risks arise due to poor pre-contractual PRM
(i.e. the ‘input’ of DB guidelines), then public parties should compensate private partners
by bearing an agreed portion of the risks. This study’s ‘shared’ allocation is relatively
sound in that both sectors may bear risks associated with design and construction
changes, but specific project conditions ultimately dictate which sector bears them.
6.9 Risks Leaning Towards Private Sector Allocation
This study indicates that ten risks should generally be allocated to the private
sector either fully or to a significant degree. The following ‘private’ risks – in order of
their strength of association to the private sector 438 – include: (i) availability of
labour/materials, (ii) asset ownership, (iii) foreign currency risk, (iv) income risk, (v)
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interest rates, (vi) inflation risks, (vii) market demand change, (viii) tariff change, (ix)
weather conditions, and (x) third party tort liability.
6.9.1 Availability of Labour/Materials
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 0.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.28; mSpri(CI) = 0.72.
While this risk is considered ‘contentious’ based on the core literature review, it
almost registers as a ‘sound’ P3 risk. Availability of labour/materials is one allocation
recommendation shy of unanimously holding a ‘private’ allocation – it appears seven
times in the core database with six private allocation recommendations and one public
allocation recommendation. It is no surprise that this risk garners the highest – and thus
most private – mean score on the questionnaire’s five-point scale for both public and
private sector respondents with a 4.083 and 4.583 rating, respectively.439
It is generally accepted in P3 literature that SPVs should be tasked with
delegating responsibility over the provision of project resources – i.e. materials and staff
– amongst its selected JVs through second-step risk transfer. Should project
subcontractors and suppliers fail to produce the resources they are tasked with, they are
generally liable to bear the financial penalties associated with such mishaps. If, for some
reason, a subcontractor or supplier defaults this risk back to its sender (i.e. from a JV to
an SPV through second-step risk transfer default), its associated penalties will still be
levied against a private party. Thus, the private sector generally retains such risks during
a P3 project’s potential DBFOM stages.
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Ke et al. note that “most construction and operation risks are assigned to the
private partner… [including] ‘Delay in Supply.’”440 Li et al. note that “construction risk
is assigned completely to contractors for all procurement methods.”441 Hwang et al. note
that “the private sector should be more familiar with design and construction risks,
including… ‘material availability’…Hence, it is not surprising that [it was] preferably
assigned to the private sector.” 442 The private allocation of material and labour
availability for P3s is confirmed in several other studies.443 This study’s private allocation
of risks associated with the availability of labour/materials appears sound.
6.9.2 Asset Ownership
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 0.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.48; mSpri(CI) = 0.52.
Risks associated with the – temporary – ownership of public infrastructure
through P3 concessions entail the costs of owning, operating, and maintaining
infrastructure over a project’s lifecycle. Potentially, maintenance and upgrade
requirements may entail additional design and build stages as well over the course of a
DBFOM P3 contract. Asset ownership encompasses a broad spectrum of post-contractual
PRM-related risks that may arise either during a P3 service contract (e.g. changes in
industrial code of practice, construction/design changes, force majeure, and market
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demand change) or upon termination of a contract (e.g. expropriation, exclusive rights
revocation, and residual value risks). Asset ownership risks mainly arise for three broad
reasons: (i) maintenance or upgrade costs of a facility are higher than anticipated, (ii) a
facility’s value falls below the initial projected value to which it was ascribed, or (iii) a
project’s lifecycle is shorter than anticipated.444
As noted in Chapter 2, conventional infrastructure procurement methods
traditionally allocate asset ownership risks to the public sector. However, a key
component of P3 projects concerns the transfer of ‘whole life’ costs to the private sector
– especially for projects with longer lifecycles and heavy private partner involvement (i.e.
DBFOM projects). Thus, it is no surprise that asset ownership risk received this study’s
second highest total mean score of 4.208 and its second highest ‘solely private’
membership degree of 0.52.
It should be noted that, for some of the risks associated with asset ownership
mentioned above, mean score ratings differ greatly from asset ownership’s mean rating.
For example, expropriation, exclusive right, and force majeure risks received total mean
scores of 1.708, 2.083, and 2.417, respectively. None of these risks fall under private
sector membership functions. This stark contrast between allocation preferences for risks
linked to asset ownership is a testament to the wide range of risks denoted with the
operation and maintenance of P3s over project lifecycles – mirrored by a similarly wide
range of RMAs suited for responding to these risks.
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This study’s proposed allocation scheme for asset ownership risk should only be
applied to the general, day-to-day risks denoted with the operation and maintenance of P3
facilities (in lieu of more grandiose risks – like force majeure – which retain their own
risk categories). Asset ownership risk is typically denoted with a P3 project’s general
operation and maintenance, technological obsolescence, and structural degradation. As is
generally the case, these common risks are borne solely by the private sector.
6.9.3 Foreign Currency Risk
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 0.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.67; mSpri(CI) = 0.33.
Foreign currency risk, dealing with the exchange and convertibility of foreign
monies, is a macroeconomic risk that concerns private equity investors, lenders, and
SPVs.445 Privately funded P3 projects are frequently financed with the aid of foreign
lenders and investors. P3 project revenue, however, is almost always denominated in a
project’s local currency (e.g. through local tolls or local government availability
payments). When ‘revenue’ currencies and ‘debt’ currencies differ, SPVs are faced with
currency exchange risks, as the cost of a project’s debt may increase – or decrease –
depending on international market fluctuations.446 With reference to Chapter 4, when
currency exchange risks decrease project debt, SPVs are faced with risk ‘opportunities’;
when currency risks increase project debt, SPVs are faced with risk ‘threats.’
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According to “purchasing power parity” – a theory regarding the equilibrium of
purchasing powers between different currencies – devalued currencies should face
enough inflation pressures over time to bring them back to parity levels with foreign
currencies. However, more often than not, foreign project lenders are unwilling to wait
for currency equilibriums to be reached before receiving payments owed.447 Thus, SPVs
must pay amortization and interest even when currency exchange rates have adversely
affected their net capital (see Figure 2.2).
The VDTF states that foreign currency exchange risks are beyond the control of
both public and private partners. Thus, it should “be dealt with in an express provision in
the [final] contract.”448 The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)
concedes that central banks and government agencies may have limited control of
exchange rate risks, but – ultimately – “currency risk is largely unmanageable for the
private sector and may be beyond the control of the government agency in charge of
infrastructure development, which means that it may not be easily acceptable for either
party.”449
The literature on foreign currency risk is too inconclusive to assign it a consistent
allocation framework that does not recognize its variability and contingency on
individual P3 project circumstances. However, this study’s respondent pool of experts
showed high levels of unanimity both within and between respondents groups over the
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private allocation of foreign currency risks.450 A framework can be adopted where foreign
currency risk is implicitly allocated to private partners to a large degree with room for
contractually explicit addendums to this principle should private partners require fiscal
support from the government. Thus, its private allocation recommendation may stand,
though the degree to which the private sector should bear this risk will likely need to be
assessed on a project-to-project basis.
For example, if the preferred proponent chosen for a Canadian P3 project has ties
to foreign financiers – or if foreign shareholders own the SPV itself – it may be assumed
that foreign currency risk can be more readily adopted by the private sector due to
established rapports with foreign financiers. Carpintero notes that “Spanish developers…
have been particularly successful in winning P[3] contracts during the last decade.”
Further, “the consortiums of financial institutions responsible for arranging the financing
for the concessions awarded to Spanish companies abroad have included at least one
Spanish bank, if not several.”451
6.9.4 Income Risk
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 0.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.93; mSpri(CI) = 0.07
This study defines income risk as the degree to which private sector revenue
streams align with revenue projections. Referring back to Chapter 2, SPVs may be
compensated by the public sector either directly (i.e. through availability payments or
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milestone payments) or indirectly (i.e. through full tolls or shadow tolls).452 As stated
previously, a key factor distinguishing P3 contracts from many conventional DB
contracts is that payments are generally contingent on the performance of private partners
(e.g. meeting specific project deadlines). It is understood that this incentivizes private
partners to complete project tasks in both an adequate and timely manner.
Of the six times income risks appeared in the core literature database, it received
five private allocation recommendations and one ‘shared’ allocation recommendation.
This is unsurprising, as private partners have a large degree of influence over their ability
to meet public sector output specifications denoted with availability payments and
milestone payments. With a high level of agreement between sectors over its allocation
(i.e. a 0.083 mean difference) and a combined mean score of 3.958, this study’s pool of
expert respondents appear to second this opinion.
However, when SPVs accept indirect payments methods such as highway or
bridge tolls, they bear a higher income risk if projections over the use of public facilities
are not met. This is because private partners have little influence over the degree to which
public infrastructure is utilized by citizens. Thus, income risks are most significant to
private partners when they accept toll-based payment methods. If volume projections for
a facility fall short, SPVs either lose profits, or garner profits at a slower rate than
anticipated, depending on a P3 project’s contractual specifities.453
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While it is true that private partners have considerably less influence on income
risks associated with toll-based payments, this study’s findings suggest that they should
still bear income risk to a major degree. Li et al. report similar findings, noting:
… financial attraction and level of demand for a project are important
investigations to be carried out in most P[3]… projects during the detailed
feasibility study phase by the private consortium. Thus, most respondents
do not see either of these… risks as being the responsibility of the public
sector.454
This is an important consideration. Recall key concepts from Chapter 4 regarding precontractual PRM and risk premiums. A key point of risk transfer in P3 procurement
projects is that, to a degree, risk cannot be completely avoided or mitigated in all
instances.
Accordingly, P3 players will inevitably accept risks that cannot be fully mitigated
by neither the risk sender nor the risk receiver. In such instances, risk premiums play an
important incentivizing role for risk takers to accept potential project threats they do not
have complete influence over. In summation, even when private partners accept tollbased payments, income risks should be borne mostly by the private sector. This study’s
proposed allocation model for income risk – with a 0.93 ‘mostly private’ membership
degree – appears sound.
6.9.5 Interest Rate
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 0.0; mMpri(CI) = 0.83; mSpri(CI) = 0.17.
Interest rate risks concern fluctuations in interest on monies owed to project
financiers. Recall from Chapter 2 that private financing has recently become a
454
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prerequisite condition for public-private contracts to adopt a ‘P3’ label in Canada.
Accordingly, Canadian SPVs are responsible for paying back project debts either fully or
partially. Interest rate risks typically pose the largest threat when project lenders charge
interest at a “floating” rate opposed to a “fixed” rate. Floating interest rates fluctuate over
a project’s lifecycle due to periodic changes in benchmark interest rates and indexes (e.g.
fluctuating bank lending rates). Fixed interest rates remain stagnant over a specified
period of time, thus the amount of money owed for P3 project financing is more
foreseeable and stable when fixed interest rates are used.455
Interest rate risks can intersect with foreign currency risks when foreign lenders
finance projects, presenting “a question of balancing… [interest] rate debt with foreign
exchange rate risk or local currency debt subject to interest rate risk.”456 Like foreign
currency risk before it, interest rate risk likely receives a high ‘mostly private’
membership degree because debt providers – local or foreign – generally deal directly
with private partners for privately financed P3 projects. It is hypothesized that this
study’s expert respondents believe that, because SPVs commit to pre-contractual
agreements with their financiers, they should be responsible for interest rate fluctuations
that adversely affect private partner revenue streams over the course of P3 projects.
Following this study’s independent two sample t-test, sectorial agreement over the
allocation of interest rate risks received a remarkably perfect significance level of one
and, naturally, a mean score difference of zero. Both public and private sectors
respondents accumulated a mean score of 3.917 for interest rate risks, denoting its
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‘mostly private’ allocation. Unfortunately, this level of agreement is not found between
scholars in P3 literature. Despite unanimously receiving a mean score of 3.917 from both
respondent groups in this study, interest rate risk is frequently given public, private, and
‘equally shared’ allocation preferences throughout P3 literature.
Internationally, public and private parties are likely to share interest rate risks for
P3 projects to some degree. For example, governments may permit “flexibility in pricing”
for private partners or – in instances where P3 projects have a significantly large debt
component – governments may allow private partners “to commit to a specified pricing
regime before signing the project agreements” (e.g. risk caps for interest rates).457
However, in instances where interest rates are fixed, major government
intervention should not be needed, as project lenders and SPVs consult with one another
over the viability of planned payments methods (e.g. amortization specification) during
pre-contractual PRM before financial close (e.g. feasibility studies and due diligence
investigations). 458 It is assumed that pre-contractual agreements between SPVs and
project lenders will yield accurate projections over interest risks where rates are fixed.
Thus, the risk of growing interest rates undermining projected profit margins for SPVs is
mitigated through the use of fixed interest rates.
Consequently, interest rate risk’s high ‘mostly private’ membership degree in this
study remains sound when fixed interest rates are selected for P3 projects. According to
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The World Bank, “project finance debt tends to be fixed rate.”459 Further, Yescombe
adds that “project-finance bonds for P[3] projects always carry a fixed-rate coupon…
[while] commercial banks do not generally lend for such a long term at a fixed rate,
because they cannot fund the loan with matching deposits.” 460
In Canada, public financing of P3s entails bonds in lieu of bank loans. Hellowell
notes, “Canadian banks [are] more conservatively managed than many of their European
counterparts, and also [take] a more cautious approach to infrastructure lending… In
[response], Canada has… developed [a] P3 bond market… structured [around] pension
funds.” Because Canada’s pension funds “have spearheaded direct investments in
infrastructure since the early 2000s,” fixed interest rates are primarily used when
governments take part in P3 financing.461
In summation: (i) the private sector is better able to bear interest rate risks when
fixed interest rates are used because of their predictability; (ii) there is a relationship
between bonds and fixed interest rates; (iii) P3s in Canada that incorporate public
financing will utilize bonds; thus, (iv) P3s in Canada that incorporate public financing use
fixed interest rates and, accordingly, they should allocate interest rate risks mainly to the
private sector.
It can be reasonably asserted that this study’s pool of expert respondents chose to
unanimously allocate interest rate risks to the ‘mostly private’ category because they are
Canadian practitioners who have worked under the influence of a bond-centric P3
459
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market. In conclusion, this study’s findings appear sound for domestic P3s in Canada.
When foreign lenders finance large portions of a Canadian P3 project, the government
may need to bear a larger portion of interest rate risk to account for foreign currency risks
and floating interest rates. However, in the context of nationally financed P3s in Canada,
this study’s ‘mostly private’ allocation for interest rate risks appears sound.
6.9.6 Inflation Risk
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 0.13; mMpri(CI) = 0.87; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
Inflation risks, like interest rate risks, are macroeconomic in nature and largely
outside of both public and private sector influence. Because long-term P3 contracts
typically span between 25 to 30 years, the incremental accumulation of inflation can have
a significant effect on projects decades after final contracts are signed.462 The main risk
inflation poses to private actors is the devaluation of agreed-upon payments received
during a project’s lifecycle. Typically, this adversely affects SPVs and, potentially,
project financiers through “diminution in real returns of the private party.”463
Inflation risk also applies to the public sector in that public authorities want to
avoid overcompensating for inflation rates based on contractually agreed upon indexation
levels. When public authorities transfer macroeconomic market risks to SPVs, they
employ “indexation adjustments” to corresponding risk premiums. Indexation is a
payment adjustment method used by governments to compensate for inflation. With
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reference to a price index – or some other market benchmark – public authorities adjust
payments to SPVs to reflect the “current state of the market” via indexation.464
Scholars generally agree that, when the private sector bears inflation risk, public
authorities should index private sector service fees – to a degree – to avoid heavy charges
associated with risk premiums and contingencies.465 However, public authorities should
be weary of “over-indexation” to avoid the overuse of its resources.466 For example, if
public authorities spend more on indexation measures than they would have spent paying
extra fees for transferring non-indexed risks (e.g. through higher risk premiums,
contingencies, and other service related costs), then public indexation can become a
redundant, or even suboptimal, public RMA for inflation.
Thus, this study’s results for inflation risk appear sound. Under the assumption
that public authorities should adopt some indexation measures, 0.13 ‘equally shared’ and
0.87 ‘mostly private’ membership degrees for inflation risk allows for a degree of risk
sharing between sectors while avoiding the problem of over-indexation for the
government.467 Where risk premiums and service charges do not account for inflation,
private actors should anticipate inflation risk’s potentially adverse effects on the ‘real
returns’ they receive throughout a project’s lifecycle through appropriate contingency
strategies during pre-contractual PRM and necessary renegotiation strategies during postcontractual PRM.
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6.9.7 Market Demand Change
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 0.22; mMpri(CI) = 0.78; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
As a risk, market demand change concerns the accuracy with which actors
forecast the future demands and costs of operational services over a P3 project’s
lifecycle. If the demand for a service transcends forecasted levels, parties that bear
market demand change risks may experience a risk ‘opportunity’ in larger revenue
streams. If the cost for a service transcends forecasted levels, parties that bear market
demand change risks may experience a risk ‘threat’ in capital losses. Conversely, if
service demands – or costs – fall short of forecasted levels, risk bearers may experience
risk ‘threats’ in smaller revenue streams – or risk ‘opportunities’ in capital gains –
respectively.
Market demand change is closely linked to income risk. Other market risks
associated with market demand change include: influential economic events, availability
of labour and materials, supporting utilities risk, asset ownership, inflation risk, and
interest risks. What demarcates market demand change from other market risks is its
distinguished connection with exogenous market factors that arise from shifting market
dynamics. Whether the demand or cost for a service is affected by shifts in market
competition, composition, or focus, both public and private partners have relatively little
influence over their occurrence.
A shift in market competition denotes the progression – or regression – of
competing services affecting a facility’s revenue positively or negatively (e.g. the
construction, or demolition, of an alternative bridge, or toll fee changes from a competing
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facility). A shift in market composition denotes changing demographic trends affecting a
facility’s revenue (e.g. an aging populace’s increasing frequency of using hospitals).
Finally, a shift in market focus denotes technological or industrial changes affecting a
facility’s revenue (e.g. technological innovation resulting in the replacement of obsolete,
yet expensive, border security equipment or the shifting industrial landscape of a
country’s energy sector embracing gas-fired facilities in lieu of coal-based facilities).468
Yescombe notes that the P3 concession model (e.g. DBFOM) with toll-based
payment agreements are “the prime example of a P[3] where usage risk is transferred to
the private sector.”469 Of course, Section 6.9.4 already established that a ‘mostly private’
allocation preference for income risk is sound. However, for P3 projects with availabilitybased payment agreements, usage risk is retained by the public sector. Pending
contractual specifities, P3 contracts that use availability payments generally do not
require private partners to influence or bear any demand-related risks during a project’s
lifecycle.470
Thus, the allocation of market demand change risk is contingent on project
circumstances. It appears that market demand change’s ‘mostly private’ allocation
preference is justified to the extent that it is applied to projects where income risks and
operating risks are largely borne by the private sector (which is often the case for
Canadian P3s).
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For the majority of Canadian P3 projects, “in cases where… revenues of projects
have been forecast poorly, the private operator… and… its equity holders… have ‘skin in
the game.’” This is a key factor distinguishing P3s from conventional public procurement
methods.471 This study’s relevant membership functions for market demand change – i.e.
0.78 degrees towards ‘mostly private’ and 0.22 degrees towards ‘equally shared’ –
recognize its general private allocation while acknowledging that the degree to which
these risks are ‘shared’ is contingent on individual project circumstances. This result
echoes findings from the core literature database, where market demand change risk is
given

six

private

allocation

recommendations

and

two

‘shared’

allocation

recommendations.
6.9.8 Tariff Change
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 0.36; mMpri(CI) = 0.64; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
The risk of tariff change is closely linked to other market risks, such as income
risk, because it deals with the accuracy of revenue or cost projections associated with
market factors that are not ‘fixed.’ More specifically, tariff risk concerns the suitability
and flexibility of tariff design frameworks and their affect on future revenue streams.
Tariff change appears eight times in the core literature database, with seven ‘private’
allocation recommendations and one ‘shared’ allocation recommendation. Interestingly,
this considerably strong association between tariff change and private risk transfer is not
mirrored in this study’s questionnaire results. With a membership degree of 0.64 towards
‘mostly private’ and a 0.36 membership degree towards ‘equally shared,’ its proposed
degree of private allocation appears to be relatively weak.
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This study’s expert respondent pool may have opted for a more moderate form of
private allocation for tariff risk because tariff changes are conventionally steered by
governments and, accordingly, beyond the control of the private sector. While public
authorities retain the right to regulate tariff payments, P3 contracts can contain long-term
power purchase agreements between governments and SPVs where terms and conditions
applying to tariff payments on utilities are contractually outlined.472 Typically, these
contractual stipulations are covered under service charge fees “under certain caps and
predetermined rules for indexation.”473
In instances where tariff costs are regulated by the public authority, the risk of
tariff change – i.e. price variations impacting projected revenue – should be borne by the
government through some sort of indexation method. This method is typically applied to
already subsidized utilities under captive public markets where revenue levels are not
maximized (e.g. hydro rates). In instances where tariff costs are regulated under longterm power purchase agreements, the risk of tariff change should be borne by SPVs
alongside an agreed upon cap for the private sector. This method is typically applied to
projects where tariff rate variability is low and thus tariff rate projections are highly
certain.474
In light of the aforementioned considerations, this study’s weaker proposed
private allocation for tariff change remains sound, albeit with recognition of the fact that
the allocation of tariff risk is contingent on the tariff in question. Depending on individual
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project circumstances, certain tariffs may be privately allocated to a degree (e.g. with risk
caps) while others may be publicly allocated (e.g. alongside indexation).
6.9.9 Weather Conditions
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 0.42; mMpri(CI) = 0.58; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
For P3s, the risk of weather conditions affect day-to-day construction and
operation practices. Theoretically, weather conditions conducive to seamless construction
and operation practices present an ‘opportunity’ for risk bearers to work uninterrupted
(e.g. sunny days); abnormal weather conditions conducive to project delay or impairment
present a ‘threat’ for risk bearers (e.g. storms).
During pre-contractual PRM, public authorities and SPVs will identify these risks
and adopt optimal RMAs in response to potential weather-induced schedule delays and/or
facility damages. Recall from Chapter 4 that the four broad P3 RMA methods include:
avoiding, reducing, transferring, or accepting risks (see Figure 4.4). Weather conditions
are exogenous risk factors that private actors cannot influence. In Canada, however, they
are largely foreseeable, predictable, insurable, acceptable, and – to an extent – avoidable.
For instance, North American P3 partners will typically plan the construction of
crucial infrastructure during summer months to avoid schedule delays from unfavourable
weather conditions.475 Also, site drainage systems like storm water management ponds
are used frequently in Canada to prevent – or at least suppress – site flooding and erosion
from surface runoff during heavy rainfall. While Canada’s weather varies significantly,
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this variation is predictable due to seasonal climate patterns. Further, adverse weather
conditions in Canada are relatively mild in severity compared to other “extra-tropical
areas” like East Asia or the United States’ eastern coastline.476 Hence, the risk of adverse
weather conditions – or, in their most extreme form, ‘acts of God’ force majeure events –
are seldom an issue.
This study’s proposed private allocation for weather conditions – albeit weak –
echoes the findings of Chan et al., Hwang et al., Li et al., and Tolani. Both Hwang et al.
and Li et al. note that “natural risks” affecting the construction stage should be borne by
SPVs. 477 While public authorities may offer relief events tied to stipulated weather
conditions (e.g. force majeure), it is generally understood that private partners are
responsible for the “adequate provision [of]… reasonably foreseeable events such as bad
weather during the winter, and hence… [they] should not be excused for such delays.”478
Thus, a 0.58 ‘mostly private’ membership function alongside a smaller, yet significant,
0.42 ‘equally shared’ membership function appears sound.
6.9.10 Third Party Tort Liability
mSpub(CI) = 0.0; mMpub(CI) = 0.0; mES(CI) = 0.38; mMpri(CI) = 0.62; mSpri(CI) = 0.0.
As discussed in Chapter 4, an SPV accepts risks from the public sector through
first-step risk transfer, which is directly followed by second-step risk transfer to multiple
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JVs throughout its consortium. Once a JV bears a risk, it may transfer a sect of its own
risks to a third party subcontractor. This is referred to as ‘third-step risk transfer’ in
Chapter 4, Section 4.5.1.479 When a third party breaches its project obligations (i.e.
defaults risk back to the original risk sender), it poses financial consequences for its
original risk sender, which is usually a private partner under the SPV consortium. Private
parties will agree to accept this risk’s financial consequences “provided [they] can earn a
commensurate return for accepting them.”480
With a public sector mean score of 3.833 and a private sector mean score of
3.083, third party tort liability risk presents a statistically significant mean score
difference of 0.75. It is no surprise that private practitioners believe the private sector
should be able to share a large portion of third party risks with the public sector; private
partners have little direct influence over the ability of third parties to enact postcontractual PRM as expected. However, it is expected that private partners perform due
diligence on third parties they transfer risks to. Further, if private partners do transfer
risks to third parties, it is expected that they accept the trade-off between the potential
returns and losses with doing so.
Thus, it is important that third party subcontractors only accept risks they are
capable of bearing, just like JV private partners should only accept risks they are capable
of bearing – this rule applies to all steps of risk transfer. Of course, when third party
liability risks arise, contractual agreements do not preclude post-contractual renegotiation
479
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and mediation to account for project mishaps. For instance, the degree to which parties
are liable for risk defaults can still be legally disputed (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1).
Accordingly, third party tort liability risks may be shared when private partners prove: (i)
they are not at fault for these risks occurring and (ii) due diligence measures on the third
party in question were thorough and accurate despite of the third party’s contractual
breach of obligations. With this in mind, this study’s private allocation of third party risks
(i.e. mMpri[CI] = 0.62) – with an acknowledgement of their potential ‘shared’ dynamic (i.e.
mES[CI] = 0. 38) – appears sound.
6.10 Conclusion
Overall, there is significant agreement between sectors over allocation preferences
of the 27 ‘contentious’ P3 project risks identified in this study. It is important to point out
the six risks in Figure 6.14 that hold statistically significant sectorial disagreement
between mean ratings based on this study’s independent two-sample t-test and MannWhitney U test. These risks include: (i) expropriation and nationalization, (ii) changes in
industrial code of practice, (iii) site availability, (iv) supporting utilities risk, (v) third
party tort liability, and (vi) exclusive right/competition. Unsurprisingly, these risks make
up the highest six mean differences between sectors in this study.481
Together, these six risks average a mean sectorial difference of 1.042 on a fivepoint scale. To put the level of disagreement between these six risks in perspective, the
other 21 risks average a mean sectorial difference of 0.254 altogether. Because of their
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large respective mean score differences, the proposed allocation for the six risks with
statistically significant sectorial disagreement should be viewed with degrees of
skepticism and their allocation and mitigation strategies should be studied further in
future studies.482 As noted in Chapter 4, mutual agreement between sectors over the
preferred allocation of risk is seldom conclusive, hence the need for long negotiation
periods during the P3 tender phase, which can span years before a final contract is signed.
As noted in Chapter 5, the allocations of these 27 risks are not conclusive in the core
literature database.483 Thus, it is unsurprising that divisive stances are held between
sectors over the allocation of at least a portion of the risks studied.
However – despite these risks being deemed ‘contentious’ based on the core
literature review – according to Kendall’s W and Chi-squared tests, this study’s results
show a high degree of overall sectorial agreement over their allocation preferences. This
is an encouraging revelation; if ‘contentious’ risks have garnered a high amount of
sectorial agreement between public and private practitioners, it can be assumed that
‘sound’ risks would have garnered a high amount of sectorial allocation agreement as
well. Thus, scholars and practitioners alike can be optimistic that the main problem of the
principal-agent relationship between P3 partners – namely, aligning the motivations of
public authorities and private partners – is both manageable and achievable.
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CHAPTER 7
STUDY LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
7.1 Introduction
Chapter 6 highlights the many advantages – or rather, lack of disadvantages –
associated with this study’s methodology compared to previous studies with similar
scopes and focuses. Nonetheless, there are notable drawbacks to this study’s
methodology that must be acknowledged. As is the case with all social science, this
study’s literature reviews, theoretical framework, and research methodologies are all
subject to degrees of subjective selection. This includes a subjective selection of covered
P3 processes, a subjective selection of adopted stakeholder perspectives, a subjective
selection of data to study, and a subjective selection of tools used to analyze data.
Even the most exhaustive research projects will be faced with such selectivity
issues. While it is important to acknowledge such research limitations, it is more
important to assess their potential impact on findings so that future scholarly works
continue to be built on solid empirical foundations. The following paragraphs attempt to
acknowledge this study’s methodological and theoretical limitations to ensure that
relevant ‘gaps’ can be filled in future studies both descriptive and prescriptive in nature.
7.2 The Issue of Transparency
Scholar Dennis De Clerck notes that the P3 industry is “difficult to study from an
empirical angle due to the scarcity of data.”484 More specifically, the lack of contractual
transparency offered from public authorities and SPVs is a “regularly reoccurring” issue
484
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for scholars to overcome.485 This limitation extends to all forms of P3 research to some
degree, as even ex post evaluation studies of past projects suffer from limited access to
contractual frameworks and public-private PRM mechanisms.486 From a theoretical level,
the issue of transparency also poses accountability questions on the public sector
regarding how it treats the privatization of public resources through P3s. This issue will
be discussed in Section 7.4.
The issue of contractual transparency, which is repeatedly mentioned in Chapter
4, is an obstructive factor that limits research “into the human aspects of the procurement
process” that practitioners face.487 To combat this barrier, this study utilizes the feedback
of an expert research network to illuminate the industry’s current state of practice in
Canada (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1). Of course, the usefulness of expert input is
limited to how research is conducted (i.e. data retrieval, aggregation, calculation, and
application).
7.3 Methodological Limitations
This structure of this study’s questionnaire, the calculations applied to its results,
and the structure of its proposed risk allocation decision model all present respective
methodological limitations that must be addressed to ensure such limitations are
considered, or at least acknowledged, in future studies of the same nature. The most
contentious limitation, perhaps, is the use of parametric analysis on ordinal data.
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7.3.1 The Assumed Equidistance between Ordinal Data Points
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the use of mean score methods on semantic
differential scales necessitates the interval treatment of ordinal data. It is commonplace
in academic literature to analyze scaled ordinal data under the incorrect assumption that
distances between ordinal points are equal. Further, researchers seldom acknowledge this
methodological mishap when it occurs in literature.488
For example, in this study’s five-point semantic differential scale, data points 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5 have a clear rank order, but by computing sample mean scores and standard
deviations for these ordinal points, an illegitimate assumption must be made that the
difference between points 2 and 3 (i.e. ‘mostly public’ and ‘equally shared’) are the same
as the difference between points 3 and 4 (i.e. ‘equally shared’ and ‘mostly private’).489
Because “the differences between any two consecutive [points on ordinal] scales [do not]
reflect equal differences in the variable[s] measured,” parametric methods that assume
their equidistance are inappropriately applied.490
Literature that criticizes the treatment of ordinal scales as interval tends to focus
on Likert scales, where a range of response categories is used to gauge respondent
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attitudes towards a question or statement. In a five-point Likert scale where the first
ordinal point represents ‘strongly agree,’ for example, the fifth ordinal point would reflect
its bipolar attitude, ‘strongly disagree.’ However, the intervals between these two points –
which separate them between points 2, 3, and 4 – are loosely defined in such a way that it
is illegitimate to use fractions, decimals, or any procedure involving mean scores and
standard deviations for integers, because the space between these integers cannot be
quantifiably measured with certainty.
Because there are degrees of arbitrary selection over the values of ordinal data
points and the values between ordinal data points, ordinal scales are not technically suited
for parametric tests that assume the equidistance of their integers. Consider the point of
Kuzon et al.:
Just as it is invalid to rank the results of a given surgical procedure as poor,
fair, good, or excellent and state that the average result is ‘fair and a half,’ it
is invalid to rate those same outcomes as 1, 2, 3, or 4 and state that the
average result is 2.5.491
Here, Kuzon et al. are saying that the average of ‘fair’ and ‘good’ cannot be
displayed as ‘fair-and-a-half’ even when there are integers assigned to represent ‘fair’ and
‘good.’ Similarly, it is invalid to use a half-adjusting scale to rate a P3 project risk with a
mean value of 2.5 as ‘mostly public.’ In response to this problem, this study utilizes
membership degrees towards membership functions over an adjusted scale, which allows
variables to be rated over a ‘fuzzy range’ (e.g. between 2 and 3) in lieu of an arbitrary
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‘crisp value’ (e.g. 2.5) between categorical sections that are each allotted 0.8 units of
space on a five-point scale.
On their own, ordinal ranges succumb to the same theoretical limitations as ordinal
crisp values; the LCL and UCL of each confidence interval still lands over the technically
unquantifiable space between ordinal integer points. Further, terms like ‘publicness’ and
‘privateness’ are imprecise linguistic labels that cannot be clearly defined as intervals.
Accordingly, the ‘public’ or ‘private’ value of an integer cannot be assumed, let alone the
area separating it from neighbouring integers.
However, by using these ranges to prescribe membership degrees from 0-1 towards
membership functions mSpub, mMpub, mES, mMpri, and mSpri, data can be assessed in relation to
its strength of association towards discrete, ordinal variables. This method captures the
details that go into parametric statistics – albeit invalidly applied – without providing
crisp interval values (e.g. 2.5) for ordinal data. In other words, while this study relies on
invalid input by using mean score methods, its output runs more consistent with ordinal
methods of measurement, which typically use the “frequencies/percentages of response[s]
in each category.”492 In this study: (i) membership degrees are equated with the projected
frequency or percentage of responses given by a sample pool’s population, and (ii)
membership functions are equated with each ordinal category.493
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7.3.2 The Assumed Equivalue of Ordinal Data Points
When assuming equidistance between ordinal points on a five-point scale, it is
also easy to overlook the assumed equivalue of these ordinal points in relation to each
variable they are assessing. It is now understood that, in this study, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are
assumed to represent a public-private spectrum demarcated by equidistant ranges
between integers. However, it should also be considered that 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are assumed
to apply to all 27 contentious P3 risks universally. This issue also has to do with the
contentious treatment of ordinal data as interval or ratio data.494
Consider, for example, a five-point ratio scale measuring the length of different
insects in centimeters. It is clear that an insect that is 2.5 centimeters long is half the
length of an insect that is 5 centimeters long – this is due to a legitimate equidistance
between data points. Not only are the data points on a ratio scale equidistant, but they
also retain equivalue in relation to all variables they measure (e.g. whether a measured
variable is one centimeter or a million centimeters, the size of a ‘centimeter’ always
remains stagnant).
Because of the aforementioned issue of assigning non-quantifiable – or inexact –
integer values to ordinal points, the assumed stagnant – or universal – relationship
between this study’s five-point scale and each of its P3 project risks is invalid. The
question of assumed ordinal equivalue is really a subset of assumed ordinal equidistance,
but it merits discussion on its own for one main reason – while both questions stem from
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the same essential assumption, the question of data point equivalue directly confronts the
problem of transferability between this study’s five-point scale and its variables.
Unlike centimeters, ordinal risk allocation categories do not equally apply to
variables they assess. For instance, a proposed ‘solely public’ allocation for force majeure
risk has a higher potential impact cost to the government than a proposed ‘solely public’
allocation for weather conditions risk. Thus, where this study provides a proposed risk
allocation decision model based on risk relationships to membership functions, these
membership functions apply differently to different risks. The assumed universal value
for this study’s five-point scale in relation to each of the 27 contentious P3 risks is a
limitation that could be mitigated by adjusting the allocation model to incorporate each
risk’s: (i) probability of occurrence and (ii) potential project impact or cost.
Together, these risk factors could be used to arrive at a ‘risk significance’ level
where: “Risk Significance = Risk Probability × Risk Impact.” Chan et al.’s study includes
‘risk significance’ by finding each risk’s “probability of occurrence and severity…
[through a] five-point Likert scale… [where] 1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = average, 4 =
high, and 5 = very high.” 495 However, Chan et al. assess each risk’s calculated
‘significance’ and each risk’s allocation preference separately. By considering both in
relation to one another, the ‘significance’ of risks could be used to gauge how they would
affect the sectors associated with them. As mentioned in Chapter 4, risk probability of
occurrence and potential project impact are two critical considerations that affect P3
PRM and selected RMAs – including risk allocation.
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7.3.3 Points of Consideration from Expert Respondents
The participation criterion for this study is considered sound; it is assumed that all
questionnaire respondents are qualified to provide information into the aforementioned
‘human aspects’ of P3 procurement from their respective areas of expertise. As is usually
the case with all questionnaire studies, a larger respondent pool would have been
beneficial to the project. More specifically, ranges derived from each risk’s LCL and
UCL could have been analyzed from a higher confidence level with a larger sample – it is
hypothesized that each risk’s CI would have been shorter and thus more accurate.
The very last section of the questionnaire posed an optional question to
respondents asking them to provide additional points of consideration that could not be
made with the semantic differential scale. This question was framed to direct respondents
towards offering ‘context dependent’ insights that may affect the treatment of certain
risks due to the ‘situatedness’ of P3s. A common point, first brought up by esteemed P3
practitioner Mike Marasco, was that P3 risk allocation is a largely circumstantial
endeavor.496 While there are certain PRM ‘trends’ and patterns in the field over risk
allocation, individual project circumstances determine specific risk allocation models.
Despite their popularity, P3 risk allocation studies cannot account for nuanced details.497
Other respondents echoed the same point in more specific ways. Will McDonald,
Chief Procurement Officer at the City of Ottawa, noted that the allocation of some of the
questionnaire’s risks was contingent on specific contract negotiations – where risks can
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be properly identified and appropriately costed. Mark Liedemann, who now occupies
Mike Marasco’s former VP position at Partnerships BC, noted that the allocation of some
risk undergoes planned changes over the course of a project’s lifecycle. Liedemann cites
inflation risk as an example, which he says should be ‘solely private’ during construction
phases and ‘solely public’ during operations phases for typical P3 DBFOM projects.498
Brenda Liegler, Contract Innovations Engineer at the MTO, notes that this
questionnaire’s general approach towards risk allocation made it difficult to ‘be
definitive’ over the allocation of risks for which there may be ‘extenuating
circumstances.’ For example, she notes that project approvals and permits risk is often
‘solely public,’ but this risk can be affected by the activities of the private partner (i.e. the
private partner can impact the public authority’s ability to obtain project approvals or
permits). In such instances, even with contractual allocation to the public sector, the
private partner may be responsible for bearing risks associated with the public retrieval of
project approvals and permits.499
Peter Bullen, Project Director at EllisDon Capital, also believes this study could
have benefited from a narrowed scope of focus. For example, Bullen notes that the risk of
project design and construction changes should be borne by the private sector when
infrastructure does not meet standards set out in a contract’s performance specifications;
yet, if government changes its DB specifications post-contractually, risks associated with
design/construction changes should be borne by the public sector. He also adds that
498
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market demand change risk should be mostly or solely borne by the private sector if
payments are toll-based, while these risks should be solely borne by the public sector if
payments are availability-based. Both of these points are recognized in Chapter 6,
Sections 6.8.9 and 6.9.7, respectively.
7.3.4 Narrowing Research Scope
In response to these claims, among others, future studies concerned with project
risk allocation in Canadian P3 projects should develop more specific subjects of study.
The scope of future studies could be narrowed by providing specific context to their
questionnaires. For example, scholars could focus on the allocation of risk for specific
projects through ex post studies, garnering expert input over the justification for risk
allocation selections and procedures. This type of research also benefits PRM literature
because it allows for scholars to reflect on the post-contractual management of risk, citing
where ex ante expectations and ex post actualities align and, more importantly, where
they fail to align.500
Future research that does not focus on individual P3 projects may still benefit
from selecting an industry of focus. Many studies are not confined to particular
industries. For those that are, the transportation sector remains a heavily predominant
topic of interest. Other areas of interest include: education, energy, healthcare, housing,
national defence, waste management, and water provision.501 By honing in on a particular
industry, researchers will be able to access more specialized knowledge pertaining to
500
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specific sectors of interest and also find risk allocation patterns that may be unique to a
given industry. For example, Chapter 6, Section 6.9.8 notes that tariff risks for already
subsidized public utilities, like hydro, are generally borne by governments.
7.3.5 Questionnaire Methods
For P3 risk allocation studies that utilize expert input via questionnaire, the
Delphi method is already commonly used to allow respondents to modify their original
answers, taking into account the selection preferences made by their peers. Both Hwang
et al. and Ke et al. utilize a two-round Delphi survey to allow their expert respondents to
refine original risk allocation preferences, which in turn promotes more deliberation over
the treatment of each risk. Delphi surveys can contain optional records of ‘why’ certain
respondents made the original selections they did, thus allowing respondents to reflect on
previously unconsidered points in subsequent Delphi rounds.502
Delphi questionnaires promote the convergence of varying values held between
different respondents. After reviewing some of the additional points of consideration
offered by respondents in Section 7.3.3, it is clear that this study could have benefited
from this type of indirect correspondence between respondents. This may have changed
respondent selection preferences – albeit marginally – but the changes would have been
based on informed consideration. The Delphi method may have also promoted higher
agreement levels between sectors over the six aforementioned risks that did not pass the
independent two-sample t-test or the Mann Whitney U test (i.e. the risks that showed
statistically significant disagreement between sectors over their allocation).
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Finally, contextual additions to the definitions of risks provided in the
questionnaire would have addressed many of the respondent pool’s points of
consideration. While it is understood that respondents assumed a DBFOM P3 model
when answering questions over each risk, some risks were still too broad to definitively
allocate. For example, a few respondents have noted that risks regarding project
approvals and permits are regularly shared – defining which type of approvals and
permits should be allocated to either sector would have made it easier for respondents to
be more definitive in their answers.
Conversely, some risks included in this questionnaire were too contextually
specific in that they disregarded scenarios that would have influenced the respondent
pool’s allocation preferences. In this study, for example, residual value risk is considered
as the risk of public authorities receiving impaired assets from the private sector upon
return of ownership at the end of a P3 concession period. However, residual value risk
also applies to the devaluation of a facility that is not impaired. Generally, the former is
denoted with a more private risk allocation than the latter.503 The omission of the latter
consideration from this study undoubtedly influenced respondents over the allocation of
residual value risk.
7.3.6 Specifities of Risk Matrices
Risk matrices are mechanisms used by both governments and private parties to
assist in the pre-contractual PRM process. They are usually simple and qualitative in
scope, whereby parties gauge the degree to which: (i) risks have a probability of
occurrence and potential for impact and (ii) risks should be allocated to a party based on
503
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proposed RMAs. This study – along with the other questionnaire-based studies performed
by Chan et al., Hwang et al., Ke et al., Li et al., and Tolani – utilizes its expert
questionnaire input to propose a risk allocation decision model (i.e. a simplified risk
matrix). While P3 risks matrices are widely used by scholars and practitioners alike, it is
important to acknowledge their limited application value for both parties.
Ng and Loosemore note that scholarly risk allocation schemes have a modest
application value to the P3 industry because they contain broad categories of risk and –
due to their situated nature – “every [P3] projects has a different array of risks, which
need to be thoroughly analy[z]ed and understood.” Further, risk allocation is highly
contingent on the risk bearing capabilities – and resources – of parties, which “can vary
considerably” between projects. Finally, these risk allocation models are static; such
schemes do not account for the fact that RMA models can change considerably over a P3
project’s lifecycle during post-contractual PRM.504
In conclusion, because of their “simplified form, [risk matrices] can misrepresent
the actual allocation of risk accomplished by both the structure and detail of the [P3]
contract.” For example, where risks are denoted with a ‘shared’ allocation preference
between public and private partners, risk matrices provide little detail regarding the
intricacies of sharing such risks.505 With these considerations in mind, the VDTF notes
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that a project’s “contract and… structure, not the matrix, are the tools by which risk
allocation is achieved.”506
Unfortunately, it is difficult for scholars to obtain transaction-specific agreements
made behind the closed doors of P3 negotiations. Thus, scholars are continually limited
in obtaining empirical data to propose risk allocation decision models via risk matrices.
One means of mitigating this issue, but not circumventing it completely, is to conduct ex
post analyses of P3 projects where public authorities can provide public documents tied
to contractual agreements for the public to view. Albeit, such documents will not reflect
project terms and conditions to the same degree as final contracts, but they will allow
scholars to develop more specific risk allocation decision models based on the PRM
measures adopted over the course of specific P3 projects.
7.4 Theoretical Limitations
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the majority of P3 literature – whether focusing on
the positives and negatives of P3s, the key ex post success factors of P3s, or risk
identification, assessment, and allocation, among others – adopts a public stakeholder
perspective either implicitly or explicitly. Due to the aforementioned issue of contractual
transparency, in which projects are mired in secrecy, “significantly less studies… solely
focus on the private side of… agreement… [because] private empirical data are scare and
the SPVs are often reluctant to share information about their strategies.” Even less
attention is paid to third party subcontracting, where an SPV’s JVs delegate tasks through
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third-step risk transfer. De Clerck notes that, nevertheless, “the public-private
relationship… is a well-studied perspective.”507
More often than not – however – even when scholars adopt a public-private
stakeholder perspective, they implicitly adopt public-sector bias in their analysis.
Scholars associate government losses with project losses, evaluating PRM processes and
RMA decisions through the lens of the public sector. For example, despite explicitly
adopting a public-private stakeholder perspective, Li et al.’s questionnaire-based study on
risk allocation states that their research findings “should enable public sector clients to
establish more efficient risk allocation frameworks.”508 It is unsurprising that scholars are
charitable towards the public sector. After all, governments are meant to be a reflection of
the general public’s greater interests. Therein lies the rub, however – scholars should not
assume that governments act in accordance with the general public’s interests merely
because that is their purpose.
This is not to say that scholars do not criticize government management of P3
transactions (e.g. strategic behaviour leading to optimism bias and adverse selection). In
fact, there are several that repeatedly do. 509 However, such acknowledgements are
generally confined to studies or commentaries where government criticisms are the focal
point of consideration. For studies that consider P3 risk allocation from a public-private
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stakeholder perspective, principal-agent issues like moral risk are often not accounted
for.510 When they are accounted for, these issues are generally denoted with the private
sector when scholars implicitly adopt a public stakeholder perspective. This portion of P3
literature still recognizes principal-agent issues like moral hazards and asymmetric
information sharing, but only to the extent that private partners can affect governments
through strategic or pernicious behaviour.511
The scholarly tendency towards adopting a public stakeholder perspective, at least
explicitly, is not the issue at hand. The issue is doing so without acknowledging that the
respective ‘gains and losses’ of government do not necessary align with the gains and
losses of taxpayers. Both are distinct actors with distinct motivations. Recall from
Chapter 3 that P3s are fundamentally documents governed by principal-agent
relationships. This implies a relationship between two main parties: the public principals
and the private agents. There is a third dynamic to this relationship, however, that
Chapter 3, and a large portion of P3 literature, fails to consider – citizens themselves.
Taxpayers are an important party involved in the P3 transaction – they are the
very reason public infrastructure is procured to begin with. By implicitly aligning their
gains and losses alongside those of public stakeholders, scholars can fail to recognize that
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governments are capable of opportunism and strategic behaviour themselves. More
importantly, when governments employ strategic practices, it can be against taxpayers
themselves, not just SPVs. Hence, the final limitation of this study – as well as the final
recommendation for future researchers – is theoretical in nature: the public sector and its
taxpayers must be demarcated as separate P3 players, even when assessing risk allocation
from a public-private stakeholder perspective.
7.4.1 Public-Choice Approach to Agency Theory
In the same vein as this thesis, Tolani – whose research is part of this study’s core
literature review – also: (i) notes the principal-agent relationship between public
authorities and SPVs and (ii) utilizes an expert questionnaire to extract data on risk
allocation preferences using psychometrics. However, Tolani also finds that, depending
on the theoretical framework used to analyze P3s, public authorities can be viewed as
principals and agents:
Theoretically, in P[3]s, the private firm is an agent for the public
organization, in providing a piece of infrastructure, and the public
organization is an agent for the consumers, who finance the public
organization through taxes and fees. Thus, the public organization is
accountable to the customers of its own agent. It, therefore, has a
responsibility to ensure that the agent acts in the best interests of the
consumers.512
This perception of the principal-agent relationship between public authorities, SPVs, and
consumers is significant because it highlights a reality that is often ignored in P3
literature – regardless of contractual allocations, P3s are ultimately accountable to the
general public.
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Remember from Chapter 3, general principles of agency theory adopt the
assumption that both principals and agents are self-interested actors – both seek to
maximize their utility. Thus, when their agendas do not align, their cooperation may be
compromised. While much of Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the problem of aligning private
agent interests with public principals, both chapters – along with the majority of P3
literature – ignore the fact that public authorities are agents to the general public. More
specifically, both chapters ignore the fact that a public authority’s interests may not
always align with the general public’s interests.513 This previously unconsidered issue
coalesces agency theory principles with public-choice theory principles.
Reverting back to Chapter 3’s introductory paragraph, neoclassical economics is
credited as the predominant field from which many P3 theory frameworks hold their
roots. Because P3s operate simultaneously under a political, social, and economic realm,
they stand to benefit from assessment under a neoclassical economic framework that
includes political, social, and economic theory. Public-choice theory, also referred to as a
“neoclassical theory of politics,” is a strand of neoclassical economic theory that adopts
the same principle assumption as agency theory: “the assumption of egoistic
rationality.” 514 Rui Sousa Monteiro notes that, from a public-choice perspective, P3
players are self-interested and self-motivated. When assessing principal-agent
relationships through public-choice theory, scholars recognize: (i) that the government’s
interests may not always align with their principals – i.e. taxpayers – and (ii) that
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taxpayers have little influence in aligning government agent interests with their own
principal interests.515
By hierarchically demarcating taxpayers and governments via agency theory,
Tolani recognizes taxpayers as distinct principal actors that should, theoretically, hold
self-interested government agents accountable for their actions.516 However, taxpayers
experience a comparatively larger separation between ownership and control with
governments than governments experience with SPVs. 517 Thus, the potential for
principal-agent issues between taxpayers and public authorities is expounded. In theory,
taxpayers are “owners” (principals) and governments are “managers” (agents). 518 In
practice, however, government officials – as self-interested agents – can go unchecked in
adopting strategic behaviour. This leaves room for moral hazards to ensue.
To demonstrate the potential for public authorities to employ strategic behaviour
– as agents – against taxpayers during P3 procurement projects, Monteiro cites economist
William Nordhaus’ public-choice research on political business cycles. Nordhaus
“assumes myopic voters, and sees politicians as having no long-term view and as anxious
to maximize short term re-election prospects.” Politicians, being self-interested agents
acting on behalf of the general public, “present a utility that is a function of both the
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public interest and [their] own personal interests.” 519 From a public-choice perspective,
public policy decisions can be mired in personal interests issues with politicians,
bureaucrats, and private practitioners that seek to maximize power or profits – even at the
expense of accruing future public debt at a suboptimal rate.
According to public-choice theory, opportunism can harm public sector PRM in
two broad ways: first, from the standard opportunistic behaviour of politicians, who are
“looking for the benefits they can get from being in power”;520 second, from politicians
with a “willingness to work for the benefit of the population, but who, having [little]
statesperson profile… perceive voters as short-memory myopic people, and so cannot
stop considering the coming elections (and not the future of the country) as the main
goal.”521 Monteiro especially considers the latter factor in assessing public sector PRM
for P3s. He adopts a Nordhausian approach to the political-cycle and notes its affects on
the ‘authenticity’ of public sector PRM for infrastructure procurement.
Public-choice theory dictates that the political-cycle can affect political behaviour
because politicians face annual budgetary constraints while simultaneously being
expected to produce services and infrastructure for the general public. As self-interested
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agents, politicians are most concerned with voters’ perceptions of them, especially during
upcoming election periods. In an effort to maximize the probability of winning elections,
they may “launch all public projects that present benefits for the users, even without
financial resources to do so.” Because of public deficits and debts, politicians can utilize
P3s as a short-term means of circumventing budgetary constraints while providing
additional infrastructural services. This general issue of the political-cycle puts a
premium on delivering projects through private financing (i.e. P3s), even at the expense
of optimal “production allocations.”522
For example, a project might achieve better allocative efficiency in the long-term
when procured through a conventional procurement model than through a P3 DBFOM
model – due to factors like avoiding expensive competitive selection and tender processes
– but, because the conventional model would require immediate public financing, the
proposed project may seem more viable in the short-term when procured through a
privately financed P3. If political emphasis is placed on ensuring P3 procurement is
adopted for a particular project, P3 screening and PSC stages may be compromised and
tailored to present VFM for P3s regardless of what is the optimal choice.523
7.4.2 Holding the Taxpayer’s Agent Accountable
Regarding the authenticity of the public sector’s VFM assessments, Hodge and
Greve claim “it is difficult to obtain clear evidence… in the absence of an accurate and
uncontroversial public sector comparator.” They claim PSCs may suffer from optimism
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bias “and are qualified to the extent that [public] managers may have aimed to report
cost-saving… for political reasons, knowing that outcomes for long-term contracts are
always uncertain.” 524 Regarding the United Kingdom’s PFI, which has encouraged P3esque practices for decades, scholars George Monbiot and Jean Shaoul have been openly
critical of government PSCs and VFM appraisals. Shaoul also notes the aforementioned
issue of transparency – she cites a general lack of contractual transparency for P3s
preventing in-depth evaluations for projects.525
Monbiot charged the government with failing to uphold the interests of its
citizens, labeling P3s as “public fraud and false accounting… commissioned and directed
by the Treasury.”526 Shaoul's most peculiar evidence for biased VFM methodology cites
multiple cases where PSCs present a VFM case for P3s mainly on the base of risk
transfer, but – “ironically” – these cases rest on almost the exact amount of risk transfer
needed to ‘tip the balance’ for P3 procurement in lieu of conventional models. She also
cites scandals over the refinancing of P3 arrangements where taxpayers have borne risks
defaulted from the private sector back to the government.527 These criticisms appear
bolstered by the fact that specialized crown corporations, like Partnerships BC, influence
public policy initiatives, creating “a need for clearer separation of policy advocacy from
the stewardship responsibilities of public funds.”528
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In situations where P3s would show ‘authentic’ VFM over conventional
procurement models, it is not guaranteed that the public sector’s main priorities are
optimal risk and resource allocation (i.e. in lieu of pushing to get projects into motion).
Thus, public sector PRM during P3 tender phases may suffer: “politicians may reduce
their concerns with project assessment and assume that more important than selecting the
best projects is delivering the maximum number of projects.”529 For instance, government
officials can be guilty of optimism bias in selecting RMAs for risks with a preferred
proponent regardless of if SPVs adopt strategic behaviour or not.530 Flyvberg et al. make
a bold claim:
Underestimation today is in the same order of magnitude as it was 10, 30,
and 70 years ago. If techniques and skills for estimating and forecasting
costs of transportation infrastructure projects have improved over time,
this does not show in the data. No learning seems to take place in this
important and highly costly sector of public and private decision making…
Strong incentives and weak disincentives for underestimation may have
taught… that cost underestimation pays off.531
The authors provide several explanations for predicaments of this vein, where risks are
identified and acknowledged but continually underestimated. Of note in this chapter is
their criticism of public officials, whose mismanagement of risk transfer may be
premised on biased forecasts. Flyvberg et al. argue that both politicians and political
529
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consultants share an inclination for downplaying the expected costs of large public
infrastructure procurement and overplaying expected revenue projections with the goal of
increasing the prospect of obtaining legal authorization for projects.532
7.4.3 Increased Transparency and Accountability: A Recommendation for All
It is difficult to take a definitive stance on the validity of VFM-based arguments
for P3s, both nationally and internationally, in the absence of transparent, uncontroversial
PSCs. This rings especially true if cost-savings and successes are reported for political
reasons due to strategic behaviour or optimism bias. Perhaps this is why P3s are subject
to displays of remarkably juxtaposing commentary. The Canadian model of P3s has been
dubbed “one of the most successful in the world” by Hellowell.533 On the other hand,
Louise Bowman candourously described Canadian P3s – which are also referred to as
PPPs – as a “Problem, Problem, Problem.”534
It is not the purpose of this chapter to criticize the P3 procurement process. In
fact, there is strong evidence both domestically and abroad that, when risks are
transferred optimally and successfully, P3s deliver infrastructure on time and on budget
with significant design innovations from the private sector.535 For a summary of the main
benefits P3s can provide to Canadian taxpayers, refer to Figure 1.1.
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What is at stake, however, is the question of government accountability towards
taxpayers under their principal-agent relationship. It is important to study and research
the allocation and subsequent management of P3 risk through a public-choice perspective
that acknowledges agency theory’s ties to both public-private and public-taxpayer
relations. If scholars adopt such theory frameworks, they can research the P3
procurement process – e.g. P3 screenings, VFM measures, PRM strategies, and RMA
methods – holistically, considering all relevant stakeholders involved.
Where public agents do not enact strategic behaviour, the issue of transparency –
and an overall scarcity of accessible data – still remains. Stewardship of public officials
on behalf of taxpayer interests should demand governments address this “evaluation
deficit” so scholars can study primary data instead of, for instance, questionnaire input.536
Scholars attempt to circumvent this issue through Freedom of Information requests, but
governments can still withhold crucial documentation when presented with them.537 In
fact, “in Canada, most freedom of information legislation does not apply to public-private
partnerships.”538
Thus, even when scholars recognize the distinction between adopting a public
stakeholder perspective and a taxpayer stakeholder perspective, their studies will be
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limited to the degree governments cooperate with them. A redeeming sanction to this
issue may be found in the form of independent government auditors like the OAG.
However, even independent auditors of federal and provincial governments face
challenges to their core functions as watchdogs. In the words of Bruce Doern, the OAG is
“an indispensible part of the accountability chain. However… the OAG… delicate[ly]
balance[s] between its media-related public persona as the taxpayers’ white knight and its
private day-to-day need to gain trust from dozens of government departments.”539
This internal contradiction is one of several limitations to the OAG’s role as a
watchdog – the most important being its limited ability to affect the mismanagement of
public resources. Michael Ferguson, Canada’s current Auditor General, recently cited the
OAG’s limited impact on the Federal Government of Canada in light of its continual
failure to act on repeated OAG recommendations: “Our audits come across the same
problems in different organizations time and time again. Even more concerning is that,
when we come back to audit the same area again, we often find that program results have
not improved.”540 In the same vein as this chapter, Ferguson has relayed the question:
“What about programs that are managed to accommodate the people running them rather
than the people receiving the services?” Further, he states that the Federal Government is
guilty of issuing “public accountability reports that fail to provide a full and clear picture
of what is going on.”541
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Increased principal-agent cooperation between governments and taxpayers is no
small feat. As previously mentioned, the ambiguous role of public authorities – as agents
to the taxpayer and principals to the private sector – presents governments with a special
conflict of interest. They must advocate policies, develop economies, and regulate private
DBFOM, all while acting as elected representatives of the public interest. Hodge and
Greve neatly summarize the aforementioned detractors from a healthy principal-agent
relationship between taxpayers and governments, most of which impede scholars from
accessing crucial data:
… the unavailability of project economic evaluations, the fact that most
deals are two-way affairs between governments and business without
explicitly including citizens… the apparent willingness to protect investor
returns rather than the public interest, the lack of clarity of commercial
arrangements, and the desire of governments to proceed with hasty project
construction for political purposes all appear to contribute to this
conclusion.542
Because of the aforementioned considerations, scholarly acknowledgment of the
unique principal-agent role governments play in P3s is not enough to bypass contractual
secrecy issues. Scholars will continue to face problems retrieving empirical data for the
study of P3 risk allocation and P3 PRM as a whole. The only foreseeable means of fixing
this issue at large is to change legislation frameworks to account for transparency issues.
Thus, this thesis’ theoretical recommendations apply not only to scholars, but P3
practitioners themselves – particularly public officials, whose PSCs, VFM assessments,
and contractual arrangements are criticized for lacking transparency and, at times,
disingenuously promoting the interests of taxpayers. P3s require good governance after
all, and good government – if anything – is an effective and accountable government.
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7.5 Conclusion
This thesis provides both descriptive and prescriptive passages on the P3
procurement process. Its literature reviews: (i) summarize the main stages of P3
procurement, (ii) provide theoretical frameworks to assess risk and stakeholder
motivations, (iii) explain project risk management methodologies, and (iv) cross-examine
risk allocation literature to arrive at a catalogue of ‘contentious’ P3 project risks. Its study
presents findings on the risk allocation preferences of P3 practitioners through an expert
research network split evenly between the public and private sector. Its final risk
allocation decision model, based on privileged industry insight, is provided in Figure
6.14. The risk allocation recommendations this thesis offers would benefit from
inspection with reference to past industrial risk allocation schemes in order to validate its
claims. Further, risks with statistically significant sectorial disagreement should be
studied more in depth.
Both the research’s subject matter and methodology are applicable to a wide array
of academic disciplines. This work contributes to infrastructure procurement literature in
general, particularly PRM literature concerning P3 and P3-esque infrastructure projects
(e.g. AFP and PFI models). P3 PRM literature tends towards merely empirical studies
without reference to theoretical frameworks. This thesis’ theoretical dimension provides
an explanatory function for both: (i) the separate motivations of public and private
partners over the treatment of risk and (ii) the restrictive regulations that govern
contractual agreements, which are mired in secrecy. While this acknowledgment alone
does not circumvent the issue of data scarcity, it does highlight areas where industry
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standards can improve to promote cooperation and transparency between all relevant P3
players under a principal-agent relationship, including taxpayers.
This thesis’ relevant subject matter and methodology need not be confined to the
broad parameters typically denoted with P3 risk allocation literature. Other scholars who
focus on P3 PRM – and risk allocation in particular – should consider narrowing the
scope of future questionnaires to develop more refined and specific risk allocation
decision models that focus on particular P3 delivery models, sectors of interests, stages of
lifecycles, or individual projects. This, in turn, would provide more conclusive results
when presenting proposed risk allocation decision models.
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